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ABSTRACT
FORMS OF JUSTICE:
THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROCEDURAL IN THE ERA OF DUE PROCESS
Sara Sligar
Jed Esty

This dissertation identifies and characterizes the literary genre of the “legal
procedural”—a genre of cultural production that represents individuals’ passage through
the criminal justice system, especially the jury trial. It argues that the genre formula
became codified in the mid-20th-century United States in connection with the criminal
rights movement or “due process revolution,” which nationally standardized many
aspects of criminal procedure. Focusing on the years between 1930 and 1970, the
dissertation explores how judicial and statutory changes, racial tensions, media-specific
censorship patterns, and changing media ecologies contributed to the legal procedural’s
increased popularity and formulaicism.
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INTRODUCTION

On a warm and rainy day in November 2015, I walked into the Justice Juanita
Kidd Stout Center for Criminal Justice to observe a homicide trial. Known until 2014 as
the Philadelphia Criminal Justice Center, the Center is a tall, modern building. It sits
kitty-corner from Philadelphia City Hall and therefore lies at the intersection of the axes
that, when William Penn designed Philadelphia as his “Holy Experiment” in the late
seventeenth century, divided the city into four mirror-image quadrants. Inside, past the
metal detectors and the bag scanners, the building is filled with identical courtrooms with
identical cherry wood finishings and identical ambient lighting. The halls are populated
by lawyers pulling carts full of files, security officers, witnesses, and jury members being
led around in lines like children on a kindergarten field trip, forbidden from talking to
strangers. The tile floors are polished to a high gleam. The Center is in many respects
indistinguishable from any number of courthouses across the country.
I was at the Center to complete a courtroom observation for a class I was taking at
the University of Pennsylvania Law School. I had been to the Center once before, for jury
duty. I had spent that day in what was essentially a large lecture hall. People called for
jury duty were checked in, sat down, surveyed to discover any underlying biases against
police, lawyers, doctors. Then we were put in a jury pool that would then go in and plug
the hole for whatever trial needed a jury of peers. The location of this hole was constantly
changing: motions would be granted, witnesses would go missing, judges would be late,
and the trial that would have been scheduled for 10 a.m. would be moved to 1 p.m., or 2
p.m., or next week. I was temporarily assigned to the jury pools for several of these cases,
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then switched out before we even left the room. Late in the afternoon, after spending five
hours reading Graham Greene at a tiny school desk, I was called up for another jury,
which was not canceled. My group was led up and down various floors, repeatedly lined
up and counted off, and then finally put into a courtroom. The jury was filled before I
was selected, and I went home with a check for $9 in my pocket, barely enough to cover
the cost of lunch. That had been my first and, until this day in 2015, my only experience
in a courthouse.
Jury duty had given me the impression that everyone’s movements in the
courthouse were carefully orchestrated. But now, here for my observation, once I made it
through security, I was at a loss for where to go. We had only been told that we had to do
an observation of a criminal case; any one would do. I asked a court officer how I could
observe a homicide trial, and he gave me a Post-It note listing the two courtrooms
handling murder cases that day. I chose the second one because the elevators were full
and the other case was three floors higher. It was all random. When I slid into the
benches at the back of the courtroom, the prosecutor had just begun his opening
argument. The defendant had been accused of shooting a man after a marijuana deal gone
bad had led to a fistfight. No eyewitness testified to seeing the shooting, although the lead
witness for the prosecution had also been shot; there had been a scuffle and
pandemonium, after which the injured man saw the defendant climbing over the fence
with a colorful gun tucked in his waistband.
I listened with interest. I had recently begun work on this dissertation, and so
although the course assignment was simply to observe, I had a secret secondary hope,
which was that at some point in the days-long trial, someone would obliquely reference
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some fictional legal procedural. It seemed plausible, even likely. But I had also told
myself this was too positivist a demand. So I was surprised and (perhaps inappropriately,
considering the venue) delighted when, fewer than five minutes after I sat down, the
prosecutor addressed the jury: “Remember, this is real life. Don’t come in here thinking
this is an episode of Law and Order or CSI.” Then the floor was turned over to the
defense, and the public defender described the forthcoming forensics testimony as “CSIlike,” in that the expert would “have a lot of props” that the jury should ignore.
Neither the prosecution nor the defense wanted the jury to think of the
proceedings as a television show. Yet they themselves went immediately to the very
examples they wanted the jury to ignore, and in denying the comparison, only brought the
similarities to the surface. That introductory moment, repeated case after case and day
after day in courthouses across the country, is exactly the kind of situation that this
dissertation seeks to explain. How did we arrive at this place? A place where people’s
perceptions of the criminal justice system rely heavily on fictionalized, formulaic, and
often inaccurate representations of it—and where the fact of that reliance is declaimed
and disclaimed in real trials? A place where the American justice system trembles under
the weight of its own policies, turns the prison system into a for-profit industry and
modern-day enslavement of predominantly African-American men, and also creates the
stories that generate some of the most popular television shows, films, and books of our
time? This state of affairs seems simultaneously natural (of course popular culture
reflects societal tensions) and surprising (despite the popularity of these texts, mass
incarceration remains at the margins of most political rhetoric).
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In this dissertation, I trace this phenomenon backwards in time to outline the midtwentieth-century development of the genre I call the legal procedural—a genre that
represents the proceedings of the American criminal justice system, often in a courtroom
setting. For centuries, literature has addressed legal themes. Sophocles’ Antigone and
Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice both involve crime, judgment, and punishment.
Herman Melville’s Billy Budd is a centerpiece of law and literature curriculums; Charles
Dickens’s Bleak House describes the boredom and inefficiency of civil law; Franz
Kafka’s The Trial critiques the opacity and repetitiveness of criminal law. The list could
go on. Law is a structuring element of society, and part of culture’s role is to digest
society for its participants; as a result, culture frequently finds itself digesting law. But
what I argue in this dissertation is that the legal procedural as a cohesive and identifiable
literary genre only emerged in the American context during the mid-twentieth century. It
emerged thanks to a swirl of developments in legal and cultural history that made not
only the genre itself, but also the genre in its most codified possible form, essential to and
desirable in American life.
While in common parlance the term “legal procedural” primarily refers to
television shows, I contend that the genre exists across media, although it also has
medium-specific characteristics. In some ways, the evolution of the legal procedural over
the course of the twentieth century is a story of progression of dominance from literature,
to film, to television, as these media jostled for attention in American culture. As
different forms of cultural production waxed and waned in power, the legal procedural
genre itself was newly subjected to the constraints, norms, and censorship protocols that
governed each medium. That said, these transitions between media were not clean:
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literary representations persisted as film became popular, and cinematic representations
persisted as television became popular, and each medium’s form of the legal procedural
carved out its own space in this changing media ecology. Additionally, popular legal
stories often flowed between media: it was common for a single crime narrative to form
the basis for a television show, a book, a radio show, and a film, sometimes multiples of
each. The landmark film Twelve Angry Men, for example, began as a live television
broadcast of the same title; Witness for the Prosecution was a short story, a play, and then
a film, all under the same name. This does not even account for multiple authors’
adaptation of the same true story—for example, Alfred Hitchcock’s Rope and Richard
Fleischer’s Compulsion are both based on the Leopold and Loeb murder from 1924.
(Rope is not a legal procedural as I define it, because it is not interested in the procedures
of criminal justice; Compulsion is, because half the film takes place in a courtroom and
represents the defense of the accused.)
In some respects, this continuous textual bleed between media reveals mediumspecific effects more clearly: we can see, for example, the remarkable impact that
censorship policies had on Hollywood representations of the law, especially in the 1930s
and 1940s. In other respects, the frequent inter-medium translation of these texts has
contributed to incomplete assessments of individual texts. Because the discipline of
literary studies is often divided by media (cinema and television studied separately from
literature; fiction studied separately from nonfiction), readings of individual texts have
frequently been done without attention to other texts with similar themes but different
media forms. Other genres have been analyzed across media—in horror studies, for
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example1—but legal procedurals have not received that same treatment. This dissertation
corrects that omission by looking across several media. The first chapter focuses on
fiction; the second, nonfiction; the third, film; and the fourth, television. (It would also be
fair to group the first two chapters together as “prose” or “books.” The fiction-nonfiction
distinction will be explored in further detail in Chapter 2.) This cross-media perspective
provides a valuable window into how the legal procedural genre evolved as a cultural
phenomenon. It is truer to how audiences experience cultural production as an
interrelated, kaleidoscopic assortment of media. It is also truer to creators’ conscious
appropriation and interpretation of other media.
The dissertation’s chapter organization naturally lends itself to an overall
narrative arc that defines the legal procedural’s development as progressing according to
medium and chronology. To a certain extent, such arguments can be made. In the
broadest, most simplistic sense, it is true that midcentury literature had fewer censorship
constraints than film when it came to representing the law, and that literary legal
procedurals were therefore sometimes able to critique the law more fully than their
cinematic counterparts. On the other hand, authors’ politics and positionality varied
greatly, and 1960s legal procedurals were closely tied to 1930s anti-lynching narratives
that held up institutional justice as an abstract ideal. Similarly, on the chronological side
of things, it is true that film censorship was relaxed in the 1950s after a major anticensorship decision, allowing for more critical representations of the justice system. Yet
not only did those earlier patterns of representation not disappear easily from film, but the
relaxation of Hollywood censorship also coincided with the rise of the episodic legal
1

For example, Xavier Aldana Reyes, Body Gothic: Corporeal Transgression in
Contemporary Literature and Horror Film (University of Wales Press, 2014); The
Biology of Horror (SIU Press, n.d.).
2
John V. Orth, Due Process of Law: A Brief History (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
6

procedural, whose didacticism and formulaicism lent itself to positive claims about the
strength of the criminal justice system. Overall, the ideal narrative arcs of chronology and
media, though they hold some validity, are complicated by the high level of intermedia
penetration and the natural messiness of historical narrative.
As the following chapters will demonstrate, the legal procedural genre mediated
the law to the public through two modes of education: procedural and ideological. In its
dimension of procedural education, the genre educated viewers about specific criminal
justice procedures—explaining terminology, representing the arc of a trial, or debating
criminal rights. In its dimension of ideological education, the genre filtered this
procedural education in such a way as to teach viewers a specific way of interpreting the
criminal justice system’s place in American life. That ideological education tended to
endorse the central tenets of the due process revolution: that criminal procedure should be
federally standardized, that individual rights should be guaranteed against state abuse,
and that the trial process (if done correctly) will arrive at the correct and moral verdict. In
reality, the system was far more inconsistent and faulty than legal procedurals let on.
But—paradoxically for a genre that makes such frequent appeals to realism—it was
precisely this disconnect with reality that made the legal procedural genre attractive to
viewers. To various extents based on the text and its medium, legal procedurals affirmed
to the reader or viewer that the arc of the criminal justice system bent towards justice. It
taught them that, should they ever be arrested or empanelled, they would know what to
do, and that that knowledge would save them—a promise that was as reassuring as the
genre’s formula was addictive.
*
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Due process is the constitutional requirement that a government adhere to the law
when handling its citizens. Because due process requires the government to behave
legally, it influences every sector of public life and lies at the core of the rule of law.2
“Substantive due process,” the concept central to the due process revolution, is the idea
that the Constitution guarantees protection against state abuse of certain rights, even if
those rights are not explicitly named in the Constitution. In the early-twentieth-century
United States, standards of substantive due process had been developed in an economic
context in the service of an unregulated economy. In the 1930s, New Deal policies
discarded that laissez-faire economic approach in favor of an enlarged federal
bureaucracy.3 Supreme Court justices began linking substantive due process to
noneconomic rights, handing down confusing and contradictory judicial decisions about
how states should legislate criminal rights.
The date usually given as the beginning of the “due process revolution” is 1953,
the year that Earl Warren was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The
traditional narrative of the due process revolution is that it occurred virtually overnight
after Warren’s appointment. As we can see from the following lists, which signal only the
major relevant criminal rights cases and are not comprehensive, this narrative contains
both true and untrue elements.
Table 1: Influential criminal rights decisions before the Warren Court
Weeks v. United States (1914): Evidence gathered during illegal searches was
inadmissible in federal trials.
Carroll v. United States (1925): Warrantless searches of automobiles were
legal.
2

John V. Orth, Due Process of Law: A Brief History (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 2003).
3
Orth, Due Process of Law.
8

Olmstead v. United States (1928): Wire tapping was legal and did not count as a
search.
Powell v. Alabama (1932): States must inform defendants charged with a capital
crime that they have the right to counsel, and they must also appoint counsel for
indigent defendants well in advance of the trial. Only applied to capital cases.
First time the Supreme Court had reversed a state criminal conviction for a
violation of criminal procedure as established in the Bill of Rights.
Brown v. Mississippi (1936): Confessions obtained through torture were
unconstitutional.
Johnson v. Zerbst (1938): Defendants have the right to be represented by
counsel unless they have knowingly waived their right. Only applied to cases in
federal court.
Chambers v. Florida (1940): Coerced confessions are inadmissible at trial. One
of the first examples of the Court deciding that evidence should be suppressed
even if it was not obtained through physical violence.
Betts v. Brady (1942): Defendants in non-capital cases do not have the right to
be represented by an attorney.
Screws v. United States (1945): In order to be indicted on charges of civil rights
violations, local government officials must be shown to have intended to violate
the victim’s civil rights.
Adamson v California (1947): State could not infer guilt from the refusal to
testify.
Wolf v. Colorado (1949): Fourth Amendment (protection against illegal search
and seizure) applies to the states, but evidence obtained in illegal searches can
be admitted in court.
Solesbee v. Balkcom (1950): Governor has discretion to determine insanity;
although that type of insanity ruling is not subject to judicial review, it is not a
violation of due process.
Rochin v. California (1952): Evidence obtained through violent means is
inadmissible at trial. Justice Frankfurter also defined due process as a way of
making the justice system fair.
Table 2: Influential criminal rights decisions during the Warren Court
Irvine v. California (1954): Information from a wiretap installed without a
search warrant is admissible in court. (Warren agreed with majority holding.)
Rea v. United States (1956): Federal agent cannot introduce illegal evidence
during a state proceeding.
Breithaupt v. Abram (1957): State courts trying state crimes can use evidence
obtained during an illegal search at trial.
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Spano v. New York (1959): Coercive but non-violent interrogation tactics
violate the Fourteenth Amendment and cannot be admitted as evidence at
trial.
Elkins v. United States (1960): Federal prosecutors cannot use evidence
gathered illegally by state police. This convenient workaround had previously
been known as the “silver platter doctrine.”
Mapp v. Ohio (1961): Evidence obtained during illegal search and seizure is
inadmissible in state courts. This rule was already in federal courts, but only
now was extended to state courts.
Robinson v. California (1962): The Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual
punishment” clause applies to states.
Gideon v. Wainwright (1963): The Sixth Amendment’s protection of the right
to counsel applies to states and to non-capital cases.
Malloy v. Hogan (1964): The Fifth Amendment’s protection against selfincrimination applies to states.
Escobedo v. Illinois (1964): Confessions without a lawyer present, unless the
right to an attorney was explicitly and knowingly waived, are inadmissible in
court. This rule was already in federal courts, but only now was extended to
state courts.
Pointer v. Texas (1965): The Sixth Amendment’s protection of the right of the
accused to confront accusers also applies to states.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966): The accused must be aware of all these rights and
must explicitly and knowingly waive them, or the evidence obtained through
violations of those rights is inadmissible in court. The process of
“Mirandizing” someone charged with a crime, or “reading them their rights,”
comes from this case, and it was the capstone to the entire due process
revolution.

As indicated in Table 1, many relevant precedents were set during the first half of the
twentieth century. Cases such as Powell v. Alabama, Johnson v. Zerbst, and perhaps most
of all Weeks v. United States were essential to the development of both the total
incorporation doctrine and an increasingly stringent attitude towards what constituted fair
treatment. The 1950s did see the rapid expansion of federal authority over states, not only
in the area of criminal rights, but also in civil rights decisions such as Brown v. Board of
Education and Bolling v. Sharpe (both 1954). And compared to past and subsequent
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Courts, the Warren Court, led by Earl Warren but also by Hugo Black and William J.
Brennan, was politically progressive and tended to make bold and controversial decisions
in defense of civil liberties and federal authority over individual states.4
On the other hand, the list of cases given above reveals a pattern of movement
towards and away from federalization, as well as lateral movement—decisions such as
Wolf v. Colorado, which established that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states, but
denied evidence exclusion as a mechanism for enforcing that finding. Additionally,
Warren’s defense of civil liberties was not consistent across all his cases, as his
concurrence in Irvine v. California indicates. Scholars have also questioned the
traditional timeline that situates due process as a phenomenon of the Warren Court:
Michael J. Phillips describes the development of substantive due process at the turn of the
twentieth century, arguing that the Lochner Court was more progressive than has
commonly been believed, and several biographies of Hugo Black position him as more
central than Warren in the quest for due process.5 James Simon focuses on the conflict
and eventual friendship between Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter as a primary
influencer in the Warren Court’s civil rights decisions.6 Melvin Urofsky argues that the

4

Jim Newton, Justice for All: Earl Warren and the Nation He Made (Penguin, 2007);
Bernard Schwartz, ed., The Warren Court: A Retrospective (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996).
5
Michael J. Phillips, The Lochner Court, Myth and Reality: Substantive Due Process
from the 1890s to the 1930s (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); Tony Freyer, Justice Hugo
Black and Modern America (University of Alabama Press, 2002); Steve Suitts, Hugo
Black of Alabama: How His Roots and Early Career Shaped the Great Champion of the
Constitution (NewSouth Books, 2017).
6
James F. Simon, The Antagonists: Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter and Civil Liberties in
Modern America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989).
11

Burger Court, usually described as a conservative pushback to the Warren Court, actually
was more continuous from the Warren Court than it appeared.7
Whether these legal-historical narratives are tightly organized or more nuanced,
one thing they do not offer insight into is the lived experience of this transformation,
however gradual or sudden it may have been. Even when later legal cases make reference
to previous decisions, those references are buried—by generic necessity—in case law,
constitutional theory, and the Court’s authoritative “we” to mean the judges. Supreme
Court decisions are intended to appear sealed off from political interests. Changes in
popular opinion are usually imagined as controlled, uniform, and easily interpretable, as
in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority in the same-sex marriage decision
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015): “Indeed, changed understandings of marriage are
characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new
generations, often through perspectives that begin in pleas or protests and then are
considered in the political sphere and the judicial process.”8 But Kennedy does not
explain the mechanism by which “pleas or protests” are translated into “perspectives” and
then into “the judicial process.” To understand the path by which popular opinion
changes, we need more sophisticated and precise tools of cultural analysis.
*
Despite their incredible popularity, legal procedurals have received relatively little
scholarly attention. The term “legal procedural” is colloquially used to refer to television
courtroom dramas, but literary scholars have not characterized or defined the genre with
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Melvin Urofsky, The Continuity of Change: The Supreme Court and Individual
Liberties, 1953-1986 (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1991).
8
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015), II B.
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anywhere near the precision they have defined, for example, detective fiction.9
Scholarship on individual canonical television legal procedurals such as Dragnet, Perry
Mason, and Law and Order often describe the formula of the individual show with high
specificity, but then fail to attach that formula to a larger genre—perhaps feeling that
legal procedurals wear their formula so visibly that it needs no explanation. Another
possible reason for the neglect is the sheer speed with which legal procedurals appeared
to develop and solidify as a genre in American culture. Perry Mason was the first full
legal procedural (as opposed to Dragnet, which is both police procedural and legal
procedural) on television, and yet many of the characteristics that came to trademark the
show and the genre were present even from its first episode. The legal procedural
sometimes appears to have sprung fully formed into the world. This rapid perfection is an
illusion: the Perry Mason formula was developed first in Erle Stanley Gardner’s novels,
then on the radio, before the character ever made it to TV. The fact that the legal
procedural became dominant in American culture at a historical moment when culture
was shifting rapidly between different media forms contributed to this sense that the
genre was born tout d’un coup.

9

George N. Dove, The Police Procedural (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green
University Popular Press, 1982); Roger Sabin, Ronald Wilson, and Linda Speidel, Cop
Shows: A Critical History of Police Dramas on Television (McFarland, 2015); Deidre
Pribram, Emotions, Genre, Justice in Film and Television: Detecting Feeling (London:
Routledge, 2012); Jerome Delamater and Ruth Prigozy, The Detective in American
Fiction, Film, and Television (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 1998); Jo Ann Vicarel, A
Reader’s Guide to the Police Procedural (New York: Macmillan International, 1995);
Robert Paul Winston and Nancy C. Mellerski, The Public Eye: Ideology of the Police
Procedural (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); Sean McCann, Gumshoe America:
Hard-Boiled Crime Fiction and the Rise and Fall of New Deal Liberalism (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2000); D. A. Miller, The Novel and The Police (Berkeley, CA:
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So what is a legal procedural? What is its formula? It is perhaps most useful to
describe it, with a nod to Victor Shlovsky, both in terms of its fabula (the raw material)
and the siuzhet (the order in which the material is narrated). The legal procedural’s fabula
includes (but is not limited to) broad declarations about the justice system’s ideals, the
criminal procedures that were established in various criminal codes throughout American
history, and the exercise of the specific rights that were part of the due process
revolution. These elements are narrated in various ways in various texts. However,
especially as the formula became more fixed and more familiar to viewers in the late
1950s and early 1960s, there was a particular narrative structure that came to embody the
genre in the cultural imagination. This structure is so fixed that many of the elements of
the fabula are more legible when they are summarized in the order that they appear in the
formulaic narrative. See Table 3:
Table 3: The typical siuzhet of a legal procedural
•

Defendant is apprehended and arrested. In hybrid procedurals, which combine
elements of the police procedural with elements of the legal procedural, this
section can be elongated, taking up half or the majority of the text.

•

The defendant is read their rights, interrogated, requests or fails to request a
defense attorney, is charged, and awaits trial.

•

The arraignment occurs, although it is usually only shown if there is
something important or unusual about the plea (if the defendant is pleading
guilty vs. not guilty, or pleading not guilty by reason of insanity).

•

The trial occurs. It begins with the judge entering the courtroom, sometimes
shows the opening statements, and swiftly moves to the witnesses. The
witnesses are questioned and cross-examined. The defendant testifies or
pleads the fifth. There are objections, some of which are overruled and some
of which are sustained. There is a shot of the court stenographer recording the
trial.

•

Outside the courtroom, further investigations may take place alongside the
trial, especially if the defendant is innocent and needs exonerating evidence,
or, conversely, if the defendant is innocent and the prosecution is having a
particularly difficult time proving the defendant’s guilt.
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•

There is an emotional confrontation between the attorney and someone
testifying—either a witness or the defendant. The person in the witness box
often breaks down crying. In a “Perry Mason moment,” the true murderer is
revealed during one of these emotional crises.

•

The closing arguments are shown and are extremely emotional, summarizing
the case’s stakes for both the fictional jury and the real viewers.

•

The jury deliberates. This process usually occurs completely off-screen, with a
few genre-inverting exceptions such as Twelve Angry Men (1957).

•

The jury returns and convicts or exonerates the accused, taking them out of
their medial state and transforming them either into a convicted felon or a free
person. There is a lot of hugging and crying; who is doing the hugging and
crying depends on what the verdict was. If the defendant was found guilty,
they are now led away in chains, with a longing look backward at the world
they are leaving behind. They disappear into the prison system.

•

The attorneys and police officers involved have some kind of “declining
action” conversation, in which they react with relief or disappointment to the
verdict. They have now finished the case and are ready for the next one.
Sometimes, they stare longingly into the distance (in film or television) or
have some grand concluding thoughts (in fiction or nonfiction), reflecting
either on the satisfaction of restoring order, or on the injustice of the legal
system.

*
Like a literary formula, the criminal justice system moves individuals through a
predetermined set of rules and procedures designed to arrive at a particular outcome. A
typical set of procedures after a defendant is charged might look something like Table 4:
Table 4: An example of movement through criminal justice procedures,
after being charged with a crime10
(1) grand jury
(2) indictment
(3) arraignment and pleas
(4) insanity inquest, if an insanity plea
(5) change of venue proposal
(6) request for continuance
(7) selection of the jury
(8) the trial, run by the judge—an entire subset of procedures on its own
10

This list of procedures is adapted from Chapter 10, “The Trial,” of Cliff Roberson et
al., Criminal Justice: A National View (West Academic, 2017), 263-299.
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(9) jury makes its decision
(10) sentencing
(11) appellate review
Some of these procedures, such as the proposal for a change of venue or the motion for a
new trial, do not always take place; others, such as arraignment and jury selection, always
take place but may contain internal variation. Importantly, with some inevitable rare
exceptions, the order of these events remains stable. The arraignment always takes place
before the trial always takes place before the jury makes its decision always takes place
either before or simultaneous with the sentencing. This list of procedures can be seen as a
flowchart through which the defendant moves. The defendant moves, too, within the
spaces of the interrogation room, the courtroom, the jail, the courtroom again (and again,
and again), the prison, and perhaps the courtroom again—if they are lucky with their
appeals. The defendant is shunted through the corridors of the Juanita Kidd Stout Center
for Criminal Justice and, if found guilty, through the endless rituals and claustrophobic
spaces of prison.11
When we talk about formula in the context of legal procedurals, therefore, we are
not “merely” talking about the readerly experience—we are talking about a readerly
experience that mimics and resists the process by which millions of real individuals’ lives
have been uprooted and reshaped. In comparison to this real trauma, the most visible and
climactic component of a vast, strained, and demonstrably unequal system of criminal
justice, the procedures of literature—especially fictional literature—seem minor, even
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exploitative. As later discussions of accuracy will demonstrate, these representations
often depart significantly from the reality of criminal justice. But this dissertation
contends that even at their most fictionalized, the representations of criminal justice and
criminal rights in the twentieth-century United States are deeply and complexly tied the
reality of the criminal justice system. They imitate it, resist it, undermine it, strive for it,
claim it, question it, comment on it, and influence it. Although legal procedurals are often
assessed as “(in)accurate” or “(un)realistic,” the relationship between legal procedure and
the legal procedural is more complex than a relationship of accuracy or realism—or,
rather, accuracy and realism are more complex than they appear, and the unique nature of
the legal procedural illuminates these complexities. In the chapters that follow, I use
individual texts to unpack the ethical implications that attend the legal procedural as a
genre. For the moment, I want only to note that the apparently mimetic relationship
between procedure and the procedural sinks into the deepest strata of a story’s or a trial’s
foundation: the formula.
Perhaps the most influential and enduring work on literary formula has come from
John Cawelti. I will return to Cawelti’s work in the fourth chapter, when I discuss
episodic television and the repetition of a formula between episodes of a show, but it is
also worth describing now, as we think about how the legal procedural formula
developed across media and across texts. Cawelti writes:
Audiences find satisfaction and a basic emotional security in a familiar form; in
addition, the audience’s past experience with a formula gives it a sense of what to
expect in new individual examples, thereby increasing its capacity for
understanding and enjoying the details of a work. For creators, the formula
provides a means for the rapid and efficient production of new works.12
12

John G. Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, and Romance: Formula Stories as Art and
Popular Culture (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 9.
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In addition to articulating the economic motivations for publishers, production
companies, or, in this case, television networks, to produce formulaic material, Cawelti
also hints at why formulas become a quasi-addictive source of “satisfaction” and “basic
emotional security.” Though originally published more than thirty years ago, Cawelti’s
understanding of genre has remained influential and relevant because he accepts genre
literature or film or television on its own merits and understands that generic texts
provide a particular viewing experience that non-generic texts cannot.
As an account of the historical emergence of a genre, this project resonates with
the work of Franco Moretti, who argues that genres emerge out of a market pressure that
winnows away ineffectual genre elements and leaves others behind. A self-professed
“Darwinian,” Moretti explicitly conceives of genre formation as homologous to
genealogical trees and species selection.13 I disagree with literary Darwinism’s total
reduction of the author, and I consider the evolutionary metaphor to be ineffective for
addressing the contradictions, multivalencies, desires, refusals, and mistakes that make
cultural production such a meaningful zone of human expression. A purely Darwinist
perspective also fails to account for the sense of authorial creativity and readerly
excitement involved in literary production and genre formation. Still, I am attached to
Moretti’s understanding of genre as comprising many particular identifiable traits
(“phenotypes,” he might say) and as emerging in response to particular historical
pressures. Our perceptions of these historical pressures differ: Moretti perceives the
marketplace as the “slaughterhouse” or selection ground for a genre’s characteristics,
whereas I argue that the legal procedural genre’s characteristics also emerged in
13

Franco Moretti, “The Slaughterhouse of Literature,” MLQ: Modern Language
Quarterly, 61:1 (March 2000): 207-227.
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conversation with and in reaction to specific cultural-historical and legal-historical
events. In looking across media, I also account for the existence of different constraints
on different media—the distinct but connected “slaughterhouses” of film, television, and
literature—and understand the overall generic contract forged with the reader or viewer
as a product of the simultaneous consumption of these media.
In thinking about the reader’s experience with formula, we can gain much insight
from the field of museum studies and its focus on the museum visitor’s experience of an
exhibition. In her influential work Civilizing Rituals: Inside Public Art Museums, art
historian Carol Duncan describes how the museum is organized “as a kind of script or
scenario which visitors perform,” that takes visitors out of the “concerns of their daily,
practical lives” in order to “open themselves to a different quality of experience.”14 The
museum-going experience can thus be conceived of as a ritual that alters—ideally
permanently—the viewer’s relationship to the outside world:
Finally, a ritual experience […] is seen as transformative: it confers or renews
identity or purifies or restores order in the self or to the world through sacrifice,
ordeal, or enlightenment. […] According to their advocates, museum visitors
come away with a sense of enlightenment, or a feeling of having been spiritually
nourished or restored.15
In the context of literature, this “transformation” can be thought of as resembling
catharsis—the feeling of emotional culmination and relief at the end of a text. The
Frankfurt School critics, especially Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, argue that
catharsis serves the interests of state ideology by providing the illusion of relief from an
inescapable system of capitalist oppression. Adorno and Horkheimer are dismissive of
this relief, but it is important, when working with this well-established lens, to recognize
14
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that the relief of catharsis is palpable, genuinely pleasurable, and thus potentially
meaningful and even radical in the sense that pleasure can be a radical experience, as
some queer theorists argue.16 It is essential not to undercut the strength of this pleasure,
because when a particular iteration of that catharsis is introduced into a genre formula,
the taught pleasure of that specific form of catharsis becomes a strong motivator for
audiences to seek out that genre. Interpreting literary narrative through Duncan’s model
of museum visits, I urge us to consider narrative catharsis not merely as a meaningless
and temporary escape, but as an educational moment that actually transforms our
experience of our normal lives, for better or for worse.
When it comes to the legal procedural genre, we are dealing with two rituals: the
genre and the trial itself. Mark Weiner explores the relationship between trials and rituals
in Black Trials: Citizenship from the Beginnings of Slavery to the End of Caste, which
analyzes the role that trials of African-Americans have historically played in American
state formation, as well as in establishing African-Americans as citizens or non-citizens.
Like Duncan, but with law rather than museums as his ultimate object of study, Weiner
turns to anthropology to define rituals as “symbolic actions undertaken in relation to
basic social values and status relationships.”17 Trials of African-Americans, Weiner
argues, have three main characteristics that allow them to become especially culturally
symbolic: they are public, they are self-referential, and they follow specific
conventions.18 What does the ritual transformation look like in the context of the trial?
Weiner writes:
16
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Most important to the symbolic transformative power of a trial is the more
literal transformation it affects on the parties to the case: the ultimate result of a
trial is the declaration that its parties stand in a new relation not simply to a
specific rule, but to the law as a general ideal. A civil trial determines whether a
given plaintiff’s claims will be recognized and supported by legal authority,
potentially transforming a defendant into an individual liable for damages. A
murder trial can turned the accused into a criminal. As it transforms an
individual’s status in the particular, a legal case takes us from the realm of largely
discrete events with specific meanings to the realm of ideals with communal
importance.19
As a ritual, the trial transforms the accused person into either a guilty person or an
innocent person. If it fails to do so, it is a mistrial, a failed trial. But the trial also
transforms a society that is threatened by crime into a society that controls crime. It
reaffirms social norms and state power by creating a process that enacts those social
norms within a state-run framework. The authority that performs the ritual is the one
whose power is reaffirmed—which is why, in the context of the due process revolution,
there is so much tension over whether state or federal governments determine the
procedure. The question of state versus federal jurisdiction for particular trials—whether
a trial takes place in state versus federal court—is established in the criminal code. But
the federalization of due process threatens to upset the balance of power, because it opens
up the question: If a trial takes place in state court but the federal government determines
the procedure, is the trial “run” by the state government or by the federal government?
The legal procedural mimics this dual transformation—accused into criminal, and
disorder into order. The formula of the procedural first uses the power of the individual
fictional character to take advantage of the reader’s capacity for empathy, then makes use
of what Weiner calls “conventionality” to encourage the reader to generalize from the
specific characters on up to the more abstract universal claims. The degree to which each
19
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specific text performs the promised transformation can vary: some authors, media, and
franchises are more critical towards the criminal justice system, and some are less. But as
the following chapters will demonstrate, all legal procedurals, even the most critical ones,
begin from a place of hope that the justice system will work to restore fairness and
equality; the critique comes when the system fails to do so. The concept of the trial as
transformation is baked into the reader/viewer’s expectations of the legal procedural, and
therefore the reader/viewer’s experience of any particular legal procedural text.
In its emphasis on reinstating social order, and in its genealogy, the legal
procedural echoes the detective novel, which promises to restore social order through the
solution to a crime. I would argue that these structures—structures that prioritize
society’s transformation as the payoff—naturally lend themselves to episodic formats,
because every episode can have a new threat and a new solution to the threat, while
maintaining the same threatened object, namely, society. This promise of societal healing
through the individual case also becomes a consistent feature of the legal procedural and
detective novel genres overall, such that the genres are partly defined by the collective
stakes of their promised payoff. Part of what distinguishes a legal procedural from a
detective novel (and there are many distinctions, although the two genres can be
combined within the same text) is that the collective referred to is not the vague,
atemporal, and colonizing “civilized society” implicated in the novels of, for example,
Arthur Conan Doyle or Agatha Christie. Rather, legal procedurals promise to restore
order to the collective of the nation-state, through a state-run and standardized system.
The lens is turned inward towards control over the nation, not outwards towards control
over colonies. (This is not to say that the legal procedural does not also have a colonial
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bent: the American legal procedural does become an international form, colonizing other
media ecologies with a specific view of the American legal system. The international
iterations of the American tropes are not my focus here, although they certainly deserve
future study, especially within the context of local laws.) D.A Miller argues in The Novel
and the Police that the nineteenth-century novel internalized policing functions in order
to become an instrument of social control.20 Legal procedurals perform social control in a
different way: not by eliminating officers of the law and assuming an appearance of
subversiveness, as Miller argues the realist novel does, but instead by modeling and
advertising the work of the law. So to what extent does the superficial appearance of
adhesion to the law enable or disable subversive politics? This question motivates all of
the chapters to a certain degree, but it will be especially addressed in Chapter 3’s
discussion of film censorship.
*
The idea that literature merely imitates law, and that these mimetic
representations serve as vivid exemplars of law’s “real” workings, undergirds a whole
slew of analyses of literature from both legal scholars and literary critics alike. Compared
to other subfields of literature, there is an unusual number of monographs devoted to
enumerating representations of the courtroom without analyzing the ideological stakes of
those representations or questioning the mimesis beyond weighing factual accuracy. This
type of book usually looks at one medium in particular—literature, film, or television—
and examples can be found for each one of these media.21 The tone of these books tends
20
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to be joyful; the objects of study are read with delight and enthusiasm, but no skepticism
or historicity, and their representations of the law are taken at face value. The lack of
analysis often appears deliberate, with the authors’ expressed purposes being empirical
rather than analytical. These texts are useful in that their encyclopedic level of
comprehensiveness provides an important starting point for anyone hoping to delve more
deeply into the very broad genre of the legal procedural. At the same time, because these
texts tend to describe rather than analyze, and because they often take on a tone of
uncritical fascination, they imply that the literary representation of law is purely mimetic
and that literature provides a transparent window into the workings of law. This illusion
is one that many viewers share, and it powers the didactic function of the legal procedural
that I will examine in this dissertation, but its reproduction in scholarship offers a
simplistic view of the relationship between law and literature. Moreover, the abundance
of encyclopedia-style books about courtroom dramas has created the inaccurate
impression that the genre has been carefully analyzed by critics.
Of course, this is only one section of the scholarship on criminal justice and
literature. There is an impressive body of work on capital punishment and literature, as
well as intersecting cultural histories of capital punishment.22 Because most legal
procedurals are about murder trials, the scholarship on capital punishment frequently
takes similar primary texts as its object of study (Compulsion, Native Son, To Kill A
Mockingbird), but the emphasis is on the punishment rather than the process of the trial.
of Television Law Shows: Factual and Fictional Series About Judges, Lawyers and the
Courtroom, 1948–2008 (McFarland, 2009).
22
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Rich analytical models for the study of criminal procedure in literature can also be found
in monographs about other subjects in law and literature. Joseph Slaughter describes the
simultaneous emergence of international human rights and the Bildungsroman, arguing
that the Bildungsroman form stepped in to enforce and naturalize the twentieth century’s
new understanding of human rights.23 Ravit Reichman attributes the rise of British
literary modernism to the cultural trauma and property damage of the period after World
War I and contends that literature reshaped understandings of justice.24 Karla FC
Holloway studies how African-American authors from the nineteenth century to the
present have used literature to represent and challenge the legal constraints placed upon
black bodies.25 Brook Thomas explores the connection between nineteenth-century
American literary realism and Reconstruction-era law’s new emphasis on social contract,
observing that realist authors used contract as a formal model in order to illustrate both
the promise and danger of contract as a legal model.26
Notably, all these authors describe literature as filling a lack that law creates or
possesses. This is a frequent formulation in law and literature. Many foundational texts in
the field, coming from both literary and legal disciplines, center on the belief that
literature contains some special element—empathy, fantasy, disruption, multivalence—
that is somehow both essential to law and external to it.27 By figuring literature as a tool
23
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(albeit a special tool) for understanding or improving law, scholarship risks privileging
law over literature. In Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (retitled in later
editions to simply Law and Literature), Richard Posner has an entire section titled “How
Else Might Literature Help Law?”, implying a nearly vampiric desire to drain literary
studies of all possible useful methodologies for the betterment of law. Similarly, Simon
Stern observes that in law and literature courses in law schools, literature is seen to
function primarily as “an opportunity for moral education,” and depth-hermeneutical
methodologies are often discarded in favor of a surface-driven reading for moral
complexity and detail.28 In the most extreme version of this perspective, literary studies
has little intrinsic value as a discipline, even as literature’s own value is seen as nothing
but intrinsic, with the literary text carrying forward some secret meaning that lawyers can
quickly glean before returning to their cases. This perspective creates a disciplinary
imbalance, a hierarchy of law over literature, that can stagnate true interdisciplinary
advances by limiting critics’ ability to engage fully with up-to-date literary-critical
methodologies.
Even more complex and current accounts demonstrate a hierarchically tense
relationship between law and literature as discourses and as academic disciplines. Guyora
Binder and Robert Weisberg reject the idea that literature is external to law, instead
arguing that law is inherently literary.29 Several other scholars likewise use literary
techniques to address the various storytelling strategies that lawyers use at trial, in
Nancy Ruttenburg, Democratic Personality: Popular Voice and the Trial of American
Authorship (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Kieran Dolin, A Critical
Introduction to Law and Literature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
28
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litigation, in crafting legislation or legal decisions, and in constructing legal histories.30
But methodologically, these analyses also end up cannibalizing literary techniques for
legal analysis. If law is inherently literary, then how can literature still be special?
In the field of literary studies, a different but related problem emerges. Authors
such as Slaughter, Thomas, and Reichman argue that literature’s capacity for fantasy and
ideals allows it to deliver on the promise the law makes but cannot keep. This
formulation generates a few important questions. First, the concept that the law makes a
promise suggests that the law is able to envision an ideal world in which that promise is
realized. So where does that original vision come from—the law itself (which contradicts
the texts’ suggestion that the law has a limited imaginative potential), a pre-existing
literary conditioning (which contradicts the texts’ suggestion that literature post-dates law
and emerges in reaction), or somewhere else in culture (which is not fully explained)?
Here, the problem is not only that literature is instrumentalized for the purposes of law,
but also that the implicit chronology of influence limits literature’s ability to inscribe
meaning. Second, and contradictorily, these texts also make certain assumptions that may
overstate the importance of literature. The argument that literature’s fantastic capabilities
allow it to deliver on certain ideals implies that the delivery of ideals or social critique is
the end goal. But an important—if uncomfortable—question is whether ideals and social
critique are a valid end goal. What happens after these ideals are generated? How do they
influence daily life? Do social critiques matter if they are not translated into lived
experience? Are critiques of the law more successful, or more important, if the changes
they propose are later borne out in the law? And if so, how can we reconcile this sense of
30
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the primacy of lived experience with our same dislike of the hierarchization of law over
literature in the field of law and literature?
There is something innately mysterious in the relationship between law and
literature, and this mystery at least partly evades our scholarly narration of it. Because
legal procedurals wear their didactic commitments so openly—as I discuss in more detail
in individual chapters—they may offer important insight into this tension. To a certain
extent, the experience of literature is a lived experience, which shapes our interactions
with the outside world even after we have closed the book or finished the movie. There is
a didactic potential associated with legal procedurals—a belief that audiences can learn
from these shows how to behave when they are put into the real situation. At the same
time, as we saw in the Philadelphia attorneys’ pleas for the jurors to ignore Law and
Order and CSI, and as we will soon see in the reception of individual texts later in this
dissertation, many of these representations were inaccurate. The stakes of these
inaccuracies can be high: the overrepresentation of people of color as defendants, for
example, perpetuates a racialized view of criminality.31 Here is where the issue of law’s
primacy becomes so complex. Because as much as literature can provide ideals and
fantasies, and as valuable as these fantasies can be, the felt intensity of pain, trauma,
boredom, cruelty, joy, and inequality will always be greater in the real world. What kind
of comfort can it be, for someone just sentenced to life in prison, to know that there is a
book that critiques the system that sent him away?
31
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The inherent tension of hierarchy makes it useful for scholars to process their own
positionality inside the interdisciplinary nexus of law and literature, and to consider how
this positionality influences their claims to the relevance of their work. I write this
dissertation from within an English department, with extensive training in literary
methodologies but a comparatively paltry education in legal ones. The stakes of this
dissertation are to better understand the genre of the legal procedural, the conditions of its
historical emergence, and its interactions with the law and with Americans’ experience of
the law during the mid-twentieth century. Because of the continued popularity and fixity
of the genre, these findings have important ramifications for both current literary work
and current experiences of the law. These are my disciplinary commitments and what I
see as the pragmatic resonances of my work.
Within literary studies, it is disciplinarily acceptable to suspend the issue of
culture’s influence on lived experience in a liquid admixture of Marxist theory and
Russian formalism. This suspension can feel frustrating and evasive. At the same time,
although many quantitative studies in sociology and criminology track the influence that
viewing crime shows has on real-world interactions with the criminal justice system,
these descriptions often lack nuance and oversimplify the relationship between text and
audience.32 (Additionally, these studies usually ignore film and literature in favor of
32
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television, offering only a limited view of the cultural field within which people develop
their attitudes about the criminal justice system.) In the chapters that follow, I use literary
methodologies to dig deeper into the question of influence through specificity, turning to
specific texts, cases, decisions, and reactions in order to conjure a holistic sense of how
culture and law, as twinned written modes, interacted with lived experience during this
period. On a more general level, I understand this tension of hierarchy between law and
literature as an activating and therefore necessary ingredient in the intense interest in
legal procedurals. We would not read and watch legal procedurals if we did not have a
basic confidence in law’s special ability to regulate our lives, but we also would not
watch legal procedurals if we did not believe that these texts provided a special window
into the effect and experience of that legal regulation. In suspension, then, suspense: that
essential ingredient of fiction, which promises an eventual solution, but takes its essential
drive from the prolongation of the answer.
*
While the dissertation overall presents a cross-media view of the legal procedural,
the chapters are roughly sectioned out according to media. This format reflects how the
locus of popular American cultural production shifted during the twentieth century from
prose, to film, to radio and television. Reproducing the traditional medium division in a
limited way is also necessary for interacting with existing bodies of scholarship, which
are generally medium-specific. The structure also enables me to demonstrate the
historical constraints that were placed upon each medium, how these contributed to
C. Stern, “Devil in a White Coat: The Temptation of Forensic Evidence in the Age of
CSI,” New England Law Review 41 (2007), 503-32; Tom R. Tyler, “Viewing CSI and the
Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction,” The Yale Law
Journal (2006), 1076; Christopher J. Ferguson, Violent Crime: Clinical and Social
Implications, ed. Christopher J. Ferguson (London: Sage Publications, 2010), 3-18.
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differences between each media’s form of legal procedural, and how they also
contributed to the legal procedural’s development as an amalgam of different media’s
formal elements.
The dissertation’s first chapter, “Regional Sin: The Southern Gothic and States’
Rights,” explores racial bias and state intervention from the perspective of regional
literature. It compares texts from the 1930s and 1960s to argue that as the Supreme Court
consolidated criminal rights under federal authority, Southern literature became a space
for managing the complex relationships between the national and the local. The chapter
begins with an analysis of the federal government’s role in early twentieth-century
lynchings, followed by readings of Richard Wright’s “Big Boy Leaves Home” (1938)
and William Faulkner’s “Dry September” (1931) that illustrate early concerns about
excessive bias at the local level. It then shifts into the 1960s, comparing Harper Lee’s
novel To Kill a Mockingbird (1960); James Baldwin’s play Blues for Mister Charlie
(1964); and Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood (1966), which combines Western and
Southern themes. I observe how these courtroom-based texts express increasing interest
in specific trial procedures, such as jury selection, change of venue, and the appointment
of legal counsel. Literariness enabled these texts to do what law could not: critique the
anonymity of federal justice while also pointing out ongoing racial bias in local
implementation.
My second chapter, “In Cold Blood, the Expansion of Psychiatric Evidence, and
the Corrective Power of True Crime,” studies Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood, the 1966
true-crime narrative of the murder of a Kansas family, in the context of the evidence
exclusion procedures that were central to the due process revolution. This chapter argues
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that Capote’s text owes its canonicity in part to its mediation between procedure’s
liberalized exclusion of inculpatory evidence, and popular culture’s liberalized inclusion
of exculpatory evidence. The former has a legal aesthetic of curtailment, and the latter
has a literary aesthetic of expansion. Legal procedurals re-stage the conflict between
these aesthetic frameworks, such that the true-crime literary text is frequently figured as
both a testament and a corrective to the original legal trial.
The third chapter, “The Hollywood Production Code and the Cinema of Criminal
Justice,” studies the effect of American film censorship on cinematic representations of
the law. Between 1934 and 1968, all Hollywood films had to be approved by an industry
board called the Production Code Administration. I argue that the PCA’s insistence that
studios show only positive representations of the law—a guideline that scholars have
largely ignored in favor of discussing the restrictions on sex and violence—indelibly
shaped the American imagination of criminal justice. This chapter combines evidence
from communications from the PCA archives with close-readings of finished films such
as Twelve Angry Men (1957), Witness for the Prosecution (1957), and Compulsion
(1959).
The fourth chapter, “Episodic Television, the Defense Attorney, and the
Simultaneous Standardization of Law and Formula,” examines how the legal procedural
transitioned into what is now its most familiar form: the episodic television show.
Though the formula developed during this time has remained consistent in many ways,
the midcentury forms of these show also contained several important differences from
later versions, especially in that they focused on defense attorneys rather than the
prosecutors featured in Law and Order and its imitators. This focus on the defense
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redirects attention to the role of the defense attorney, which was front and center in
criminal rights debates in the form of the right to counsel, and it means that when
perspectives on the justice system are presented, they are presented from the perspective
of the defense rather than the prosecution. The prosecutors are not exactly antagonists—
one striking element of the midcentury shows is the degree to which all lawyers and legal
actors are generally treated positively, in keeping with the tone established by the PCA
censorship in film—but they are not the protagonists of the shows. The chapter also looks
at how episodic form, claims to realism, and didactic tone picked up on and fed into
ideological arguments about the justice system in order to create a form that asserted a
strong connection to viewers’ lives.
In the coda, I discuss some common cross-media elements of the increasingly
standardized formula, while also reflecting on the inherent nonstandardness of both
ideology and cultural production. After describing a few key future avenues of research
in this project, I conclude with a reflection on legal procedurals’ persistent influence on
our expectations for the American criminal justice system.
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CHAPTER 1
REGIONAL SIN: STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE SOUTHERN GOTHIC
The story of criminal justice in the twentieth-century United States revolves
around the debate that has consumed American politics since the country’s foundation:
states’ rights. Because the doctrine of total incorporation asserted the federal
government’s duty to protect citizens from infringement by state governments, the due
process revolution under the Warren Court marked a major triumph for federalism. (In
contrast, the Burger Court’s later backtracking and stalling on criminal rights occurred at
least partly under the banner of states’ rights.) The historical narrative of the Warren
Court’s movement towards federalization has been repeatedly inscribed in legal history,
but little previous scholarship has analyzed how literary narrative illuminated, responded
to, and influenced midcentury states’ rights debates, especially in the domain of criminal
justice. In this chapter, I explore the concomitant development of federalized criminal
rights and the legal procedural as a literary genre. The legal-political tensions about
criminal due process and federalism manifested in literature as thematic concerns about
race and regional identity.
My method relies on historical description of the evolution of criminal justice as
well as on close-readings of several texts that hew to Southern Gothic conventions. These
include texts by giants of the Southern literary canon, such as William Faulkner and
Harper Lee, as well as authors who have been the subjects of recent efforts towards
inclusion in the Southern Gothic, such as Richard Wright and James Baldwin. The
literary texts can alternatively be grouped by decade: the 1930s texts, which contain
nascent features of the legal procedural but are removed from the courtroom, and the

34

1960s texts, which demonstrate the fully fledged legal procedural formula. Neither of
these groups of texts is traditionally understood as a legal procedural: the earlier texts do
not show courtroom settings at all, and the later texts, written by giants of literary fiction,
are not usually considered formulaic. Readers, audiences, and publishers in the period
may have likewise been bemused by the texts’ conflation here. Within this chapter,
however, I draw out the characteristics that are shared both within and between these
chronological groupings, tracing a generic consistency in the way that criminal procedure
is explored, detailed, and question. In the case of the 1930s narratives, whose
preponderance corresponded with the historical development of the anti-lynching
movement, I argue that these were incubators for the kinds of representations of
institutional authority over criminal justice that would soon become more obviously
recognizable as legal procedurals.
Comparing these two groups, I contend that legal conflict over states’ rights was
essential to the development and popularization of the legal procedural as a literary form,
and that literary fiction in turn became a potent, memorable source for interrogating the
complicated relationship between local, state, and federal justice. The judicial movement
towards federally guaranteed rights and the rise of the Southern Gothic as a breeding
ground for legal procedurals were not chronological coincidences, but rather
manifestations of federalism as a major ideological feature of the twentieth-century
United States. Whereas the 1930s texts tend to phrase the conflict between state and
federal justice as an issue of regionalism, the 1960s legal procedurals keep the distinction
hazy, making only haphazard references to a separation of authority. I attribute this
blurriness to both genealogical factors (formal and thematic elements inherited from the
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ur-legal procedural’s emphasis on vigilante justice) and ideological factors (political
investments that demanded the consolidation of state and federal interests). The latency
of state vs. federal tensions in the texts explains why legal procedurals’ investment in
states’ rights debates has gone largely unremarked by critics.
In 1930s Southern Gothic fiction, the primary discussions about criminal due
process arose in lynching narratives that imagined local vigilantism as the major threat to
judicial authority. Over the following decades, as criminal justice became increasingly
bureaucratized, scenes of the hanging tree became scenes of the courtroom, but the threat
of mob justice continued to structure representations of criminal justice in both implicit
and explicit ways. In the legal procedurals of the 1960s, authors criticize a justice system
that has failed to regulate mob justice and has in fact absorbed mob justice’s affect and
intentions. These legal procedurals critique both local courts’ failure to implement
federally standardized procedure, and federally standardized procedure’s own failure to
exclude racism from trials. Comparing the 1930s and 1960s texts reveals a shift away
from lamenting the violence and unpredictability of vigilante justice, towards critiquing
the impersonality and reductiveness of the legal system, while also observing the
system’s susceptibility to perversion by individual bias. The 1960s narratives are
therefore largely more critical towards institutional justice than the 1930s narratives,
which envision any form of institutional justice as abstract and inaccessible. Because of
their genealogical attachment to the anti-lynching narrative, however, even the 1960s
works contain a subterranean (and sometimes overt) investment in institutional justice’s
potential to deliver moral justice. The continuity between the 1930s and 1960s texts
additionally illuminates the degree to which, even as the due process revolution
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standardized many criminal rights, race and region continued to structure experiences of
the justice system as well as the quickly-codifying legal procedural.

Selecting Texts: Foreground and Background
First, a note on the texts I have selected, and their relationship to the midcentury
literary market. Faulkner, Wright, Lee, and Baldwin are all now considered canonical
authors of literary fiction; as such, they are representative of what Gordon Hutner calls “a
history of professional choices rather than of actual reading practices.”33 In future
research, I hope to more precisely quantify the legal procedural genre’s penetration into
both upmarket and downmarket literature. Here, building on Hutner’s analyses of the
most popular books sold during these decades, I can offer some preliminary ideas about
whether my objects of study are representative of their literary contemporaries. In the
1930s, Faulkner was an easy candidate for inclusion into the canon because he was
favored by both groups responsible for intellectual canon formation: the New Critics and
the radical thinkers behind the Partisan Review.34 But the authors whose stories have
been suppressed through decades of intellectual canon formation were very different than
the authors who have come to represent the 1930s. Their differences arise not only in
terms of gender and race, axes along which academics have begun diversifying the canon
(as in the inclusion of Wright and Baldwin), but also in terms of class. Hutner argues that
many of the authors who were deliberately excluded from the canon in the 1930s wrote
about realism and middle-class subjects, often paying close attention to regional
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identity.35 Themes of criminal justice were not central to most of these popular 1930s
regionalist texts, which instead tended to focus on the daily struggles of farming and
homesteading. (One quasi-exception is lawyer and Pulitzer Prize-winning writer T.S.
Stribling, whose Birthright [1922], Vaiden Trilogy [1930-1934] and The Sound Wagon
[1935] did deal with some themes of law and crime.) Middle-class novels were similarly
demonized during the postwar period, and indeed, many saw the novel form itself as
decaying in creativity.36 Middle-class 1950s and early 1960s fiction did see the
development of autobiographical fiction and anti-segregationist themes, both of which
are relevant to this dissertation and provided the background for the surprise success of
To Kill a Mockingbird.37 That resemblance is perhaps unsurprising given that, of the four
authors I analyze in this chapter, Harper Lee is the one who is probably most often
dismissed as middlebrow.
The point of that overview is to illustrate that the texts I analyze in this chapter
share some elements (regionalism, civil rights themes) with the popular texts of their
respective eras. At the same time, they cannot be said to be representative of a broad and
identifiable genre of literary legal procedural—unlike the courtroom dramas of film that I
analyze in Chapter 3, or the episodic legal procedurals of television that I analyze in
Chapter 4, both of which have multiple prominent examples that are nearly formulaically
identical. I do take these four authors as representative of Southern Gothic literature, and
my arguments about their regionalism and representations of justice can also be extended
to works by authors such as Flannery O’Connor, Carson McCullers, or Eudora Welty,
who explore similar themes in their works. In short, as representations of vigilante
35
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justice, regionalism, and criminal procedure, the texts I analyze in this chapter are both
exceptional and unexceptional compared to their contemporaries. They should be read as
case studies for a certain mode of literary production, but also as examples that I have
selected for their continued popularity and their resemblance to the legal procedural genre
that they also helped create. More provocatively, it could even be argued that Lee,
Baldwin, Wright, and Faulkner’s emphasis on the law is one reason why their texts
became and have remained popular among both readers and critics. Because of the high
degree of intermedia penetration during this time period, visible not only as one story’s
translation between media (e.g., To Kill a Mockingbird’s translation to film) but also as
the total media ecology experienced by midcentury audiences (who took in films,
television, books, and radio), it is difficult to see the legal procedural as a literary genre
when we are looking only at literature. The way I construct and refer to the legal
procedural genre in this chapter, though also valid within this more constrained context,
will become increasingly cohesive in the larger context of later chapters on the film and
television that were also highly influential during this time period.

Lynching, Vigilantism, and the Transition towards a “Northern” Mode of Justice
In 1909, the Supreme Court tried the first and only criminal trial in its history.
United States v. Shipp unfolded after a black man named Ed Johnson from Chattanooga,
Tennessee, was sentenced to death in local court in 1906 for the rape of a white woman.
Johnson appealed his conviction on the basis that (1) blacks had been excluded from the
jury and (2) his lawyer had been so intimidated by the judge and by threats of mob
violence that Johnson had effectively been denied the right to counsel. The District Court
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granted him a stay of execution to give him time to mount appeals to the Supreme Court.
During that time, Johnson was remanded to the custody of Sheriff Shipp. When Justice
Harlan decided to allow Johnson’s appeal to be heard, the Supreme Court stayed his
execution until the appeal date. Upon hearing this news, an incensed mob in Chattanooga
rose up and stormed the jail where Johnson was being held. They were prepared to shove
past or disable the guards, but no one was there: Shipp had given all his jailers but one
the night off, and had removed the other inmates. The mob broke into Johnson’s cell,
abducted him, and lynched him on a public bridge. To ensure that he was dead, members
of the mob began shooting at him. At one point, a deputy sheriff shot him at close range
five times.38 Two Supreme Court cases followed. The 1906 case39 found that the
Supreme Court had jurisdiction and no conflicts of interest, so the criminal trial could
proceed. The 1909 case40 was the actual criminal trial, where Shipp, his deputy, and four
mob leaders were found guilty—not of murder, but of contempt of court. The court
sentenced the defendants to between two and three months imprisonment. None of them
served the full sentence.41
As an example of the overt, extreme violence that white mobs continually
committed against African-Americans during this time, Shipp was tragically
commonplace. Legally, the case was more exceptional. Not only did it establish mob
justice as a threat to government sovereignty, but it also set an early precedent for the
federal court intervening in state criminal trials to punish violations of due process. In the
38
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1906 case that preceded the 1909 trial, the Court hinted towards a future of total
incorporation when they explained that, although Johnson’s death made it impossible to
rule on whether a federal court could enforce the habeas corpus writ he called for, they
saw possible merits to the hypothetical case:
we shall say no more than that it does not appear to us clear that the subject matter
of the petition was beyond the jurisdiction of the circuit court, and that, in our
opinion, the facts that might have been found would have required the gravest and
most anxious consideration before the petition could have been denied.42
The question at the heart of the 1906 part of the United States v. Shipp case was the
federal government’s capacity to intercede in state conflicts, and, inversely, the state’s
ability to intervene in federal courts’ decisions. When the Court originally granted
Johnson’s appeal, they indicated that the state authority could not execute the witness
until the Supreme Court had reached a decision.43 By allowing the mob into the jail, the
sheriff and the mob were disobeying the federal court’s orders.44 While many lynchings
could be superficially presented as individual disobediences of local authority (though
local officials were, of course, often involved in these mobs), the circumstances of the
Johnson lynching pitted local officials directly against the federal courts.
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The Supreme Court viewed Johnson’s killing as a threat to the rule of law: “The
intent to prevent that delay by defeating the hearing of the appeal necessarily follows
from the defendants' acts, and, if the life of anyone in the custody of the law is at the
mercy of a mob, the administration of justice becomes a mockery.”45 If the power to
execute, whether by killing or by “letting die,” defines sovereign power,46 then the
Court’s desire to protect the “life” of “anyone in the custody of the law” arises not from a
humanitarian interest in Johnson’s own particular life, but rather from an interest in
preserving federal sovereignty. The word “mockery” introduces the specter of parody, a
rhetorical structure that appropriates content in order to make it appear foolish. This
aesthetic threat, wherein the sobriety of the legal institution is toppled by humor, also
poses a structural threat to federal courts’ status as the “real” source of justice.47 I note
this perception that humor threatens judicial authority here because it so closely mirrors
the reasoning behind the Production Code Administration’s eventual requirement that
films represent courtrooms in a solemn way, a regulation I explore in further detail in
Chapter 3 of this dissertation. The potentially frictional quality of humor is also an
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important element in the ironic structure of To Kill a Mockingbird, as I discuss later in
this chapter.
The Court’s sense in Shipp that lynchings were repudiations of federal justice
seemed to be confirmed when the Southern Commission on the Study of Lynching, a
project of the Committee on Interracial Cooperation, found in 1931 that post-trial
lynchings often happened because the mobs were angry that the accused had been
granted executive clemency.48 But the federal government’s relationship to lynching was
more ambiguous than Shipp and the SCSL study suggest. Contradicting a progressive
narrative of federal intervention in mob justice, the 1945 decision Screws v. United States
specified that in order for government officials to be held responsible for their roles in
lynching, the prosecutors must prove the officials’ intention to deprive the victim of
constitutional rights.49 This high burden of proof made it difficult for the government to
prosecute lynchings in subsequent years, and the government’s intervention in lynching
cases was inconsistent. A 1946 lynching case was investigated by the FBI, but only after
the NAACP requested, and the deputy sheriff involved in the incident was acquitted
along with his co-conspirators.50 In fact, many historians argue that the federal
government may have actually encouraged what appeared to be violations of their
authority, and that the Reconstruction-era Supreme Court had made it impossible to
control racial violence through federal rights enforcement.51 Desmond King and Stephen
Tuck show that federal inaction was so sustained over the early twentieth century that it
48
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amounted to a national endorsement of mob justice as a means of upholding white
supremacy.52 Daniel Kato uses a model of constitutional anarchy to contend that “the
issue of lynching—and black rights more generally—was central to the very development
of the federal government” and that the lynchings were “within the purview of the federal
government but were not federally sanctioned.”53 While federal failure to prevent
lynchings may not have constituted an endorsement, Kato says, it was nevertheless
responsible for the proliferation of mob justice.
Whether or not the federal government actively or passively enabled lynching,
lynchers saw themselves as working against institutional justice. Historian Michael
Pfeifer writes that what he calls the “rough justice” of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries was a reaction not against an absence of law, but against “a style of
criminal justice that was careful and deliberative, ostensibly impersonal and neutral, in
which the rights of the defendant, the reform of the criminal, and humanitarian
considerations were factored in beyond the punitive demands of communal opinion.”54
Lynchers believed that mob justice served a higher function than the law did, because it
was community-based, was face-to-face, and preserved a particular order or hierarchy of
citizens that was important to the community but was not adequately handled by the
justice system.55 Southern lynchings in particular sought to re-establish a racial order that
the lynchers felt had been violated. Generally undertaken by white mobs against black
victims, these lynchings sought to use spectacle and violence to intimidate African52
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Americans into obedience while simultaneously providing a perverse entertainment for
the white mobs in attendance. Pfeifer also clarifies that while “rough justice” existed
everywhere in the United States, its form differed significantly between regions. He
divides the country into five regions with distinct types of vigilantism. First and second,
the lower Midwest and upper Midwest, where Yankee and Southern cultural
characteristics combined and competed with one another. Third, the West, where mob
justice was seen as the primary type of justice in a frontier land. Fourth, the North, where
the death penalty first centralized racialized justice under state authority. Fifth, the South,
where white-on-black mob lynchings occurred with disturbing regularity.56 It is this last
region, the South, whose mob justice—usually involving mutilation, burning, and
hanging, carried out by large groups, and often nominally responding to a black man’s
perceived slight against a white woman—has become most synonymous with the word
“lynching” in American cultural representations.57 The Shipp case is emblematic of this
pattern of violence.
In addition to influencing the forms rough justice took, regionalism also
influenced attitudes towards the federal justice system. Northerners tended to support
Supreme Court decisions about criminal justice more, likely because Supreme Court
justices had been trained in the North and their decisions reflected Northern legal values.
Southerners were less approving, especially because national rhetoric tended either to fall
into anti-Southern tendencies or to challenge white supremacy on a systematic scale,
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threatening Southern whites’ view of the world.58 Michael Klarman explains that the
ideological differences between Southerners and Northerners generated a fundamental
disagreement not only about rough justice, but about the goals for a standardized state
trial:
For the Southern courts, the simple fact that these defendants enjoyed the
formalities of a criminal trial, rather than being lynched, represented a significant
advance over what likely would have transpired in the pre-World War I era. For
the United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, criminal trials were supposed
to be about adjudicating guilt or innocence, not simply avoiding a lynching.59
According to this account, Southerners of the 1920s and 1930s tended to see any criminal
trial as a kind of victory, whereas Northerners wanted to push the trial further towards
liberal ideals of justice. Klarman then notes that Southern criminal trials’ blatant racism
raised national support for Supreme Court interventions. In this public support, the cases
of the 1920s and 1930s differed significantly from what Klarman sees as the
“countermajoritarian judicial decision-making one often associates with landmark
criminal procedure decisions such as Mapp or Miranda.”60
Rates of reported lynchings declined in the 1930s, dropping into the single digits
after 1936.61 Throughout these years and into the 1950s, the proliferation of images of
lynching sometimes encouraged mob violence, but also helped stoke outrage and
popularized antilynching efforts.62 Meanwhile, the debates about capital punishment that
had begun during the nineteenth century were reactivated. After a steady increase
58
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throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the rate of capital punishment had
began to rise precipitously after the end of the Civil War, rocketing upwards in the early
decades of the twentieth century, with a small drop between 1906 and 1925.63 Stuart
Banner writes that the number of executions peaked in 1935, then declined from the
1930s through the 1960s.64 Capital punishment was looped into the due process
revolution in 1962, with Robinson v. Georgia, when the Supreme Court decided that the
federal government could force states to obey the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against “cruel and unusual punishment.”65 That decision set the stage for the temporary
national suspension of the death penalty in 1972.66 The moratorium was largely a
response to public opinion shifting against capital punishment, which was partly
influenced by critical representations in popular culture.67
Regionalism became, and remains, central to debates about capital punishment.
Prior to 1950, capital punishment had been primarily Northern.68 But as the due process
revolution federalized criminal rights, applying the Northern style of justice across the
country, it was the South that became associated with the death penalty. When the death
penalty was reinstated in the 1976 decision Gregg v. Georgia, all four of the cases that
were simultaneously decided came from the South.69 Today, even as capital punishment
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is slowly vanishing either de jure or de facto from many parts of the United States, the
South remains the stronghold of the death penalty, leading Emily Bazelon to declare that
the geographical division of capital punishment has created “two Americas.”70 Many
scholars have explored literature’s representation and critique of capital punishment as a
moral problem.71 Rather than retread this ground by studying the death penalty’s moral
dimensions, I consider capital punishment as part of a larger midcentury criminal
procedure discourse inflected by the relationship between the nation and the region.
In considering the transition from lynchings to capital punishment, from local
“rough justice” to its federalized institutional variant, it is important to note that there are
many substantive similarities between the two. As Kato points out, the death penalty was
connected to lynchings, if not perfectly continuous:
Although both lynchings and the death penalty share the same attributes of being
a highly localized and racialized affair, the death penalty is nevertheless highly
medicalized, bureaucratized, and performed by state actors in the confines of a
centralized location. It is as if the proponents of the death penalty went to great
pains to make sure the death penalty appeared to be nothing like lynchings,
although it practically served the same function.72
In The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander argues both for a resemblance in form
between legal and extralegal executions and for a historical link between them. The
prison-industrial complex—the “new Jim Crow”—has only adapted the racialized
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“justice” of lynchings into a new context. One of the most striking elements of this shift,
Alexander argues, is how racism has persisted in an ostensibly race-neutral system,
thanks to “huge racial disparities at every stage of the criminal justice process.”73 The
death penalty, disproportionately applied to black defendants, is one of these disparities.74
A famous 1983 study (the “Baldus study”) revealed that the death penalty was sought far
more often when the murder victim had been white, and most of all when the murder
victim had been white but the defendant was black, to the extent that the authors declared
that “Georgia is operating a dual system, based on the race of the victim, for processing
homicide cases.”75 Given the continuity of this racialization, as we go on to consider the
representation of the midcentury transition from vigilante justice to institutionalized
justice, we must also reflect on the ways in which literary mechanisms for representing
race were likewise inherited and twisted in accordance with shifting cultural norms.

The Southern Gothic in the American Nation
When Gothic literature first emerged in Europe in the late eighteenth century, its
characteristics included melodrama, sensationalism, stock characters, supernatural
elements, an emphasis on blood and heritage, ruined settings, darkness and shadows, and
a sense of claustrophobia. Wildly popular and overlapping with Romanticism, the Gothic
aesthetic quickly emerged in American literature as well, perhaps most famously in the
work of Charles Brockden Brown and Edgar Allan Poe. American Gothic fiction
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incorporated the melodrama, sensationalism, and supernaturalism of the European
Gothic, but explored themes specific to early American society: rationality vs.
irrationality, puritanism, guilt, sinfulness, and popular democracy.76 Unlike the
claustrophobia that characterized the European Gothic, the American Gothic worried
about the isolation and threat from the wilderness that typified the frontier experience.77
Joseph Bodziock incorporates the puritan and frontier themes into an order/disorder dyad,
writing that American Gothic fiction develops around the struggle between community
order and the “howling wilderness of chaos and moral depravity.”78 Eric Savoy notes that
the American Gothic articulates “a profound anxiety about historical crimes and perverse
human desires,” and contends that American Gothic derives its specificity in part from
the continually staged conflict between dreamy optimism and a nightmarish horror.79 The
elements that characterize the American Gothic can also frequently be found in Southern
Gothic literature, although the Southern Gothic usually also includes a strong sense of
Southern regionalism, often expressed literarily through use of the vernacular; sharp
ironic dissections of Southern society; characters that are outlandish or grotesque in some
way; and undercurrents of evil or violence.80
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Because Gothic fiction was so popular and its characteristics so familiar as a
source of horror, it had a unique capacity for social criticism. Sue Chaplin, writing about
the nineteenth-century European Gothic, explains, “The Gothic poses a challenge, or at
the very least a question, to the law. Gothic representations of power query the origin and
legitimacy of juridical authority, frequently exposing its hidden violence, its ‘obscene
dimension.’”81 Mysteries of authority and source pervade the Gothic, which stages and
re-stages epistemological investigations. American variants of the Gothic readily and
overtly engaged this critical quality. For example, Charles Brockden Brown, arguably the
earliest practitioner of the American Gothic, used Gothic aesthetics to critique processes
of democratic formation in early America.82 Bodziock (in a different essay from the one
listed above) explains how nineteenth-century African-American authors adapted Gothic
themes to criticize the culture of their oppression, taking advantage of the Gothic’s
insight into visible and invisible threats to illustrate slavery’s horror to white audiences
who were largely oblivious to it.83 About a scene in Frederick Douglass’s My Bondage
and My Freedom (1855), Bodziock writes that Douglass performs “a moment of
‘haunting back,’ resisting the tendency of the dominant culture to frame him as Gothic
Other and instead locating the source of Gothic horror upon the dominant culture.”84 As
the Southern Gothic developed during the first half of the twentieth century, it likewise
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lent itself to critical commentary on race, whether through the figure of the zombie as a
metaphor for slavery, or through the continual reanimation of the Confederacy in the
form of ghosts or inheritance.85 The specter of the Civil War is alive and well in the very
name of the Southern Gothic: if the American Gothic is defined in contrast to the
European Gothic, “Southern Gothic” codes a tension between the American South and
the rest of the nation, and more specifically the North. This tension is far from incidental:
in Seeking the Region in American Literature and Culture, Robert Jackson argues that in
the post-Civil War America, there is no way to conceptualize region as existing outside
race.86
While the distinction between American Gothic and Southern Gothic would
therefore seem to carry important information about the central geographic tension in the
text, in actuality scholars often blur the boundaries between the two terms, veering
between the two terms, even as they focus on primarily Southern writers.87 I attribute the
ambiguity to the dominance of the Southern Gothic in twentieth-century literary history
and to underlying tensions about the relationship between regional and national
identity—the very same regional/national tensions that motivate states’ rights debates. To
this day, Southern literature embodies these tensions, received simultaneously as
representative of American literature (Mark Twain and William Faulkner being two of
the most frequently assigned authors in courses on “American literature”) and
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contradictory to it (their Southern identity and regional particularity being continually
reasserted by critics and by the authors themselves). The broader cultural narrative about
the South’s relationship to American identity is also complicated: Margie Burns explains,
“the view of the South self-identified as the ‘national’ or ‘American’ view is basically a
colonial romance, with the rest of the nation identified with the forces of light and the
South with the forces of darkness.”88 Elaborating on how this cultural narrative has
influenced Southern Gothic literature, Burns argues that “that southern gothic is a literary
technique which both enacts and conceals the dehumanization of response to the South,
by representing it as a dehumanization of response in the South.”89 The Southern Gothic
is more than simply a more specific version of the American Gothic: the generic
association between the South and “the forces of darkness” constructs a vision of
American national identity as both contiguous with and resistant to Southern regional
identity.
The dialectic of region as both constitutive of nation and resistant to it is
perpetuated throughout American cultural production. Jackson explains:
Are we, then, an empire or a republic? […] I maintain several related claims.
First, I contend that the United States has attempted to affirm both possibilities
whenever possible and to deny that such a response to the question could be, at
some level, deeply inconsistent. Second, I suggest that the nation’s overall sense
of identity is constructed precisely in the often extraordinarily delicate, and
frequently violent, balance between empire and republic: between the aims of an
outward-looking imperialist impulse, whose cultural products arise from a
mythology of conquest and its justifications, and the civic-minded concerns of
republican idealism, whose focus on the ongoing provision and maintenance of
individual rights within the existing democratic polis produces a very different
kind of culture. Finally, and most importantly, I argue that it is exactly this
problematic and often contradictory nature of expanding national space that
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endows the smaller and more discrete spaces within the United States with their
unique cultural identities.90
On one hand, the relationship between region and nation is one of scale: regions are
“smaller and more discrete,” and exist within the United States. On the other hand, the
relationship is more complicated, because region is neither a miniature version of
national identity nor entirely separate from it. As Jackson explains, the American regionnation relationship has unique historical parameters. He notes that the formation of the
United States transitioned states from colonies to members of a republic, effectively
making them embody the conflict between imperialist ideology of conquest and the
republican idealism that focuses on individual rights. He also observes that as the nation
moved towards and through the Civil War, states’ rights debates became obviously
imbricated with race and slavery.
So if (1) region cannot exist outside race or states’ rights, (2) states’ rights cannot
exist outside race or region, and (3) Gothic literature is especially suited to social
criticism, then (A) regional literature is also structurally tied both to states’ rights debates
and to race, and (B) the Southern Gothic in particular has a unique capacity for
interrogating these rights through the deliberate use of affect and horror. Add to this
theory the intrinsic importance of violence and crime to the Southern Gothic aesthetic,
the American Gothic’s interest in the order/disorder and civilization/wilderness dyads,
and the discourse of federalizing criminal rights that was contemporaneous with the
Southern Gothic’s development, and the Southern Gothic seems an obvious crucible for
the swelling pressure of race, region, state’s rights, violence, and legal order. These
connections had already come to light in nineteenth-century literature, as Ellen Weinauer
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demonstrates when she argues that in antebellum anti-slavery texts, “the law itself
becomes a kind of gothic villain, exerting a seemingly absolute and inescapable control
over the lives of the enslaved.”91 In early- to mid-twentieth century literature, as legal
power shifted towards the federal and the Southern Gothic became popular, the thematic
threads of law’s oppression were woven into a new shape. Southern Gothic texts from
both the 1930s and the 1960s demonstrate a keen awareness of the racialization of both
legal and extralegal action, as well as a persistent anxiety about the region’s place in the
nation and the state’s place in the republic.

The Absence of Procedure in William Faulkner’s “Dry September”
William Faulkner’s short story “Dry September” (1931) is a canonical lynching
narrative by a canonical author of Southern Gothic fiction. In it, a black man, Willy
Mayes, is lynched by a mob for an unknown act of violence allegedly done to a white
woman, Minnie Cooper. The mob is led by an angry and abusive man named McLendon;
the other major character is the barber, who attempts to intervene in the lynching but
eventually jumps out of the moving car, abandoning Mayes to the mob’s hands. The story
begins:
Through the bloody September twilight, aftermath of sixty-two rainless days, it
had gone like a fire in dry grass: the rumor, the story, whatever it was. Something
about Miss Minnie Cooper and a Negro. Attacked, insulted, frightened: none of
them, gathered in the barber shop on that Saturday evening where the ceiling fan
stirred, without freshening it, the vitiated air, sending back upon them, in
recurrent surges of stale pomade and lotion, their own stale breath and odors,
knew exactly what had happened.92
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At the height of New Criticism, much scholarly discussion focused on the story’s title
and the relative importance of the weather in the sequence of events.93 The heat and
drought create a charged atmosphere that quickly puts the reader into a state of edgy
claustrophobia; Faulkner implies that, like a chemical reaction, heat can transmute a
“rumor” into an attack. The comparison between mob violence and the weather further
suggests that the drive toward violence is also a natural phenomenon, uncontrollable by
human technologies (“the ceiling fan stirred, without freshening it”). We can also read
the “sixty-two rainless days” as a metaphor for history, setting up a story in which a
world without change (literally revolution, in the case of the ceiling fan) becomes quasiincestuous (“their own stale breath and odors”) and primed for explosion. In such an
environment, the details of the inciting event are irrelevant: the “something about Miss
Minnie Cooper and a Negro” is never fully clarified, but the events proceed regardless.94
One of the most striking elements of “Dry September” is the degree to which the
actions that drive the story are omitted from actual narration. We never see Mayes’s
murder, only that the car that once held six people (including the barber and Mayes)
comes back with only four. In the next scene, someone says that Mayes “went on a little
trip.” Likewise, we never learn exactly what happened to Minnie, if anything. Even
though one scene describes Minnie Cooper in detail, and we receive constant glimmers of
the myriad ways in which she is rejected and injured by the community for being an older
single woman, we do not ever even learn whether she was attacked at all. These blank
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spaces in the narrative, the refusal to narrate either the original crime or the
murder/“punishment” of Willy Mayes, formally demonstrate the absence of procedure
that the story thematizes. The most evident reference to legal procedure comes when the
barber implores the members of the mob to stop their pursuit of Mayes: “Find out the
facts first, boys,” he tells them. “I know Willy Mayes. It wasn't him. Let's get the sheriff
and do this thing right” (519). The barber believes that involving law enforcement is the
“right” way to pursue the judgment and punishment of a crime, but even in his defense of
institutional law, he seems to acknowledge its impotence. He attributes no active power
to the institutional law, instead suggesting that it relies on the cooperation and action of
the community members (“Find out the facts, boys”; “Let’s get the sheriff”). In the end,
he has only limited commitment to his own sense of rightness. Not only does he reject
procedure by not involving law enforcement, but he jumps out of the car to avoid
witnessing the murder and thus leaves Mayes to the mob’s mercy.
At the moment of jumping out of the car, the barber declines to act as the
individual representative of the institutional law he claims to support. It is these acts of
passive complicity that allow mob justice flourish. Even before that climactic moment,
Faulkner shows the hollowness of mob justice in the initial discussion in the barbershop.
McLendon initially acknowledges the possibility that Hayes is innocent, asking the
barber if he’d let blacks get away with such crimes until one of them “really does it”
(519). Shortly afterwards, he challenges the barber’s statement that Willy Mayes did not
attack Minnie Cooper: “You mean to tell me […] that you’d take a nigger’s word before
a white woman’s? Why, you damn nigger-loving—” (519). Then, when one of the exsoldiers in the barbershop agrees that they should “figure this thing out” before acting,
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McLendon says, “Figure out hell!” (519). His rapidly shifting logic reveals the dearth of
reason or morality beneath his actions. That hypocrisy is underscored in the story’s last
scene when, having just returned from killing a man for allegedly assaulting a woman,
McLendon beats his wife. McLendon and the mob believe they are adhering to procedure
in a sense—the “procedure” being that if you hear an accusation against a black man,
then you punish a black man without regard for his guilt or innocence—but this
procedure is devoid of any deeper moral code or consistency; its only governing ideology
is racism.
And yet mob justice rules the town in Faulkner’s story because institutional law is
too weak, too passive, and too abstract to intervene. Absence is a persistent theme
throughout the story. In the final scene, the confrontation between McLendon and his
wife, Faulkner writes:
“Haven't I told you about sitting up like this, waiting to see when I come in?”
“John,” she said. She laid the magazine down. Poised on the balls of his feet,
he glared at her with his hot eyes, his sweating face.
“Didn't I tell you?” He went toward her. She looked up then. He caught her
shoulder. She stood passive, looking at him.
“Don't, John. I couldn't sleep... The heat; something. Please, John. You're
hurting me.”
“Didn't I tell you?” He released her and half struck, half flung her across the
chair, and she lay there and watched him quietly as he left the room.
He went on through the house, ripping off his shirt, and on the dark, screened
porch at the rear he stood and mopped his head and shoulders with the shirt and
flung it away. He took the pistol from his hip and laid it on the table beside the
bed, and sat on the bed and removed his shoes, and rose and slipped his trousers
off. He was sweating again already, and he stooped and hunted furiously for the
shirt. At last he found it and wiped his body again, and, with his body pressed
against the dusty screen, he stood panting. There was no movement, no sound, not
even an insect. The dark world seemed to lie stricken beneath the cold moon and
the lidless stars. (74-5)
Almost every line of dialogue here begins with a negative verb: “haven’t,” “didn’t,”
“don’t,” “didn’t.” Like the barber, McLendon’s wife receives McLendon’s wrath with
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only a hint of protest, standing “passive,” watching “quietly,” struggling to explain what
she is doing. McLendon tears off his shirt, then struggles to find it again. Outside, there is
“no movement, no sound, not even an insect.” The world is “dark,” the stars “lidless.”
The stale, unmoving environment lacks justice, generosity, forward momentum; indeed,
the only vivid element in this scene and in the rest of the story is the environment itself,
full of dust and oppressive heat, still as “stale” as was mentioned in the foregoing
paragraph. Regional identity, from weather to vernacular to landscape to the classically
exaggerated Southern Gothic characters, exists boldly in the story, while both moral and
institutional justice hover unsurely in the background.
“Dry September” takes no overt stand on the question of the federal government’s
involvement in lynching, and there is no apparent involvement of local law enforcement
in the lynching, unlike in the case of Shipp or innumerable other historical lynchings
sanctioned by the government. But the formal and thematic construction of absence
surrounding the lynching does create a position on the connection between institutional
law and mob justice. Remember that Michael Pfeifer used historical evidence to establish
that what mob justice resists is not the absence of law but “a style of criminal justice.” In
Faulkner’s story, the repetition of absence as a defining factor of the lynching suggests
that this is a world in which mob justice rises to fill a gap left by institutional law. This
point does not necessarily run counter to Pfeifer’s historical claim: rather, it shows that
however much an institutional justice system may have existed as a historical fact, it is
not necessarily felt as a reality. From the characters’ perspective, it does not much matter
whether the absence of institutional justice is real or merely perceived. Faulkner’s story
also demonstrates that while the absence of institutional law can be due to the state’s
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failure or an individual’s deliberate rejection of a particular justice style, this absence also
occurs simply because individuals who do support a more “careful and deliberative,
ostensibly impersonal and neutral” (Pfeifer) style of justice are too afraid or too passive
to take action. Fiction’s utility in this instance is that it allows us to see a range of ways in
which individuals contribute to a cultural norm, and shows us the degree to which even
institutional justice requires active participation from the community.
Faulkner explored the theme of community participation in institutional law in
other work, including the 1931 novel Sanctuary, in which one character (Goodwin) is
wrongly convicted and then lynched for a rape and murder that another character
(Popeye) committed. Later, Popeye is wrongfully convicted of a different crime. Noting
how the district attorney in the novel “invites the jury to think like a lynch mob,” Ticien
Marie Sassoubre argues that through these conflations of legal and extralegal justice,
Faulkner “conceives law as properly the expression of the values of the community.”95 In
“Dry September,” Faulkner not only suggests that institutional law can embody regional
values, but also seems to criticize the countervailing assumption that mob justice
represents regional identity. In the barbershop, one man tells a man supporting the
barber’s urge to uncover the truth, “You better go back North where you came from. The
South don't want your kind here.” The other replies, “North what? I was born and raised
in this town” (62). The first speaker believes that procedural law is inherently unSouthern, but the second speaker disconnects regional identity from procedure, insisting
on his connection to the South. Later in the story, he participates in the lynching, perhaps
believing that this violence will prove the Southern identity that has come into question.
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Lynching has this power because it represents what Laura Edwards calls “the peace,” an
entrenched political concept that “expressed the ideal order of the metaphorical public
body,” reacted to community norms, and often opposed the aims of institutional justice.96
But because these “community norms” represented a white imagination of the
community, and because white critiques of lynchings were always written from a place of
relative safety. If, like the barber, the author leapt from the car of the mob, their physical
pain would be limited to some bruises; they would survive. Black authors experienced
and represented the perceived opposition between local and institutional justice
differently.

The Replacement Trial in Richard Wright’s “Big Boy Leaves Home”
As Cedric Gael Bryant notes, many scholars have overlooked African-American
authors’ role as producers of Southern Gothic narrative throughout the twentieth century,
even when the stories clearly fit the Southern Gothic archetype.97 Richard Wright’s “Big
Boy Leaves Home” is one such example. The story describes a group of young black men
whose encounter with a white couple at a whites-only swimming hole turns into a
bloodbath. Two of the boys are shot by the white man before Big Boy seizes his gun and
kills him. After the survivors escape the watering hole and make it back home, Big Boy’s
parents ask him about what happened. Then, pursued by a lynch mob, Big Boy flees his
hometown in the trunk of a car. Reading the story as an inversion of the myth of Acteon,
Sandy Alexandre contends that Wright reveals the white female body as “the seat of
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various questions and debates regarding the entanglements of property, crime, and
punishment in the lynching drama that besieged America, particularly the South, from the
1880s well into the 1930s.”98 Like many historical lynchings, this instance of mob justice
turns on the imagined sexual violation of a white woman by black men. (Here, that
“sexual violation” is simply the white woman seeing the naked black boys.) According to
Bryant, “Big Boy Leaves Home” qualifies as Gothic for a number of reasons, including
the extreme violence, the intense fear and desire that the segregated swimming hole
evokes as a space, and the prominent role of witnessing.99 Like other writers working in
the Gothic tradition, Wright used Gothic elements for social critique throughout his
career. For example, describing the influences behind Native Son (1940), Wright wrote
that modernity had expanded institutions such that the keenest horror now came from the
oppression of individuals by large bureaucracies built upon racism and economic
determinism.100 In the book, the crowded urban landscape evokes the Gothic sense of
claustrophobia, while the perpetual, brutal, and explicit violence creates suspense and
horror. A.S. Monnet argues that all of Wright’s work can be read as Gothic, and, reading
the stories from Uncle Tom’s Children in particular, argues that Wright’s work can be
read as “Jim Crow Gothic,” a type of Southern Gothic that examines racial violence as a
continual present concern, rather than merely the re-haunting of past slavery that can be
seen in other Southern Gothic works.101 Both Bryant’s and Monnet’s readings of “Big
98

Sandy Alexandre, The Properties of Violence: Claims to Ownership in Representations
of Lynching (University Press of Mississippi, 2012), 93.
99
Bryant, 541-553. Bryant also references Jack Halberstam’s definition of the Gothic.
100
Richard Wright, How “Bigger” Was Born: The Story of Native Son (Harper &
Brothers, 1940).
101
Agnieszka Soltysik Monnet, “Jim Crow Gothic: Richard Wright’s Southern
Nightmare,” in The Palgrave Handbook of the Southern Gothic, ed. Susan Castillo Street
and Charles L. Crow (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 297–308.
62

Boy” as a Gothic text revolve around Wright’s use of Gothic conventions of spatiality
and spectacular violence.
If American region is inextricably connected to race, as Jackson argues, then
many scholars’ failure to read Wright as a Southern Gothic author could represent a
perception of regional identity that ignores the ways in which individuals’ geographical
location is shaped by racialized conditions of labor and living. Readers wanted Wright to
perform his Southernness by writing principally about the South, as he does in “Big Boy
Leaves Home,” instead of turning to the North as he did in Native Son (1940). At the
urging of the Book of the Month Club, Wright shortened his autobiography American
Hunger to focus solely on his experiences in the South, in what became the memoir Black
Boy.102 The Book of the Month Club judges wanted him to focus on the South because
they had long had “an interest in literary regionalism” that stemmed from their belief—
expressed in a 1927 article by lead judge Henry Seidel Canby, and in a 1946 letter by
judge Dorothy Canfield Fisher—that American writers needed to investigate their local
roots.103 They also urged the changes because they disliked Wright’s implication that
racism was a systemic national problem, and imagined that limiting the description to the
South would situate racism as a uniquely regional problem, which would appease
Northern white liberals.104 The discussions about Wright’s identity hint at a broader
cultural anxiety about the region’s capacity—or desire—to stand in for the nation at
large, especially in matters of race and justice. And when Wright claimed, a few years
later, that his combination of Northern and Southern experiences made him uniquely
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qualified to write broadly about American race relations, that claim insisted upon a
relationship between region and nation very different from the one posited by authors like
Faulkner or critics like Canby and Fisher—whites who, despite their allegedly
progressive politics, overidentified with a notion of the South as white and unchanging.
This simultaneous critique/glorification of Southern backwardness is analogous to the
phenomenon that has guided the racialized definition of the Southern Gothic canon.105
The promises and dangers of movement between the local and the national are
dramatized in Big Boy’s final car ride north, which Bryant reads as indicative of an
acceleration towards freedom.106 Certainly this journey represents an escape on one level,
in that the immediate threat to Big Boy’s life has been temporarily removed. On another
level, the journey cannot truly be emancipatory: Big Boy makes this journey in terror,
concealed beneath a trapdoor. A voluntary imprisonment, in order to escape the unlawful
fate that would await him at the hands of the mob—but an imprisonment all the same.
The story’s last line, “He turned on his side and slept,” suggest that his salvation will be
only temporary; he will eventually wake from the comfort of sleep (53). As his
entrapment connotes the cramped and narrow beds that characterize prison life, the
emphasis on the repetitive daily routine of sleep forecloses Bryant’s reading of mobility.
Instead, the ending loops the day back into a pattern of black life in which these events—
accusation, murder, pursuit by a lynch mob—are commonplace.
If we read this “escape” not as escape but as imprisonment, or at least as a form of
punishment, the nascent procedural structure of “Big Boy Leaves Home” starts to
emerge. Like later legal procedurals, the story begins with a crime, or rather several
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arguable crimes: the trespassing, the white man’s shooting at the boys, and then Big
Boy’s shooting the white man in self-defense. But all the characters know from the
beginning that there is no chance of this situation being resolved through institutional
justice. The procedures of judgment take a different shape. When the survivors make it
back home, Big Boy’s parents question him at length about what happened:
“Big Boy, did yuh-all bother her?”
“Nawsah, Pa. We didnt touch her.”
“How long fo the white man come up?”
“Right erway.”
“Whut he say?”
“Nothin. He jus cussed us.”107
This dialogue, which continues on for some time, echoes an interrogation or examination
at trial in several ways. The topic is a crime, and the parents’ goal is to reach a decision
about Big Boy’s involvement and guilt. The parents’ ability to reach the truth of the
matter through this interrogation indicates Wright’s basic belief in the epistemological
conceit of interrogation—that questioning, done properly, can generate truth. At the same
time, this conversation has several notable differences from an interrogation or witness
examination. There is no courtroom, no jury, no cross-examination, no promise of
fairness or lack of bias. Only one party is participating in the “trial,” because the other
party, the white mob, has already rendered a judgment based only on race and rumor.
Bryant considers Big Boy’s survival to be a victory and a sign of future
exoneration. He emphasizes the fact that Big Boy is heading north while “carrying the
ocular, documentary evidence of unspeakable human rights violations.”108 But this
optimistic reading of the ending assumes that evidence is synonymous with justice, and
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that the existence of proof or testimony will naturally eventuate in the morally just
verdict. The particular tragedy of “Big Boy Leaves Home,” or any lynching narrative, is
that the punishment is delivered even if evidence exists that could theoretically avert that
punishment. (Not that the value of Big Boy’s testimony would be clear-cut even if the
case did go to trial—eyewitness testimony is one of the most notoriously unreliable types
of evidence, but also one of the types most likely to sway a jury.)109 Big Boy’s parents
embody the spirit of the law, but without the adversary’s participation in the ritual
procedures, Big Boy can never undergo the transformation into guilty or innocent that the
ritual promises. (See Introduction.) Hence the car ride can be both an escape and an
imprisonment. Hence Big Boy is eternally trapped in limbo: he has a valid defense, but
no court to which he can give that defense; he has evidence, but no jury to listen to the
evidence.
Unlike Faulkner’s “Dry September,” “Big Boy” is narrated from the perspective
of the accused, not the accusers and witnesses. The Mayes character in “Dry September”
is sympathetic, but always contains some element of caricature, some implication that his
victimhood is secondary to the story even as his murder provides the central plot. Big
Boy is a more complex, multi-dimensional character, and through him, Wright also offers
a more complex view of what the lack of due process looks like. Big Boy is not
wrongfully accused, per se; he and his friends were trespassing, and he did shoot the
white man, although he was acting in self-defense. But the conditions of the crime, the
justifiability of his actions, his mens rea, his fair punishment—none of these can be
reached without trial. Whereas a trial in “Dry September” is abstractly perceived by the
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white characters as “right,” in “Big Boy” the trial is a matter of the protagonist’s life or
death. Yet Big Boy never even imagines the possibility of a trial. His fantasy instead is
about retribution:
He jerked another blade and chewed. Yeah, ef Pa had only let im have the
shotgun! He could stan off a whole mob wid a shotgun. He looked at the ground
as he turned a shotgun over in his hands. Then he level it at an advancing white
man. Boooom! The man curled up. Another came. He reloaded quickly, and let
him have what the other had got. He too curled up. Then another came. He got the
same medicine. Then the whole mob swirled around him, and he blazed away,
getting as many as he could. They closed in; but by Gawd, he had done his part,
hadnt he? N the newspapersd say: NIGGER KILLS DOZEN OF MOB BEFO
LYNCHED! Er mabbe theyd say: TRAPPED NIGGER SLAYS TWENTY BEFO
KILLED! He smiled a little. That wouldn’t be so bad, would it? (50)
Perhaps Big Boy imagines this possibility because he is young and a trial is less
glamorous than the blazing showdown he imagines, but more likely, the idea of a trial is
so far outside reality that it does not even occur to him. The absence of law is
underscored again and again in Faulkner’s story, but in Wright’s story it is even more
absent, so absent that the trial is never even a fantasy.
This difference speaks to Koritha Mitchell’s commentary on the way that
photographs have become the best-known primary referent to lynching in popular
culture: because such images are necessarily taken by white bystanders not in danger of
being lynched, Mitchell writes, “when we treat images of mutilated bodies as the ultimate
evidence of lynching destruction, we reaffirm the authority of the mob.”110 Reading antilynching narratives by white authors such as Faulkner in isolation carries the same
consequences. Comparing “Dry September” to “Big Boy” reveals the extent to which
perceptions of the law’s proximity and accessibility depend on race. To Big Boy, the
distinction between federal and local law enforcement is irrelevant. The only reference to
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a potential divide in law comes early in the story, when the boys are talking and laughing,
before any violence or tragedy has occurred:
“Headin fer up Noth!”
“Blazin it down the line!”
“Lawd, Ahm goin Noth some day.”
“Me too, man.”
“They say colored folks up Noth is got ekual rights.” (20)
While Faulkner’s main characters refer to the North as the source of an oppressive
standardized justice, Wright’s main characters imagine the North as an idealized place of
equality and freedom. But this rumor of “ekual rights” remains only a rumor; even when
Big Boy is headed north in the car trunk at the end of the story, he has (and we have) no
guarantee that the North will be different. Only rumors, hearsay, and the continual
definition of the North and South as opposites to one another leave open the possibility
North could lack the violence that has destroyed his, his friends’, and his family’s lives in
the South.

Nested Narratives and Nested Courts in Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird
The decades after the publication of “Big Boy Goes Home” were transformative
in American society. The country went to war and won, ushering in a new period of
American military and economic dominance that was split through with cresting racial
tensions and further military conflicts. As described in the Introduction, these decades
also witnessed the development in the Supreme Court of total incorporation doctrine,
which said that the federal government was responsible for protecting all the rights
named in the Bill of Rights against abuse by individual states; in this way, many qualities
of a fair trial were federally standardized. The due process revolution thus shifted
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priorities towards individual rights and away from what Edwards calls “the peace” and
what Bodenhamer calls “the good order of society” (both terms are used in the context of
colonial America).111 Bodenhamer writes of the twentieth century’s new approach to the
conflict between local specificity and national standardization,
We accept the idea (if not the practice) of local standards and individual treatment
because it comports with popular notions of justice, even though it may contradict
expressed beliefs in equality and universal norms of due process. […] Only when
social and political change dictated a national policy in this [defendants’ rights]
and other areas did due process find a place on the agenda of federal judges.112
The “we” in this paragraph is too broad and unintentionally racialized; “popular notions”
legitimizes mob authority and erases the norms and ideals of the black community, while
“expressed beliefs” suggests that the “we” supports equality on the surface and thus
implies that the “we” is progressive and liberal. Despite these generalizations, which
pervade legal, literary, and critical understandings of local/federal conflict, Bodenhamer’s
point that “social and political change” were responsible for the due process revolution’s
reimagination of national authority is important. It points us towards a third wing of
change: cultural change, as effected by cultural production such as the lynching
narratives discussed above, which had illustrated the risks of local power and the
idealized, though racialized, promise of federal authority.
Around the time that the Supreme Court was issuing the more famous decisions
of the due process revolution—Mapp v. Ohio (1961), Gideon v. Wainwright (1963),
Miranda v. Arizona (1966)—courtroom narratives were becoming more popular in film,
radio, and television, which are discussed in the later chapters of this dissertation. Fiction,
too, saw a proliferation of courtroom representations. Compared to television and film,
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fiction was less subject to censorship either by government-related agencies such as the
Federal Communications Commission or ostensibly internal industry bodies such as the
Production Code Administration. Additionally, even when literature was banned, it was
mostly not for reasons relating to the representation of law or politics.113 In the twentieth
century, most literary censorship was related to perceived obscenity, but two Supreme
Court decisions, United States v. One Book Called Ulysses (1933) and Roth v. United
States (1957), chipped away at these bans. In Roth, which related to the use of the Post
Office to mail “obscene materials,” the Court ruled that material was protected by the
First Amendment if it had “even the slightest redeeming social importance.”114 Like any
medium, of course, literature was subject to the whims, preferences, and beliefs of
industry members: editors, publishers, sales and marketing teams, booksellers… But this
content limitation was more obscured, and I have found no evidence to suggest that there
was systemic industry censorship of prose representations of the law.
During the 1950s and 1960s, legal themes found a strong foothold in Southern
Gothic genre, where, as in the nineteenth-century texts studied by Bodziock and
Weinauer and the 1930s texts I describe earlier, the genre’s characteristics qualified it for
social critique. The most famous example—one of the most well-known Southern Gothic
texts, and perhaps the best-known American courtroom novel—is Harper Lee’s To Kill a
Mockingbird (1960), in which an upstanding black man Tom Robinson is accused of
raping Mayella Ewell, a poor white woman. The entire story, set in 1930s Alabama, is
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observed through the eyes of Scout Finch, the six-year-old daughter of Tom’s defense
lawyer, Atticus Finch. The case resembles a trial that Harper Lee witnessed in her youth,
as well as any number of historical trials about alleged rape of white women by black
men, including the Scottsboro trial and the case that led to the Shipp decision. To Kill a
Mockingbird holds a strange yet important place in American literary culture. It is widely
read in high schools, such that almost everyone who has attended an American school
through twelfth grade has read it. Yet there is also what Jennifer Murray describes as “the
recurrence of a need to justify having spent time on To Kill a Mockingbird in the first
place” and a sense that the novel is “a less than great novel” and yet, simultaneously, “a
novel worthy of critical consideration.”115 This doubt about Mockingbird’s validity as an
object of study partly relates to the questionable racial politics of the novel, which hold
up a white man as the savior of a disabled black man. It also partly relates to the novel’s
frequent inclusion on high school reading lists, and corresponding assumptions that the
novel is more basic or less skillful because of the age at which many readers encounter it
for the first time. Regardless of assessments of its aesthetic quality, the book’s popularity
attests to its importance as a cultural document—and in fact, a close examination of the
novel reveals a deceptively complex layering of perspectives that furthers its significance
as a legal procedural.
Fictionalizations of trials such as the one in Mockingbird are important because
they resolve issues of guilt through a cadre of evidence unavailable to the law. Thanks to
the differences between legal and literary epistemologies, evidence deemed incomplete
by historical evaluations—for example, character testimonies, primary sources, and
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alternative explanations—appears sufficient in a fictional context for the reader to
evaluate the individual’s guilt. There are several reasons for this, all of which play an
important role in the legal procedural’s function during this period. First, in fiction
written in first-person narration or limited third-person, we receive all of our information
about a situation through one source, who colors our perception. (This is another major
difference between Mockingbird and In Cold Blood, which is written in omniscient thirdperson.) Literary norms have accustomed us to receiving information this way in novels,
so we accept as valid evidence that may dismissed for excessive bias if it came from
historical accounts.116 Second, our awareness of the novel’s fictionality makes the
question of what “really” happened irrelevant; that is, while a lack of certainty seems
troublesome in a historical context, in fiction it is simply part of the game.
Mockingbird emphasizes readerly judgment through a heavily ironic structure.
Lee frequently uses irony to comic effect, sharing observations for which we understand
the underlying truth, but Scout does not, as when she wakes up and screeches that the
apocalypse has come. When Atticus informs her that what she thinks is the end of days is
actually just snow, we believe his adult perspective and our own sense that, in the realist
world of Mockingbird, snow is more likely than doom. Then we laugh at Scout’s error.
Through this process of observing and correcting, Lee suggests that truth is achieved
through the combination of multiple perspectives and the addition of information. What
Truman Capote accomplishes through the direct narration of extra information that the
courts ruled inadmissible (see Chapter 2), Lee accomplishes through the dialogic
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representation of different interpretations. Given the fame of the Mockingbird film
adaptation (1962), it is worth mentioning here that this process parallels the introduction
of multivalent cinematic languages into film. Multivalent languages are often considered
the direct result of censorship under the Hollywood Production Code, which is the focus
of the following chapter. In addition to forcing the incorporation of metaphor to describe
censored elements, the Production Code mandated solemnity in cinematic depictions of
justice in order to emphasize the solemnity of judicial proceedings. Seriousness and
humor in the justice system are also conjured by Shipp’s claim, discussed in Chapter 1,
that lynchings make a “mockery of justice.” The novel version of Mockingbird throws
this into question: while the novel has many solemn moments, its recurrent humor
suggests that comedy can serve a corrective role. When the mob descends upon the
jailhouse to lynch Tom and discovers Atticus out front protecting him, Scout interrupts
the angry confrontation. She singles out for conversation Mr. Cunningham, the father of
one of her schoolmates:
“He’s in my grade,” I said, “and he does right well. He’s a good boy,” I
added, “a real nice boy. We brought him home for dinner one time. Maybe he told
you about me, I beat him up one time but he was real nice about it. Tell him hey
for me, won’t you?”
Atticus had said it was the polite thing to talk to people about what they were
interested in, not about what you were interested in. Mr. Cunningham displayed
no interest in his son, so I tackled his entailment once more in a last-ditch effort to
make him feel at home.
[…] “Well, Atticus, I was just sayin’ to Mr. Cunningham that entailments are
bad an’ all that, but you said not to worry, it take a long time sometimes…. that
you all’d ride it out together…” (174)
Her innocence reminds Cunningham of a morality that exceeds community specificity,
even as its evidence—the Finches’ kindness to his son—is tied into community relations.
Trying to find an acceptable topic for conversation, she inadvertently reminds him of the
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ways in which his family is linked with theirs: “you all’d ride it out together.” In other
words, she successfully replaces an understanding of community as violent regulation
(the mob) with an understanding of community as bureaucratic co-operation—a
suggestion for how to maintain localism while allowing the state to wrest control of
justice away from the mob.
The combination of multiple perspectives that creates humor also permits a
rupture in which people can be forced to see a situation from a different perspective and
thus reconsider their prior assumptions. In this scene, Scout does not entirely understand
the men’s reactions or the situation’s danger, although we as readers are aware of them.
This ironic form is typical of Mockingbird, which is structured as a series of corrections
to Scout’s misconceptions. Her initial alienation from cultural norms qualifies her to
serve as an observer of Tom’s trial rather than an implicated participant. As a child, Scout
is linked to the system in a future sense—she will eventually become part of it—but she
is also set apart from it in the current moment. As the novel goes on, her misconceptions,
both small and large, are corrected and she is gradually pulled into society. Mockingbird
is often called a Bildungsroman, though there is some debate about whether the primary
character to undergo the transformation is Scout or her older brother, Jem.117 I believe
that Scout is indeed the transformation’s central object, but that the education into society
is not a sexual one or one of opposition to political forces, as Murray argues Jem’s
Bildung might be,118 but rather an education about injustice, racism, and the inherent
corruption of institutions. Lee suggests that children’s innocence is correlated with
justice, which is then contaminated by collective biases as the individual is trained into
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society. The Bildungsroman format aligns with the American justice system such that a
sentimental education is conditional on the discovery that courts are not void of human
bias. This elision provides another dimension for considering Joseph Slaughter’s claim
that the Bildungsroman and modern understandings of human rights are intrinsically
connected. Slaughter invokes the complex privileges implicit in the Bildungsroman form
when he writes that traditional Bildungsroman imply an “almost invisible literacy
privilege (ordinarily conceived of as a class privilege)” that is shared between the
protagonist and the reader, whereas postcolonial Bildungsroman frequently show the
protagonist learning to read and write “as a significant part of the curriculum vitae of
modern personality development.”119 In To Kill a Mockingbird, the privilege that
structures the narrative is one of racialized protection from the law. Like the barber in
Faulkner’s “Dry September,” the protagonist of Mockingbird is never directly
endangered by the law; Scout observes its unfairness from the outside, and while learning
about its unfairness is painful to her, there is never any real risk that the system will harm
her. The physical threats to her come first from the mob at the jail, then from Bob
Ewell—never from the law itself.
Much has been written and said about the representation of the law in
Mockingbird. The representation of Atticus as a lawyer in both the novel and film
versions has in particular received a great deal of attention, and that focus should be read
as congruent to the television depictions of defense attorneys that are analyzed in Chapter
Four.120 The other main area of attention scholars have paid to the law in Mockingbird is
119

Joseph R. Slaughter, Human Rights, Inc: The World Novel, Narrative Form, and
International Law (Fordham University Press, 2007), 286.
120
E.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, “To Kill A Mockingbird (1962): Lawyering in an Unjust
Society,” in Screening Justice--the Cinema of Law: Significant Films of Law, Order, and
75

in the distinction that the novel draws between the law and what several critics call “the
code.” This use of the term “code” is confusing, and not only because in literary studies
the word carries a host of other meanings related to structuralism and signification. It is
taken from Atticus’s famous comment that Mayella Ewell “has merely broken a rigid and
time-honored code of our society,” but scholars also use it synonymously with what legal
theorists call “moral law”; in the same paragraph that he references that quote from
Atticus, Robert O. Stephens draws an analogy between “legal evidence of rape versus
pictures in the minds of jurors” and “the difference between the law that people are
presumed to live by and the code they actually follow.”121 Meanwhile, Claudia Johnson
refers to “the disjunction between the codes men and women profess and those they live
by.”122 Both Stephens and Johnson connect their arguments about “living by” various
codes to the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education decision and school desegregation.
This interpretation makes sense to a certain extent, given that Scout attends school
and several crucial scenes in Mockingbird take place in the classroom, but it also seems
to miss the point of the very passage that Johnson quotes at the beginning of her article, a
paragraph from Atticus’s closing argument:
There is one way in this country in which all men are created equal—there is one
human institution that makes a pauper the equal of a Rockefeller, the stupid man
the equal of an Einstein, and the ignorant man the equal of any college president.
That institution, gentlemen, is a court. It can be the Supreme Court of the United
States or the humblest J.P. court in the land, or this honorable court which you
serve. Our courts have their faults, as does any human institution, but in this
country our courts are the great levelers, and in our courts all men are created
equal. (233)
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The language of equality does indeed echo the rhetoric of school integration efforts. But
to read this passage as a progressive statement on civil rights is to miss several important
components of the novel and the argument being raised. First of all, this passage is
explicitly about criminal justice, and it should be read first and foremost as a commentary
on that topic rather than an oblique reference to the related but distinct movement of
school integration. Second of all, Johnson contends that Mockingbird “presents the
argument that the forces that motivate society are not consonant with the democratic
ideals embedded in its legal system.”123 But the idea that democratic ideals are perfectly
“embedded” in the American legal system, and especially in the criminal justice system,
is both untrue and anachronistic. Part of the problem is that while Stephens, Johnson, and
innumerable other Mockingbird critics have spent a great deal of time excavating the
historical context of the Scottsboro Boys cases that the novel is partly based on, they have
paid much less attention—in fact, no attention—to the status of criminal rights at the time
the novel was written. Another part of the problem is that they have neglected the
changes that occurred between Mockingbird’s publication and the articles’ creation: by
the time Stephens and Johnson wrote these articles in the 1990s, the concept of a
nationally standardized criminal justice system was so fully entrenched in American
thought—thanks in part, I argue, to the myths created by legal procedurals such as
Mockingbird—that it appeared to have always been this way. Stephens and Johnson
accidentally implanted 1990s criminal justice discourse in their analyses of this 1960
reimagining of a 1930s trial.
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Let us return to the quote from Atticus’s closing argument, from the perspective
of midcentury criminal rights discourse. Atticus says that there is one way in which “all
men are created equal,” a single “human institution” that accomplishes the complete
flattening of social class. This city-on-a-hill language imagines the United States as the
pinnacle of democracy and equality and insists upon the central role that American courts
play in ensuring this position. But which American courts? Atticus conflates them all,
saying that “the Supreme Court of the United States,” “the humblest J.P. court,” or the
local court to which he is speaking all share the same ideals of equality. The tension
inherent in this sentence, however, reveals itself in the very effort it takes to smooth over
the distinctions between these many courts. Clearly there are differences between how
these courts are perceived, because they must all be named in order to be included under
the banner of “a court,” and in that naming they are separated out again. The other type of
difference that Atticus attempts to flatten is historical difference. The present tense and
passive voice are used to obscure the historical narrative of the criminal justice system’s
development. We only hear how the courts are now. He affirms the legal system as
permanent, unyielding, enduring—just as Supreme Court decisions frequently resist
implications about their historical context. This passage is therefore a construction site
for the very same myth that has generated so many misinterpretations of the passage.
Atticus’s speech functions essentially as propaganda for the due process revolution.
The issue Johnson and Stephens see in Mockingbird is a competition between
written law and the underlying principles of that law. We can also see the book as a
competition between written law and moral law. But more importantly, we should look at
the novel, and at other Southern Gothic legal procedurals, as a competition between
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scales of law: community, state, and federal.124 Individuals are conflicted about the
relationship between these scales, confused by the system’s opacity and distance, but
outraged and endangered by the local alternative’s bias. Where literary conventions pivot
to meet social context, the individual character in the 1960s Southern Gothic is trapped
within the many nested and competing cylinders of law: a new, bureaucratized form of
the claustrophobic Gothic space.

Whitetown, Blacktown, North, South in James Baldwin’s Blues for Mister Charlie
A similar description of the multiple scales of justice arise in James Baldwin’s
1964 play Blues for Mister Charlie, which is based on the well-known murder of
fourteen-year-old Emmett Till. The play is another important example of how authors
combined Southern Gothic aesthetics with a courtroom setting and intervened in states’
rights debates. Although Blues was a play rather than prose fiction, it in some ways can
be read as an extension of Baldwin’s prose career, which frequently engaged with
theatrical themes but rarely turned towards the stage form itself.125 He had risen to fame
as a prose stylist, and Blues for Mister Charlie was his first finished play, aside from a
1958 stage adaptation of Giovanni’s Room. He used many traditionally novelistic
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techniques, especially the flashback, in constructing Blues for Mister Charlie. Indeed, the
prose qualities of Baldwin’s writing may have been one reason why many viewers found
the play heavy-handed when it was first performed.126
To the contemporary critic, the play’s visceral anger is one of its most remarkable
and important characteristics. Christopher Metress writes that in Blues, Baldwin is
“writing large for the blind, shouting loud for the hard of hearing, all in an attempt to
shock white people out of their complacency.”127 When he wrote Blues, Baldwin was still
being roundly criticized by other black writers, critics, and activists, both for his
homosexuality and for a perceived veneration of white culture at the expense of
reproducing black stereotypes.128 In 1963, black nationalists criticized what they
perceived as the conciliatory tone of his new essay collection The Fire Next Time.129 In
the coming years, Baldwin became increasingly invested in black militant strategies and
less interested in collaboration between whites and blacks. In 1972, he told George
Goodman Jr. of the New York Times that his disappointment in the Civil Rights
Movement had led to a hospital stay during which he realized that “our destinies are in
our hands, black hands, and no one else’s.”130 Blues for Mister Charlie was produced and
published in the middle of this transition, in 1964, only a year after Baldwin participated
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in the March on Washington. Its racial politics should therefore be read both as the
continuation of a more conciliatory approach, as represented in the white character of
Parnell James, and as an early entry into a more polemical literary and political space.
Aside from being a play rather than prose, there are other reasons why Blues has
not often been thought of in conversation with Southern Gothic literature. In addition to
the same racism in canon formation that has excluded Wright from the category, Baldwin
had no direct personal geographic attachment to the South. Baldwin says in the preface
that he thinks of the play as being set in “Plaguetown, U.S.A.” (xv), and Richard tells his
grandmother that despite superficial differences, the North is no better than the South for
African-Americans:
I convinced Daddy that I’d be better off in New York—and Edna, she convinced
him too, she said it wasn’t as tight for a black man up there as it is down here.
Well, that’s a crock, Grandmama, believe me when I tell you. At first I thought it
was true, hell, I was just a green country boy and they ain’t got no signs up, dig,
saying you can’t go here or you can’t go there. No, you got to find that out all by
your lonesome. (19-20)
But while Baldwin certainly believes that racism is a pervasive national crisis, he also
vividly and specifically evokes the South. In a flashback, Richard complains, “What I
can’t get over is—what in the world am I doing here? Way down here in the ass-hole of
the world, the deep, black, funky South” (17). Lyle rants that Richard “went North and
got ruined and come back here to make trouble” (13). Part of what Blues illustrates,
therefore, is the extent to which racism, law, and states’ rights were tied up with Southern
settings in the national imagination.
When the play begins, charges are brought against Lyle Britten, a white man, for
the murder of Richard Henry a week earlier. Simply getting the charges brought against
Lyle has proven difficult, and has been orchestrated partly by the white Parnell James, the
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editor of the local newspaper and a friend of Britten’s. The first two acts describe the
days leading up to the trial, and the third one shows the trial itself. All three acts feature
numerous flashbacks,131 during which the events leading up to Richard Henry’s death are
shown, with the eventual revelation that Lyle shot Richard not in self-defense, as he
claims during the trial, but point-blank as revenge for Richard insulting him for his
impotency. The play suggests the impossibility of mounting a fair trial for interracial
crime in a community with such rampant and obvious racism, and the undertones of mob
violence are apparent throughout the play. Richard has recently returned from the North
with a new perspective on race relations, but Baldwin does not situate the North as an
entirely redemptive space; in the North, Richard has also become addicted to drugs (29).
Like To Kill a Mockingbird, Blues has a structure that encourages dramatic irony
and therefore gives the audience more information than any single character has. In
Blues, the structural element is the flashback, which shows conversations and sometimes
monologues that explain or disprove characters’ claims. The most chilling example
comes in the final scene of the play, which shows the scene of Richard’s death and
reveals that Lyle shot Richard in cold blood because he felt he wasn’t being appropriately
deferential. This scene, and others like it, show that the diegetic trial only provides a
limited view into the truth. The flashbacks are what enable the audience or reader to
determine the veracity of accusations such as Jo’s assertion that Richard sexually
assaulted her. The other way to question these assertions—though, importantly, not
disprove them—is through other characters’ voiced interpretations of what happened. For
example, during Jo’s courtroom testimony about the alleged assault, Blacktown expresses
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doubt in the truth of the account (100-105). As in In Cold Blood, literature provides the
opportunity to expand upon details that are truncated or compressed by trial procedures.
As in To Kill a Mockingbird, literature provides the possibility of juxtaposing multiple
characters’ perspective, with the suggestion that this helps us arrive at an unbiased truth.
These are the two qualities of literature, then, that enable it to offer correctives and
alternatives to the justice system: its quality of expansion, and its quality of multiple
perspectives.
In Blues for Mister Charlie, a discussion about a fair trial immediately swings
towards a federal-local shift:
REV. PHELPS: I saw the Chief of Police the other day. He really doesn’t want to
do it, but his hands are tied. It’s orders from higher up, from the North.
LYLE: Shoot, I know old Frank don’t want to arrest me. I understand. I ain’t
worried. I know the people in this town is with me. I got nothing to worry about.
ELLIS: They trying to force us to put niggers on the jury—that’s what I hear.
Claim it won’t be a fair trial if we don’t.
HAZEL: Did you ever hear anything like that in your life?
LYLE: Where they going to find the niggers?
ELLIS: Oh, I bet your buddy, Parnell, has got that all figured out.
LYLE: How about it, Parnell? You going to find some niggers for them to put on
that jury?
PARNELL: It’s not up to me. But I might recommend a couple.
GEORGE: And how they going to get to court? You going to protect them?
PARNELL: The police will protect them. Or the State troopers—
GEORGE: That’s a good one!
PARNELL: Or Federal marshals. (56)
Like the character in “Dry September” who tells an advocate for due process to “go back
to the North,” Southern characters in Blues for Mister Charlie construct their Southern
identity in opposition to decisions about criminal procedure that they see as Northern.
The orders to hold the trial come from “higher up, from the North,” equating the legal
hierarchy with latitudinal position. At the time Blues was written, the federal government
had been enforcing multiracial juries to various degrees of success for more than eight
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decades, since the 1879 decision Strauder v. West Virginia ruled that categorically
excluding individuals from juries on the basis of their race was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, a decision that was reiterated and expanded in the 1935 case Norris v.
Alabama, which arose out of the Scottsboro Boys trial. In practice, however, the rules of
peremptory challenge, in which defense or prosecution can dismiss particular jurors,
allowed all-white juries for another century. Not until the 1986 Supreme Court case
Batson v. Kentucky was it made illegal to exclude jurors by peremptory challenge based
on their race. In the last two decisions, as in the other decisions of the due process
revolution, the Supreme Court extended the federal government’s power over state and
local courts. In this passage from Blues for Mister Charlie, Ellis’s use of “force us”
demonstrates anger about this exercise of power and top-down decision-making. Baldwin
also draws our attention to the cylindrical structures of judicial power when the question
of protecting black jurors comes up, and Parnell quickly moves from local police to state
troopers to federal marshals. George suggests that the first two would cooperate with
town sentiment, but does not object to the invocation of federal marshals; it seems that
this is the only authority seen as likely to quell town revolt.
During the trial, the town’s racial dynamics are underscored by the segregation of
whites and blacks into WHITETOWN and BLACKTOWN on stage.132 Throughout the
testimonies, as objections are lobbed at the witnesses, lines are allocated to this collective
rather than individuals. These opinions are usually directly contradictory.
BLACKTOWN. Man, that’s the southern white lady you supposed to be willing
to risk death for!
WHITETOWN. You know, this is a kind of hanging in reverse? Niggers out here
to watch us being hanged! (83)
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The conflicting perspectives underscore the extent to which the assessment of a fair trial,
at a local level, depends on the viewer’s race and background. The play is not impartial
on whose perspective is valid; Baldwin’s critique of white privilege and the blindness of
white supremacy is searing. As in To Kill a Mockingbird, the combination of perspectives
creates an irony that opens a back door into the the deep ideological structures of racism.
Whitetown’s claim that the trial is a “hanging in reverse,” that the black residents are
there “to watch us being hanged,” points towards their latent awareness both that mob
justice runs in opposition to the theory of a fair trial, and that trials are not inherently
unbiased proceedings. The bleed between mob justice and trials is underlined by the stage
directions for the courtroom scenes, which specify that “one should be aware of masses
of people outside and one should sometimes hear their voices—their roar—as well as
singing from the church” (81). As the “roar” of a mob streams through the windows, the
courtroom loses its claim to an unbiased space. The church singing resonates with
Baldwin’s larger correlation between religion and civil rights, a unity that leaders of the
Civil Rights Movement also drew heavily on. Yet the church singing has the secondary,
perhaps unintentional effect of also challenging the secularism of the church, suggesting
that religion is needed to quell a secular, unchristian segregation.133 Whitetown’s
assertion that a trial must be equivalent to a lynching indicates a refusal of the concept of
a fair trial on a local but systemic level. In conjunction with the earlier exchange about
jury composition, the trial scene implies that a less racialized trial can only be
accomplished through national mandate, although the local applications of such mandates
may also inevitably fail, as local bias overtakes standardized procedure.
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Change of Venue as Imagined Procedure
In order to standardize the criminal justice system across the United States, trials
had to be brought out from under the influence of local mobs. The procedure that
promised this outcome was change of venue, a procedure in which a trial is moved
outside the jurisdiction where it occurred, in order to prevent the selection of a biased
jury. Like the voir dire process of jury selection, change of venue emphasizes the
perceived importance of trial actors’ lack of prior knowledge of the crime. That logic
differs from colonial America, where people’s pre-existing knowledge about the situation
was seen as a means of ensuring a more informed decision.134 As with other court
procedures, such as an impartial judge or silence in the court, the underlying motivation
behind change of venue and voir dire is to protect the trial from outside infection. Change
of venue procedure is unique from other procedures, however, in that it equates opinion
with physical location. It assumes that in some cases, a place can become actually
incapable of being the site of a fair trial, not only due to individual jurors’ pre-existing
opinions but also due to atmosphere, noise, observers, and more. In some ways, change
of venue encapsulates the effort towards federalization, both because it seeks to make
trials neutral by removing them from local context, and because the concept of moving a
trial to another location assumes that trial procedures are interchangeable across state and
local lines.
In the early twentieth-century, anti-lynching advocates were interested in change
of venue as a way to prevent the formation of lynch mobs in the event that the accused
134
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was either found not guilty or was granted an executive pardon. In a questionnaire
conducted by the SCSL of judges, lawyers, and legislators, 123 out of 198 respondents
believed that a change of venue “often averts a threatened lynching.”135 The SCSL
suggested that a law be implemented that forced the “compulsory removal of prisoners in
certain types of cases.”136 Such a bill was indeed introduced into the North Carolina
Senate in 1931, but failed to pass, allegedly because the relocations would be too
expensive. The procedure was extremely rare. Anecdotal examples from the
questionnaires elaborated:
One lawyer says, “I do not know of any case where change (of venue) has been
granted in Georgia. Strangely enough, I do not think this statute has been
practised in Georgia.” Another says, “My observation is that this is a worthless
provision, and the judge does not on his own motion change the venue.” A third
says: “You can hardly get a change of venue in Georgia. It should be granted
often when it is not. Many defendants go to trial when a fair trial is impossible.
Our statute is all right—but politics are not.”137
Between 1858 and 1926, the authors of the SCSL’s study results found only 36 cases in
which defendants appealed on the basis of trial courts refusing to grant a change of
venue.138 This small number could be due to a number of factors: the procedure being
rarely requested, convicted individuals having limited access to appeals, or an
understanding that change of venue was a difficult grounds for appeal, because it
occurred only at the trial court’s discretion. What the small number of appeals does tell
us, when added to the survey anecdotes and compared to the 3,753 lynchings that took
place between 1889 and 1932 alone (as well as the innumerable lynchings of which the
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SCSL did not have proof),139 is that change of venue as a successful legal procedure was
nearly nonexistent compared to the amount of mob violence that took place. This
disproportionate relationship indicates that even before we consider its literary
representations, change of venue was in some senses already an especially fictional or
fantastic procedure.
Although the historical scholarship on change of venue is extremely limited,
change of venue requests seem to have increased in number during the twentieth century,
based on Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in the 1961 case Irvin v. Dowd, where
the court ruled that defendants must be granted as many changes of venue as necessary to
secure a fair trial:
Of course, I agree with the Court's opinion. But this is, unfortunately, not an
isolated case that happened in Evansville, Indiana, nor an atypical miscarriage of
justice due to anticipatory trial by newspapers, instead of trial in court before a
jury.
More than one student of society has expressed the view that not the least
significant test of the quality of a civilization is its treatment of those charged with
crime, particularly with offenses which arouse the passions of a community. One
of the rightful boasts of Western civilization is that the State has the burden of
establishing guilt solely on the basis of evidence produced in court and under
circumstances assuring an accused all the safeguards of a fair procedure. These
rudimentary conditions for determining guilt are inevitably wanting if the jury
which is to sit in judgment on a fellow human being comes to its task with its
mind ineradicably poisoned against him. How can fallible men and women reach
a disinterested verdict based exclusively on what they heard in court when, before
they entered the jury box, their minds were saturated by press and radio for
months preceding by matter designed to establish the guilt of the accused. A
conviction so secured obviously constitutes a denial of due process of law in its
most rudimentary conception.140
Change of venue, Frankfurter argues, can theoretically accomplish the essential task of
separating the trial out from the unstandardized, unproceduralized judgment of mob
139
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justice. Frankfurter also notes, without apparent solution, that change of venue is a
procedure that takes two central tenets of the Constitution, fair trial and the freedom of
the press, and pits them against one another.
It is difficult to ascertain the percentage of criminal trials in the 1950s and 1960s
that requested or were granted a change of venue. The number of criminal cases is too
large and (ironically) too dispersed across jurisdictions to generate a satisfactory statistic
without an immense amount of archival research and legal expertise. Nor are newspaper
accounts necessarily helpful: sensational trials were more likely to merit a change of
venue, so the change of venue was more likely to be reported. More importantly in the
context of this dissertation, these statistics on how often a change of venue was actually
pursued as a procedure would not be especially easy to judge against midcentury legal
procedurals, because in these texts, the procedure is immediately discarded before it is
even legally pursued. For example, in Richard Wright’s Native Son:
“A change of venue is of no value now. The same condition of hysteria exists all
over this state.” (348)
In To Kill A Mockingbird:
“Nobody around here’s up to anything, it’s that Old Sarum bunch I’m worried
about… can’t you get a—what is it, Heck?”
“Change of venue,” said Mr. Tate. “Not much point in that, now is it?”
Atticus said something inaudible. I turned to Jem, who waved me to silence. (165)
And, finally, in Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood:
The advisability of requesting a change of venue was discussed, but as the elderly
Mr. Fleming warned his client, ‘It wouldn’t matter where in Kansas the trial was
held. Sentiment’s the same all over the state. We’re probably better off in Garden
City. This is a religious community. […] And most of the ministers are opposed
to capital punishment, say it’s immoral, unchristian […] (266)
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Change of venue is proposed—but never actually requested. As soon as the possibility of
a change of venue is raised, it is dismissed as impractical or irrelevant. These examples
deny the fundamental assumption of change of venue, which is that different localities
can be separated out ideologically. In these texts, change of venue appears inherently
belated: once there is enough “hysteria” to merit a change of venue, the “sentiment” has
spread far enough that it cannot be escaped. Again and again, lawyers lament that a
change of venue “wouldn’t matter,” would be useless and “of no value” because opinion
is “the same all over the state.” Some of the characters making these statements are
defense lawyers, who should theoretically pursue any defense for their client, and aside
from Fleming, whose effectiveness as an attorney is thrown into question, they are good
and sympathetic lawyers.141 So why do they dismiss the idea of a change of venue so
quickly? And why does the change of venue proposal persist in these texts if it will never
be granted?
The answer to the first question is at least partly a matter of craft. From a
narratological standpoint, the author must deny the change of venue in order to facilitate
the construction of drama and moral dilemma in the trial. A change of venue would
theoretically remove the threat of mob justice and biased decision-making. But if those
threats are removed, the narrative’s central conflict is removed, too. The refusal of a
change of venue is on some level also about historical fidelity to the source: Native Son,
To Kill A Mockingbird, and In Cold Blood are based (to varying extents of nonfictionality) on existing trials that derived their dramatic narratives from the tension
141
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between the court of law and the lynch mob. If these trials had been given a change of
venue, they may have been more fair, but they would not have commanded historical
attention and would not have been good examples of the type of racial tension and mob
mentality that the authors wanted to illustrate. In other words, and this will remain
extremely important as we continue to consider the relationship between due process and
its literary representation: The very thing that might make a trial more fair is the thing
that makes it less narratively interesting.
So if the change of venue will inevitably be denied, and swiftly, why does it
emerge in these texts in the first place? I argue that there are two reasons. First,
references to change of venue simultaneously support and deny the view that legal
procedure can successfully control the tensions wrought by local bias. If the change of
venue were granted, the characters fatalistically suggest, nothing would change—and yet
obviously the narrative would change, because its setting would be shifted and it would
become detached from the local particularity that structures these texts. Second, these
recurrent mentions of ungranted changes of venue provide a commentary on the complex
relationships between county, region, state, and nation as jurisdictions and settings. The
repetition of change of venue as something that fails because opinion is “the same all
over the state” suggests that the local, the regional, and the state are all essentially
interchangeable as loci of bias. They all stand in opposition to the ostensibly neutral and
unbiased federal justice system. This opposition is underscored by the texts’ repeated
invocations of the “state,” and the characters’ assumptions that if the trial were
transferred somewhere, it would still be transferred in-state, when in reality changes of
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venue also frequently occur across state lines. But depicting that as an option would
imply that racial bias is a national problem.
The reticence to make that implication is interesting, given that all three authors
who reject change of venue in these terms seem to see their cases as illustrative of general
problems in American society, and all three authors are frequently included in American
literature courses for the same reason. And Wright, for one, had explicitly asserted his
capacity to speak to the national nature of systemic racism. Yet these authors stumble
when it comes to the justice system crossing state or regional lines. Even though the
change of venue will never even be requested in the narrative, its foreclosure also
becomes a site for representing the consolidation of public opinion within state lines. This
strange contradiction speaks to the degree to which midcentury American culture
muddled together the local and the state as the biased counterparts to the unbiased federal
system. To say, as Max does in Native Son, that the “same condition of hysteria exists all
over the state” simultaneously expands local opinion far beyond the individual
community, and firmly quarantines opinion’s spread within state lines.
This bewilderment of geography—the panic over the contagion of local opinion,
the erasure of the nation in favor of the region, the oblique sense that federal law is both
oppressive and perfected—comes from the same element that caused Justice Frankfurter
so much anxiety: the media. Newspapers appear again and again in these Southern Gothic
works, both the ur-legal procedurals of the 1930s and the more fully realized legal
procedurals of the 1960s. Big Boy dreams his life in headlines as he hides in the bushes;
McLendon’s wife is reading a magazine when he comes in and beats her. In
Mockingbird, the newspaper editor Mr. Underwood defends Atticus from the mob and,
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after Tom’s conviction, writes an editorial that rails against the injustice of the decision.
For some characters, newspapers promise hope, accountability, revenge. Yet these
representations also fear the media’s uncontrollability: the way in which newspapers
guide public opinion, enable rumors, and change the course of criminal punishment
without proper procedure. In Native Son, newspapers tighten the net around Bigger
Thomas. In In Cold Blood, Capote (a journalist himself!) writes scathingly of the
newspapermen hovering around the courthouse. In Blues for Mister Charlie, Jo says to
Lyle he will be arrested because, “We had so much trouble in this town lately and it’s
been in all the northern newspapers—and now, this—this dead boy—” (10). In
Mockingbird, Scout’s classmate brings in a newspaper article that prompts an American
exceptionalist definition of rights and democracy:
She printed DEMOCRACY in large letters. “Democracy,” she said. “Does
anybody have a definition?”
“Us,” somebody said.
I raised my hand, remembering an old campaign slogan Atticus had once told me
about.
“What do you think it means, Jean Louise?”
“‘Equal rights for all, special privileges for none,’” I quoted.
“Very good, Jean Louise, very good,” Miss Gates smiled. In front of
DEMOCRACY, she printed WE ARE A. “Now class, say it all together, ‘We are
a democracy.’”
We said it. Then Miss Gates said, “That’s the difference between America and
Germany. We are a democracy and Germany is a dictatorship.” (281)
In these texts, newspapers simultaneously circumvent legal procedure and embody the
nationalizing of popular culture. They enable local bias and they supersede it. These
myriad representations of newspapers illustrate the bewilderment that attended the
rapidly changing media ecology of the early- to midcentury United States, where news
was shared faster and further than ever before. These literary descriptions of newspapers

93

also demonstrate awareness of the central but complicated role that cultural texts,
including novels and stories, play in the ideological formation of criminal rights.
I wrote at the beginning of this chapter that it was difficult to explain the legal
procedural as a historically contingent genre of literature without also alluding to the
formula’s increased codification in other media during the same time. But it is equally
difficult to understand film and television legal procedurals without also understanding
the cultural articulation of federal-state tensions that was illustrated in literature’s more
regionalist content. Furthermore, the comparison of these very different literary texts
reveals that, even when there were not media-specific pressures towards standardization,
as there were in film and television, a level of uniformity was nevertheless baked into the
legal procedural’s structure. Faulkner, Wright, Lee, and Baldwin made vastly different
choices of style and subject, with different personal motivations behind those choices—
but when it came to representing courtroom procedures, there is an undeniable continuity
between their texts. Champions of literary fiction may want to argue that the medium
provided more opportunities for challenging state ideology than the “mass culture” of
film and television, and it is true that the single-author circumstances of production of
literature do tend to enable more authorial control compared to the studio and network
processes of film and television, which means there are fewer checks on individual
political expression. (This claim will become more evident as we see mechanisms of
censorship and competition guiding film and television content production in Chapters 3
and 4.) Yet the remarkable repetition of tropes across these selected literary texts,
especially the 1960s texts, also suggests that representations of courtrooms in an era of
ostensible legal uniformity tend to produce repetition as a signal feature of the genre. In
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this way, even highbrow literary legal procedurals produce a generic contract with the
reader that guides that reader’s expectations for future interactions with books, films, and
television shows about the law.
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CHAPTER 2
IN COLD BLOOD, THE EXPANSION OF PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE, AND THE
CORRECTIVE POWER OF TRUE CRIME142

About three-quarters of the way into Truman Capote’s nonfiction book In Cold
Blood (1966), the confessed murderers Dick Hickock and Perry Smith are finally put on
trial for their seemingly irrational killing of the Clutters, a prosperous Kansas farming
family. They plead not guilty by reason of insanity, and their defense relies on a
combination of psychiatric testimony and character witnesses, both of which are
frequently and successfully challenged by the prosecution. In one such example, a prison
chaplain who knew Perry Smith during a previous jail term offers Perry’s artistic talent as
proof of his humanity:
The Reverend Post survived somewhat longer, for he made no direct attempt to
compliment the prisoner, but described sympathetically an encounter with him at
Lansing. “I first met Perry Smith when he came to my office in the prison chapel
with a picture he had painted—a head-and-shoulders portrait of Jesus Christ done
in pastel crayon. He wanted to give it to me for use in the chapel. It’s been
hanging on the walls of my office ever since.”
Fleming said, “Do you have a photograph of that painting?” The minister had
an envelope full; but when he produced them, ostensibly for distribution among
the jurors, an exasperated Logan Green leaped to his feet: “If Your Honor please,
this is going too far…” His Honor saw that it went no further.143
Although the judge prevented character witnesses from making more overt claims such as
“Perry was a very likable fellow,” he allows the Reverend to describe Smith’s artistic
142
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skill. Describe, but not show: the judge stops Fleming before he can produce a
photograph of the work in question, permitting only the second-hand account of the work
of art. The Reverend’s apparent conviction that Smith’s artwork serves as evidence of his
emotional depth matches Capote’s general figuration of Smith as a delusional, troubled,
inventive, brilliant, and damaged soul—a complex representation that resists traditional
notions of evil and then-emergent theories of sociopathy. Yet because it is successfully
challenged by the prosecutor, this evidence never enters into the courtroom. The
photographs of the painting vanish back into their envelope, and the trial continues
without elaboration.
This process is a familiar trope from legal procedurals, which often show lawyers
battling over whether certain kinds of information fall outside the realm of acceptable
evidence and should be withheld from the jury for fairness’s sake. These debates about
evidence exclusion are often exaggerated and leveraged in order to maximize diegetic
drama; their importance for the structure and pacing of a narrative means that they can
easily become disconnected from legal reality. But the claims about evidence exclusion,
like other claims to procedural verisimilitude, usually maintain some form of contact with
said procedure. In this chapter, I will zero in how In Cold Blood, by playing with the
principles of exclusion and admissibility in the context of the insanity defense, asserts (1)
literature’s central role in the formation of legal culture, and (2) the persistent interplay
between different forms of cultural narrative (in this case, legal and literary narratives).
Although there are a range of ways in which evidence admissibility factors into
the Smith/Hickock trial and into In Cold Blood, the theme is most overt on the topic of
the insanity defense and the exclusion or admission of psychiatric evidence. The
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particular iterations of the exclusion theme in In Cold Blood are shaped by the legalhistorical moment of the text’s creation during the 1950s and 1960s, and by the literaryhistorical question of the text’s relationship to the new genres of true crime and the legal
procedural. My analysis understands the relationship between legal and literary narrative
structures as historically contingent; at the same time, I take In Cold Blood as an
individual work with a unique position in the evolution of these genres. I argue that
Capote’s text owes its canonicity in part to its mediation between procedure’s liberalized
exclusion of inculpatory evidence, and popular culture’s liberalized inclusion of
exculpatory evidence—a dyad that energized midcentury legal and literary discourse and
became a central feature of the true crime genre.
By combining legal history with literary analysis, I respond to major questions in
both literary studies and legal history about In Cold Blood and its context. In literary
studies, these questions are about the relationship between hyperrealism and strategic
omission in Capote’s work, which has given rise to a number of contradictions and
conflicting interpretations among Capote scholars. In legal history, while the
standardization of criminal rights in the mid-twentieth-century has received significant
attention from doctrinal scholars, less attention has been paid to the actual ways in which
these changes to criminal rights law were translated and received in American popular
culture. The lacunae in both fields can be remedied by using the other’s methodology: the
legal context of In Cold Blood helps explain the contradictions that undergird the text’s
literary form, while the literary context reveals the complicated ways in which literary
interpretation adapted and corrected evidence admissibility laws. For this reason, I
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present In Cold Blood as both a seminal literary text and a prime example of an emergent
mode of representing the law.
Legal scholars refer to the 1950s and 1960s as the “due process revolution”—a
series of Supreme Court decisions intended to protect the rights of the accused from state
abuse. Principally undertaken by the Warren Court, the due process revolution
federalized and standardized criminal rights such as the right to a lawyer, the right to
refuse an unwarranted search, and the right to an impartial jury of peers. The legal
arguments were rooted in the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and
represented both a victory for criminal rights advocates and a stunning blow to supporters
of states’ rights. A number of these decisions—including Mapp v. Ohio (1961) and
Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)—were handed down during the six years that Capote was
writing In Cold Blood. Other landmark decisions had been issued in the years leading up
to the Clutter murder. In Cold Blood thus emerged out of—and was then released into—
an environment in which criminal procedure was undergoing significant debate and
revision. The book contains many references to legal procedures changed under the due
process revolution. For example, in Perry and Dick’s later appeals, they claimed their
trial had been unfair due to judge and jury bias and inadequate counsel, and Capote lays
the groundwork for these claims in his accounts of the trial. But the bulk of his narration
of legal details is devoted to the question of evidence admissibility, and particularly the
instance of the insanity defense.
Evidence admissibility refers to the concept, common to modern legal systems,
that some evidence can be excluded from the jury’s decision, either as a matter of law or
at the judge’s discretion. Evidence admissibility can be a mechanism for standardizing
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the events in many disparate courtrooms, because a legislative change to the rules of
exclusion—for example, the decision that wiretapping is an illegal search—will influence
what evidence is presented in each court case covered by the new law’s jurisdiction. For
this reason, evidence admissibility is key to the protection of many criminal rights, and it
was mechanistically essential to many advances in the mid-twentieth-century criminal
rights revolution.144 Likewise, it became an important formal and thematic element of the
emergent legal procedural genre, including one of the genre’s best-known examples, In
Cold Blood.
This chapter focuses on the procedural issue that was the central legal question of
Hickock and Smith’s trial and then the central moral question of Capote’s book: the
insanity defense. Rather than focus on the changing medical discourse around insanity
during the mid-twentieth century—a topic that has already filled any number of
books145—I will consider the insanity defense as an issue of evidence admissibility,
arguing that forensic psychiatry’s use in the courtroom formally resembles other
procedures of evidence exclusion. Analyzing the insanity defense as a matter of form
rather than of shifting scientific norms allows me to draw out the formal similarities
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between legal procedure and literary form and to contend that In Cold Blood’s structure
reproduces the formal structure of evidence exclusion. This perspective explains how
Capote construes the relationship between law and literature, and thereby gives new
insight into why he spends so much of his text discussing the insanity defense and other
legal issues.
In addressing the formal similarities between law and literature, this chapter
enters into a conversation about law and narrative that has become increasingly nuanced
in recent years, and which I describe in more detail in this dissertation’s introduction.
Simon Stern points out that although the interdisciplinary conversation between law and
literature has become extremely popular, both disciplines have tended to cannibalize the
other’s documents for their own purposes, with law using literature as a mechanism of
moral education, and literature using law as yet another “text” to dissect while discarding
its nonlinguistic elements.146 He writes that courses on law and literature “treat legal and
literary writings as mutually constitutive productions of a particular historical period,” a
relatively recent approach whose development coincides with what Greta Olson identifies
as legal studies’ “narrative turn,” in which scholars unearth narrative’s centrality to the
practice and theory of law.147 What I hope to show in this chapter, and elsewhere in this
dissertation, is that law and literature’s “mutually constitutive” nature extends beyond
their co-creation of meaning about historical content, into the very ways in which they
produce narrative structure. In other words, to use as an example a topic that I do not
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discuss in this dissertation, capital punishment, my point would be not simply that law
and literature work together to influence popular views of the death penalty (though I also
believe this to be true), but rather that the historical event of death penalty debates creates
a plane on which law and literature’s narrative structures can collide with and reshape
one another.
The friction generated in the collision of these narrative structures in turn helps us
see the accomplishments and failures of each scholarly methodology, as well as the
concomitant roles that literary and legal structures play in individuals’ experience of law.
Stern criticizes literary critics’ tendency to reduce law (or whatever textual object they
select) to narrative, a practice that diminishes the non-narrative but equally influential
components of law.148 Some later elements of my analysis, especially the section
examining the Durham decision, may be guilty of this error. Stern also criticizes legal
scholars’ tendency to reduce literature to an opportunity for “moral education.”149 This
latter mode is far from exclusive to lawyers; though Capote had no legal training, In Cold
Blood repeatedly embraces the idea that literature can nuance, elaborate, and improve
upon legal procedure. But if Capote’s critique undermines the practice of law, that
undermining need not be anathema; indeed, I will suggest here that literature’s
undermining of legal authority may actually be an essential part of the very cultural
ecology that reifies legal institutions’ place in the twentieth-century United States.
Furthermore, if—as Kevin Heller and Chris Rideout separately argue—trials manipulate
jurors’ existing understanding of narrative to produce verdicts, then the cultural
documents that shape popular understanding about narratives will eventually trickle down
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into the courtroom itself, a process of influence that I discuss further in the dissertation’s
introduction, coda, and fourth chapter.150 Through historical analysis of legal precedents
about evidence exclusion, rhetorical analysis of the legal narratives around the insanity
defense, and formal analysis of the book itself, I seek to construct a better understanding
of how In Cold Blood works as a literary text, in service of the broader investigation into
how literature about the law functions in relation to the law it purports to narrate and
correct.
*
The journey to In Cold Blood began in 1959, when Truman Capote read a brief
article in the New York Times describing the mysterious murder of a family of four in
rural Kansas. He immediately flew out to Kansas to cover the investigation for The New
Yorker, launching a project that would continue for six more years. Assisted by his friend
Harper Lee, Capote interviewed everyone related to the case, including the victims’
neighbors and investigators. When Hickock and Smith were apprehended in January
1960, Capote covered their arrest, confessions, hearings, and trial. Although there was
some disagreement about whether Smith had killed all four Clutters or whether Hickock
had shot the women, the fact that they collectively killed the family was not contested at
the trial. After their confession, they had given the police corroborating evidence, such as
telling the police where to find the tape and gloves they had hidden after the murder.
Their central defense was a plea of not guilty by reason of temporary insanity.
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They were sentenced to death: at the time, murder in Kansas received a mandatory
death sentence. As they awaited execution, Capote befriended them, becoming especially
close to Smith; it has been hypothesized that he and Smith had a romantic relationship,
but this has never been proven. Capote visited Smith and Hickock frequently in prison,
following their imprisonment and assisting with their appeals process, until at last, in
1965, they were executed.151 Only then did Capote finish his book-length account of the
murders, which he published to great acclaim the following year. Capote’s biographer
called it “the most talked-about book of the year.”152 While other nonfiction accounts of
crimes had existed, the popularity and format of In Cold Blood was essential to the
development of narrative nonfiction and of the true crime genre, both of which became
enormously popular over the following decades. As a result of the genres’ persistence, In
Cold Blood has retained a prominent place in American culture: Capote’s obsessive,
single-minded research process was famously chronicled in the films Capote (2005) and
Infamous (2006), and the novel continues to be reviewed and taught to this day.153
Capote’s encyclopedic style attracted both positive and negative commentary. In a
well-known and controversial 1966 review, Stanley Kauffman wrote that Capote “has
vastly oversupplied facts. […] He suffers from the current craze for fact-gathering and
the inability to ‘waste’ material once he has gathered it.”154 In a more positive response
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the same year, Conrad Knickerbocker suggested that the surplus of facts was essential to
create the hyperrealistic effect that Capote sought: as Knickerbocker put it, Capote
“wanted the facts to declare a reality that transcended reality.”155 Whether they figured
this excess as wasteful or transcendental, both critics saw a surplus of facts as the book’s
dominant characteristic—one that could potentially dominate the original story, or even
the author himself. Conversely, in her dismissal of the “novel” portion of the “nonfiction
novel” appellation, Diana Trilling described Capote’s adherence to facts as a kind of
castration, writing that “in his submission to actuality, or factuality, and his abrogation of
the artist’s right to emphasize or even to suppress or distort reality for his own purposes,
Mr. Capote prepared for himself an almost inevitable artistic defeat.”156 Trilling’s
celebration of Capote relied on her perception of the voluntary “abrogation” of his
literary power, his self-castration as an author, and the exclusion of any detail that might
be “distortion.” Whereas Knickerbocker and Kauffman saw facts as a surfeit that swelled
up in the boundary between reality and the text, Trilling saw Capote as valiantly resisting
a different form of excess, aesthetic detail. All three accounts evince a tension between
elaboration, which is presumed to indicate either reality or artistic embroidery, and
exclusion, which is presumed to signal either editorial intervention or authorial restraint.
Not everyone was so convinced that the details that overwhelmed the text were, in
fact, “facts.” While the book’s subtitle confidently asserted that the narrative was a
“factual account,” readers have long doubted the accuracy of Capote’s narrative, as
evidenced by Kenneth Tynan’s reported conversation with Capote below. Some of the
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doubts arise from Capote’s unorthodox research procedures: Capote did not take notes or
use a tape recorder while interviewing subjects, but instead recorded the conversations
alone later that night, based on what he famously claimed was a 95% recall.157 Despite
this procedure, he asserts that characters’ statements to him are recorded verbatim in the
book. He also frequently gives dialogue and details for scenes where he was not present,
and which it is unlikely that anyone recalled with such precision. His account of Dick and
Perry’s preparations for the murder, and their flight across the United States and into
Mexico, must particularly have involved some level of conjecture.158
In a systematic comparison of the book’s original New Yorker edition and its final
published version, Jack De Bellis points out that Capote altered many details in the
revision, ostensibly to make them more accurate. But as De Bellis notes, while many of
these changes happen in “unverifiable quoted sources,” some can be checked, and that
checking suggests that Capote vacillated between sources when relating certain materials,
such as a poem cited by a fellow prisoner of Smith and Hickock. The end result, De
Bellis argues, is that “a breach of trust is created with the reader over such confirmable
matters,” and “his doubts begin to gather about other matters of plot, characterization,
symbolism, and theme of In Cold Blood.”159 According to De Bellis, the violation of
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factual accuracy, even on a seemingly minute issue, destroys an essential bond between
the reader and the author, and thus throws the book’s entire functioning into question. De
Bellis’s perspective has become typical of a certain strain of ethical critique of the novel.
Prominent true-crime scholar Mark Seltzer avoids the debate altogether, calling In Cold
Blood a “novelization” and positioning it within the history of the novel.160
In general, previous Capote scholars have been overwhelmingly concerned with
discussing fact and fiction in In Cold Blood through questions such as: To what degree is
In Cold Blood a faithful representation of the Clutter murder and Smith and Hickock’s
trial? Is factual accuracy actually important to the book’s success as a literary text, or
does a true narration sometimes require that aesthetics supersede facts? Is the omniscient
narrator’s pretense to objectivity ethical or misleading?161 In responding to these
questions, several authors have noted a break or separation between modes of
representation in the book. John Hollowell points out that Capote “promote[s] conflict by
establishing two interpretations of the events—the first legal and restrictive, the second
psychological.”162 Other authors have hinted at the division in terms of the strange
absence of Capote’s voice from the book, interpreting this absence either as constructing
a supervisory gaze (Trenton Hickman) or as indicating the complexity of drawing
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conclusions from limited available evidence (Chris Anderson).163 But while these
analyses may reference the ideas of legal evidence or interpretation, they do not seriously
consider the book’s status within a historically contingent legal context.
Conversely, other critics move away from the issue of literary form and fictionality,
and towards a discussion of the book as a legal artifact.164 This arc defined most of the
contemporaneous reactions to the In Cold Blood. In a letter prefacing the Spring 1966
issue of American Criminal Law Quarterly, James V. Bennett observed that In Cold
Blood “is so detailed it affords the basic material for discussing whether in fact the
perpetrators had a fair trial.”165 Bennett explicitly states that he is responding to the
brewing controversy over whether or not Capote should have intervened more directly to
assist Smith and Hickock before execution.166 Perhaps the most prominent example of
this controversy was Kenneth Tynan’s early, somewhat self-righteous review of the book:
The question of morality is tougher and (for me) more personal. Early in 1960,
when I was in New York, upper-Bohemian dinner guests were already full of
“Truman and his marvelous bit about Perry and Dick.” I attended one such party,
which Capote regaled with a dazzling account of the crime and his friendship with
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the criminals. I said they seemed obviously insane, and agreed they were “nuts.”
And what would happen to them? “They’ll swing, I guess,” he said.
When I asked whether he thought insane people should be hanged, he said I
couldn’t understand unless I had read Nancy Clutter’s diary: Perry and Dick had
destroyed “such a lovely, intelligent girl.” “You mean it would have mattered less
if she’d been ugly and stupid?” I said.
I don’t recall his answer to that, but I do remember several subsequent
disputes—one in which I failed to persuade him that he (or the New Yorker)
ought to provide Perry and Dick with the best available psychiatric testimony: and
another in which I convinced him, much against his will, that if he was writing a
book about death in cold blood he owed it to his readers to be present at a really
cold-blooded killing—the legal strangulation of his friends.167
Tynan’s accusation that Capote failed Dick and Perry invokes a common ethical dilemma
for journalists, who must decide between documenting an injustice and intervening in it.
For Capote, the issue was particularly acute given that he was present throughout the
investigation, trial, and sentencing; he was not reporting after the fact. He had the
financial and physical ability to intercede, and yet such intervention would have
compromised the vision of objectivity that he ostensibly sought to achieve. While
Tynan’s ad hominem attack arose partly from a personal antipathy, the conversation does
helpfully articulate the criminal rights movement’s cornerstone belief that criminal
defendants, like victims and survivors, deserve ethical treatment.
A better discussion of Capote’s ethics—one that is rooted in legal practice but also
recognizes the uniqueness of the literary frame—can be found in David S. Caudill’s
article “The Year of Truman Capote: Legal Ethics and In Cold Blood” (later turned into a
chapter in his book Stories about Science in Law). Caudill discusses both Capote’s
journalistic ethics and his representation of Smith and Hickock’s defense attorneys’
behavior in the courtroom.168 Caudill reads In Cold Blood as “a point of reflection on the
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ethics of lawyering,” examining the ambiguities in the defense attorneys’ strategy as
inherent to their role as “persuasive storytellers” and revealing the parallels between trial
advocacy and journalistic writing.169 Yet although Caudill’s interdisciplinary
methodology often succeeds, he also skates near the trap into which many legal scholars
have fallen: reading In Cold Blood as a completely permeable lens through which we can
perfectly perceive historical issues of ethics.
The complicated relationship between fiction and law in both In Cold Blood and its
criticism can be seen in the two-pronged critique that Capote’s biographer, Gerald
Clarke, mounts against Tynan, whose attack he finds not only “bitter and rather cheap,”
but also legally dubious.170 These are two very different grounds for criticism, and the
differences are telling. Whereas fiction exposes itself to aesthetic criticism (“bitter,”
“cheap”), law insists upon an assessment of legal validity (“legally dubious). The
conflation of the two can quickly lead to the accidental conflation of aesthetic success
with legal accuracy—or, perhaps more problematically, aesthetic failure with legal
inaccuracy. More meaningful is an analysis of how law and literature shadow one another
within the text, generating a rubric of evaluation that is neither about success nor validity,
but about the text’s constant negotiation between these two poles, and the resulting
implications for (and implications by) multiple lived experiences of the criminal justice
system.
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If we understand the text as a literary text with a specific form that also represents
the criminal justice system at a specific time, we can recognize that cultural production
and legal history are inextricable from one another, and that any exploration of
fictionality in In Cold Blood should also explore the legal fictions that history embedded
in the text. Similarly, any analysis of the book’s legal dimensions must take into account
the multiplicity of meaning endemic to any literary text. A methodology that understands
literature about law as neither historically inviolate nor aesthetically unconstrained, but
rather as constantly balancing aesthetic success against legal validity, allows us to ask an
important but previously unanswered question: What about literature—or, more
precisely, the “novel” form that Capote aspires to repurpose—makes it such an effective
agent for expanding upon the legal record?
One possible answer can be found in the writing of literary theorist Mikhail
Bakhtin. Bakhtin named the novel’s signal trait “heteroglossia,” meaning a range of
voices that coexist within the same text. He argued that in the modern European novel,
heteroglossia represents a move from monoglossia’s “absolute dogma” to a dialectical
mode of relation that moves constantly between centralization and decentralization.171
This dialectic in turn lent itself to a temporal liminality, an existence “on the border of
time,” and to a limitless ability for self-critique.172 As a “non-fiction novel,” In Cold
Blood reproduces certain elements of the novel form, including heteroglossia and its
concomitant pluralistic ideology. This abundance of voices permits Capote to show the
reader what happened at the time of the trial and information that would later surface.
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Heteroglossia allows the simultaneous indulgence of voices expressing Perry and Dick’s
guilt and voices expressing sympathy, without the need for one voice to eventually win.
Whereas in law, the battle between guilt and innocence is a zero-sum game, literature can
sustain both guilt and innocence. It can present multiple sides of a story—in effect mimic
an adversarial system of law—without having to arrive at the verdict. It can tell us what
happened and what could have happened if conditions had been different. In the case of
true crime, it can present both fact and counterfactual. What happened, and what might
have happened, with and without inadmissible evidence.

The Insanity Defense and the Formal Structure of Evidence Exclusion
Understanding the formal qualities of In Cold Blood’s engagement with the
insanity defense requires some background in the broader discussions about evidence
admissibility that preceded and coincided with the text’s production. Evidence
admissibility in Anglo-American law has altered shape over the years; some parts have
remained static, while others have changed dramatically. Among the more static elements
is the exclusion of hearsay, which emerged in Western law in the 1500s and was refined
in various countries until the 1700s.173 In the early eighteenth century, the argument in
the British context for excluding hearsay for trial was that statements made outside the
courtroom could not be valid in court, both because such statements were not made under
oath and because there was no opportunity for cross-examination.174 Character
evidence—evidence that presented information about an individual’s past behavior with
the assumption that they had behaved that way in the situation at hand—was
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intermittently excluded from the 1690s onwards, and more systematically after the late
1700s.175 Arguments in favor of excluding character evidence usually depended on a
sense that admitting it would contravene common-law ideas of a fair trial, because it
would remove the presumption of innocence.176
But although such exclusions were designed to ensure the sanctity of a fair trial
and the execution of regular procedure within the courtroom, they had little to do with the
way in which evidence was gathered—the question at the heart of many twentiethcentury debates about evidence exclusion. The due process revolution was particularly
concerned with the “exclusionary rule,” which holds that if a piece of evidence is
collected, analyzed, or provided in an illegal way, that evidence will be excluded from
the jury’s evaluation of the crime.177 This assumption governs police behavior, forensic
analysis, and lawyerly conduct, and serves as the primary motivation for individuals in all
areas of the justice system to obey the law when handling evidence: if they handle it
wrong, they endanger the future of the case by risking the evidence’s exclusion from trial.
Former Supreme Court justice Potter Stewart notes that the history of the exclusionary
rule’s development is one of an accumulation of often unremarkable cases that did not
even center on the debate about whether illegally obtained evidence should be
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excluded.178 These decisions culminated in 1961 in the Mapp v. Ohio (1961), a case in
which a defendant protested the use of evidence obtained during an unwarranted search
of her home.179 Although Mapp’s scope was limited to unwarranted search and seizure,
its impact on the due process revolution was much greater, because the decision allowed
the federal government to limit what kind of evidence was used in state courtrooms. A
setback for states’ rights advocates and a triumph for those pushing for a federally
standardized criminal procedure, Mapp continued to use evidence exclusion from the
courtroom as a means of protecting defendants’ rights before and during arrest.
This chain of cases establishing the exclusionary rule aimed to protect the
individual’s rights by excluding inculpatory evidence, or evidence that proves the
accused’s guilt. But criminal law also has another category of evidence: exculpatory
evidence, or evidence that proves the accused’s innocence. This could range from an alibi
to various “mitigating factors.” The obvious difference between inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence is that one works against the defendant while the other works
against the defendant, but they also enjoy slightly different statuses, given that in
American law, the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused—the old
refrain “innocent until proven guilty.” The prosecution therefore, in general, has a higher
burden to produce inculpatory evidence, than the defense has to produce exculpatory
evidence. In general, the due process revolution tended to emphasize the exclusion of
inculpatory evidence, rather than the inclusion of exculpatory evidence. However, there
was at least one area of exculpatory evidence that generated substantial public debates
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about evidence exclusion during the 1950s and 1960s: the insanity defense. Doctrinally,
the insanity defense debates were almost completely separate from the chain of decisions
about the exclusionary rule; formally, they were linked by their investment in what
belonged in the courtroom and in the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
In the 1950s and 1960s, debates about the insanity defense swirled around a few
key rules that courts used. First, the M’Naghten Rule—the rule that Capote directly
criticizes in In Cold Blood—which said that if a defendant knew what they were doing
was wrong at the time they did it, they were criminally liable. Second, the Durham rule, a
more permissive rule that had been recently introduced.180 Third, the irresistible impulse
test, which accompanied the M’Naghten rule in fourteen states and held that if an
individual committed a crime because a psychological trait prevented him from resisting
the impulse, he was not liable, or at least was less liable (meaning a lighter sentence).181
Fourth, the morbid propensity rule, which contradicted the irresistible impulse rule (and
was therefore used in different jurisdictions) and said that “a morbid propensity to
commit a prohibited act” was not a sufficient defense for a crime.182 With the exception
of the Durham rule, which had been created in 1954, these rules all dated back to the
nineteenth century: the M’Naghten rule was created in 1843, the irresistible impulse rule
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in the 1840s, the morbid propensity rule in 1864, and even the Durham Rule incorporated
an alternative indicator developed in New Hampshire state law in 1871.183
In 1950, the International Penal and Penitentiary Conference decided to encourage
pre-sentence psychiatric examination, which had been recommended by the American
Bar Association since 1929, but the role of such evidence in the courtroom remained
unclear. In 1953, Henry Weihofen, who two decades earlier had written a seminal
account of the insanity defense, called Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law, took to the
page again to argue that the legal treatment of insanity had remained largely stable since
the 1840s. This stability was surprising, he admitted, because:
The static quality of the law on the subject is hard to reconcile with the dynamic
nature of the scientific subject itself. Psychiatry is almost wholely [sic] a 20th
century science. During the past 50 years the whole concept of mental health and
mental disorder has been revolutionized. Psychiatrists no longer look upon mental
disorder as due solely or even largely to hereditary predisposition or to structural
changes in the nervous system resulting from exhaustion or organic disease.
Rather, they regard mental disorders as functional responses to external or internal
stresses, as failures in the individual’s socioadaptive capacity.184
Interestingly, while Capote and other critics of M’Naghten take issue with its rigid
definitions of right and wrong, Weihofen argued that the value of the M’Naghten test lay
partially in its ambiguity: “The words of the test, such as ‘knowledge,’ ‘nature and
quality,’ and ‘wrong,’ are sufficiently vague to permit us to read new content into them,
and thus keep reasonably abreast of changing psychiatric concepts.”185 At the same time,
Weihofen admitted, the vagueness of the “right” and “wrong” designations also produces
problems on the level of implementation, because it does not clarify the difference
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between legal and moral wrongs. Weihofen suggested that the solution was for the judge
to clarify the instructions to the jury, and for individual judges to have discretion over the
definition of right and wrong. The problems posed by lack of standardization—the issue
motivating the due process revolution’s move towards federalization—did not,
apparently, concern Weihofen.186
The argument that judges would be able to update vague terms to remain in
keeping with psychiatric advances was contradicted, however, by Weihofen’s admission
that modern psychiatry was beginning to exceed the bounds determined by law. His
embrace of the M’Naghten rule from the beginning was conditional upon the
implementation of the irresistible impulse rule, or what Weihofen vaguely referred to as
“other rules which permit us to give some effect to mental disorders not coming within
the test”187—a rule that, again, was only implemented in fourteen states.188 And
Weihofen concluded that even the addition of the irresistible impulse rule did not fully
account for new discoveries in the field of psychiatry, such as the existence of “severe
psychoneurotics and others whose criminal acts seem to stem from unconscious
motivations.”189
Like Weihofen, many scholars writing about the insanity defense in the 1950s
were concerned with the delimitation of psychopaths and personality disorders. The range
of illnesses covered by this category is somewhat debatable: within a single paragraph,
Weihofen uses the words “neurotics,” “psychoneurotics,” “partially insane,”
“psychopathic personalities,” “borderline,” and even “dull normal” to describe this group.
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In the following article in the same law journal, doctor Michael J. Pescor used the term
“sociopathic personality disturbance.”190 Capote used the word “sociopath,” which
remains common today. Though the words vary, the basic meaning of such a category, in
the context of the insanity defense, is to describe an individual who is not visibly insane
but lacks “normal” emotional responses. Such a category is confusing, as we will see in
the case of In Cold Blood, for two reasons. First, sociopathy exists precisely at the site
where knowledge and mental health separate from one another. Second, because
sociopathy often lacks externally visible characteristics, it is both more difficult to
determine and easier to feign than some other mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia.
Sociopathy was also the subject of much debate beyond the legal sphere at this
time. Coined in the nineteenth century, the term “psychopathy” referred for a long time to
any general mental disorder.191 In the twentieth century, however, psychiatrists began to
taxonomize the term more thoroughly.192 In the 1920s and 1930s, George E. Partridge
defined the term as antisocial personality and proposed the alternative name of
sociopathy to describe both behavior and character; Hervey M. Cleckley’s Mask of Sanity
(1941) described the psychopathic personality as amorality cloaked beneath a “mask” of
normalcy.193 When the American Psychiatric Association released the first edition of
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1952, they used the term
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“sociopathic personality disturbance” to broadly describe individuals who were “ill
primarily in terms of society and of conformity.”194 Through the emphasis on conformity,
the concept of psychopathy even infiltrated David Riesman’s best-selling sociological
treatise The Lonely Crowd, took pains to assert that it was not about individual
psychologies, but about sociological types.195 But it is impossible to define a group
without defining the limits of that group, the outliers, and so the threat of psychopathy
underlay Riesman’s best-seller as he described the “proper functioning” of individuals’
psychological “control equipment.”196 The popular science of the 1950s cared
enormously about psychological health and social health, or more accurately about the
lack of it, embodied in the figure of the sociopath/psychopath.
Many midcentury novels and films also dealt with sociopathy, most famously
Patricia Highsmith’s The Talented Mr. Ripley (1955) and Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho
(1960). Both texts feature a murderer who gives the initial impression of normalcy but is
“disturbed” in some ambiguous but fatal way. Tom Ripley and Norman Bates are
characterized by an initial appearance of normalcy, a high intellect, and an inability to
relate to the other characters, which eventually leads them to murder. It is not that Ripley
and Bates do not understand the difference between right and wrong; it is that they do not
understand the relevance of the question in the first place. Literary critic Michael Trask
has helpfully pointed out the dangers of the critical tendency to psychologize Highsmith’s
writing, arguing that Ripley should be read as a statement on performativity and
objectivity rather than as an encouragement towards psychoanalysis.197 His critique
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challenges depth hermeneutics by insisting instead on a surface reading paradigm in
which the performance matters more than the reality. I would argue, however, that
psychopathy and performance are not mutually exclusive in novels in general, nor are
surface reading and depth hermeneutics. It is the constant tension between such binaries
that structures Capote’s approach to evidence and to psychiatry, and legal procedurals in
particular posit a peculiar relationship between the surface of a text (what we might think
of as the court transcript) and its depths (the gloss provided by the literary text).
In the later 1950s and 1960s, courts increasingly dipped their toes into the new
reservoir of psychiatric information that flooded both medical journals and popular
representations. There were several judicial and legislative efforts, at a range of levels, to
revamp the insanity defense to be more inclusive of the new information about
sociopathy. In 1954, an appellate court replaced the M’Naghten rule with the Durham
rule (also known as the product test”), which said that “an accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.”198
The Durham majority opinion specifically cited the growing body of medical evidence
arguing that the M’Naghten rule no longer accurately represented medical understandings
of insanity.199 This rule was implemented only at the state level. In the early 1960s, the
American Law Institute also developed the Model Penal Code, whose major
contributions related to mens rea and the mental state’s influence on culpability. The
Model Penal Code distinguished between committing a crime “purposely,” “knowingly,”
“recklessly,” or “negligently,” in descending order of severity. The Model Penal Code’s
purpose was to offer a set of guidelines for standardizing criminal law across the United
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States. In terms of the insanity defense, the Code established that the standard of
responsibility is related to the defendant’s knowledge that his action is criminal.200 Unlike
the M’Naghten and Durham rules, the Model Penal Code was not law, but rather
guidance for legislative action; however, on the subject of mens rea, it represented a
compromise between the very strict M’Naghten rule and the more permissive Durham
rule.201
In 1963, Joseph Goldstein and Jay Katz argued for the abolition of the insanity
defense altogether, on the grounds that the moral objectives it serves are ambiguous and
not in the interest of the community. In the process of making this argument, they found
themselves struggling with unwieldy but essential questions in the criminal justice
system, such as: Is the purpose of a prison sentence to separate offenders from the general
population (what they call “restraint”), to deter crime, or to punish crime after it has
occurred? What is “free will” and what place does it serve in the justice system?
Goldstein and Katz were primarily interested in a defendant’s future behavior and
likelihood of recidivism, so their solution was to abolish the insanity defense in favor of
evaluations of voluntariness, mens rea, and treatability of the mental illness.202
The insanity defense and the evidentiary debates intersected in a series of 1950s
cases about the burden of proof in an insanity defense. In Leland v. Oregon (1952), the
Supreme Court held that requiring the accused to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt did not deprive the defendant of due process.203 In the 1964 Maryland Court of
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Appeals case Bradford v. State, the court held that there was a legal presumption of
sanity until the defendant had offered a preponderance of evidence of insanity; if such a
proof was offered, it then became the prosecution’s duty to prove sanity (synonymous, in
this situation, with guilt) beyond a reasonable doubt.204 (One of the most detailed
summaries of this Maryland case comes from a review of South Carolina law—a helpful
reminder, given the continued emphasis on the differences between state laws, that legal
scholars frequently consulted other states’ guidelines when attempting to make sense of
an element as yet unlitigated in their subject state.)205 While both the Leland and
Bradford decisions upheld the principle of the insanity defense, they also demonstrated
concern that defendants might feign insanity in order to receive a verdict of innocence.206
The concerns about the performance of normalcy that undergirded contemporaneous
discussions of psychopathy outlined earlier in this chapter can also be seen in these
doctrinal threads, though they were not openly expressed.
In 1955, immediately after Durham, the University of Chicago Law Review had
dedicated an entire special issue to the topic of that decision. Evidence exclusion arose as
both a doctrinal and rhetorical issue in these essays. Warren Hill contributed an article
arguing that the views of Thurman Arnold, a justice who had sat on the D.C. circuit prior
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to the Durham decision but departed the court in 1945, had shaped the Durham
decision.207 On the idea of mitigating circumstances, Arnold had written in 1932:
The only effect on the contested trial of that enormous body of literature devoted
to mens rea and criminal insanity is that it permits mitigating circumstances to
creep into the evidence dressed up as facts to which scientific and impartial
testimony may bear witness. The search for definitions of mens rea since the
McNaughton case, while it may express public morality, is pathetic in its failure
to solve the trial problem of keeping emotion out while letting science in.208
This description of the trial’s goal of “keeping emotion out while letting science in”
frames the insanity defense as a matter of exclusion and inclusion, and more than that, the
exclusion of “emotion” and “mitigating circumstance” and the inclusion of “science” or
“facts.” In Cold Blood actually brings these supposedly opposing elements back together,
folding emotion back into the trial through an affective and affecting literary narration,
while also incorporating expanded scientific findings.
In Gregory Zilboorg’s entry into the same 1955 issue of the Chicago Law Review,
he described Durham as forcing courts to consider an individual’s actions in the context
of their larger history of mental health. Zilboorg wrote,
A mental illness, a severe chronic mental illness, cannot be considered as
something that enters and leaves a given person at various period. A mental
illness cannot be considered as something that, when it enters a person, makes
him awfully ill, and when it leaves a person, leaves him unscathed, hail [sic],
hearty, completely and fully in possession of all his faculties of reason and will.209
Zilboorg indicated that because Durham incorporated fewer frameworks for
understanding human psychology, it challenged a previous perspective that easily
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snipped a person’s life into discrete parts. As the Durham decision put it, quoting the
1895 case Davis v. United States,
For once the issue of insanity is raised by the introduction of “some evidence,” so
that the presumption of sanity is no longer absolute, it is incumbent upon the trier
of fact to weigh and consider “the whole evidence, including that supplied by the
presumption of sanity” on the issue of “the capacity in law of the accused to
commit” the crime.210
Here, the Durham judges encouraged an approach that included more evidence, to the
point of including all evidence, expressing suspicion about any system that easily or
automatically excludes evidence that might usefully inform the determination of sanity.
Another relevant element of the Durham decision was the distinction drawn
between offering evidence to the jury and offering an expert interpreter of that evidence.
The judges wrote,
In such cases [of disability claims in insurance policies], the jury is not required to
depend on arbitrarily selected ‘symptoms, phases or manifestations’ of the disease
as criteria for determining the ultimate questions of fact upon which the claim
depends. Similarly, upon a claim of criminal irresponsibility, the jury will not be
required to rely on such symptoms as criteria for determining the ultimate
question of fact upon which such claim depends. Testimony as to such
‘symptoms, phases, or manifestations,’ along with other relevant evidence, will go
to the jury upon the ultimate questions of fact which it alone can finally
determine. Whatever the state of psychiatry, the psychiatrist will be permitted to
carry out his principal court function which, as we noted in Holloway v. U.S., “is
to inform the jury of the character of [the accused’s] mental disease [or
defect].”211
In considering this assertion’s implications for literary form, two elements seem
especially important. First is the idea that, without an appropriate interpreter, the jury’s
evidence would be “arbitrarily selected.” One aspect of the psychiatrist’s role is to choose
the evidence—the “symptoms, phases, or manifestations”—that their expert opinion
judges most relevant and meaningful for the case at hand. The court thus positions the
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expert as the one who actually decides what evidence will and will not make it into court.
Here, the Durham opinion admits the difficulty of legally standardizing the exclusion of
psychiatric evidence. The second interesting element is the other part of the expert
witness’s job—interpretation. The Durham decision insists that the psychiatrist’s
“principal court function” is to translate the evidence into an assessment of the accused’s
mental state for the jury. Here, interpretation is positioned as the logical next step to
evidence exclusion, and the expert’s value is as an experienced interpreter of evidence.
The jury’s role, the court goes on to say, is to “make moral judgments” based on that
evidence—guided under the more permissive Durham rule, versus under the M’Naghten
rule, by “wider horizons of knowledge concerning mental life.”212 Looking at In Cold
Blood as a text that claims formal similarity between the literary narrative and the legal
trial, we might think of Capote as resisting the strict M’Naghten rule by embracing a
similar act of selection and interpretation, positioning himself as the expert that presents
and translates evidence to us, the jury.
All in all, as the courts wrestled with the complicated questions of federalization
involved in the due process revolution, they found themselves relying increasingly on
evidentiary exclusion in order to effect these changes. At the same time, the everchanging landscape of forensic psychiatry put new pressure on long-standing norms of
psychiatric assessment. With the figure of the sociopath becoming a familiar trope in
popular culture, and concerns about guilt and responsibility percolating through postwar
discourse, it is perhaps no surprise that the legal procedural—epitomized and canonized
with In Cold Blood—found forensic psychiatry to be a compelling subject and an
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accessible lens for discussing the somewhat banal doctrinal issue of evidentiary
exclusion.

Exclusion and Expansion in In Cold Blood
Perry Smith and Dick Hickock’s trial centered on the insanity defense; so, too, did
Capote’s narration of that trial. Although Smith and Hickock were tried simultaneously,
their sanity had to be evaluated individually. The forensic psychiatrist charged with
examining both men, Dr. Jones, took the stand and began by testifying to Hickock’s
mental state. As narrated in In Cold Blood, his testimony is limited to two words: “Yes,”
to describe his ability to reach a conclusion about Dick’s mental state, and “No,” to
respond to the yes/no test and contend that Dick knew right from wrong at the time he
committed the murder. Capote quickly criticizes the M’Naghten rule for its inability to
address moral quandaries and extenuating circumstances: “Confined as he was by the
M’Naghten Rule (“the usual definitions”), a formula quite color-blind to any gradations
between black and white, Dr. Jones was impotent to answer otherwise” (294). Because
Capote strenuously avoids the first-person throughout the text, he must instead convey
his political stance through implication and word choice. The “color-blind” and “black
and white” metaphor echoes a language of racial segregation, which was the other major
focus of the Warren Court’s decisions. The language choice associates the M’Naghten
rule with the outdated and unjust system of segregation. Capote sides with contemporary
legal decisions that present more nuanced solutions for a subtle, variegated world, and
rejects the traditional and conservative laws that reinforce boundaries between the
black/white, sane/insane dyads.
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But while the courtroom makes the forensic expert “impotent,” the text of In Cold
Blood restores his power by permitting him to testify as to the complexity of Dick’s
mental state. Capote obtained (through means not revealed to the reader) the expert’s
testimony and included it in the narrative, so that the final text reads:
It was hopeless because though Dr. Jones agreed to elaborate, the prosecution was
entitled to object—and did, citing the fact that Kansas law allowed nothing more
than a yes or no reply to the pertinent question. The objection was upheld, and the
witness dismissed. However, had Dr. Jones been allowed to speak further, here is
what he would have testified: “Richard Hickock is above average in intelligence,
grasps new ideas easily and has a wide fund of information. He is alert to what is
happening around him, and he shows no sign of mental confusion or
disorientation. His thinking is well organized and logical and he seems to be in
good contact with reality. Although I did not find the usual signs of organic brain
damage—memory loss, concrete concept formation, intellectual deterioration—
this cannot be completely ruled out. He had a serious head injury with concussion
and several hours of unconsciousness in 1950—this was verified by me by
checking hospital records. He says he has had blackout spells, periods of amnesia,
and headaches ever since that time, and a major portion of his antisocial behavior
has occurred since that time.” (294)
Dr. Jones continues to deliver a dry, medical account of his evaluation of Dick for several
pages. Occasionally abridged by Capote, his account ends with these words:
[…] He is uncomfortable in his relationships to other people, and has a
pathological inability to form and hold enduring personal attachments. Although
he professes usual moral standards he seems obviously uninfluenced by them in
his actions. In summary, he shows fairly typical characteristics of what would
psychiatrically be called a severe character disorder. It is important that steps be
taken to rule out the possibility of organic brain damage, since, if present, it might
have substantially influenced his behavior during the past several years and at the
time of the crime. (295)
The longer version points out that the long-term effects of Dick’s car crash are unknown
and recommends a further examination of brain damage. It also diagnoses Dick with an
unnamed “severe character disorder.” Both these claims, which would seem to have
relevance to an insanity defense, are never shown to the jury. Capote’s longer version of
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Dr. Jones’s findings discredits the court’s shorter version, showing how much
information is lost in condensing his assessment to a single word. Unlike the legal
testimony, Capote’s account acknowledges the subtleties of both mental health and
biography, providing details that give us a richer understanding of Hickock’s mental
state.
Transitioning from an inadmissible psychiatric assessment to an admissible
psychiatric assessment means curtailing the presentation of evidence; correspondingly,
moving from an admissible assessment (which is all that Capote initially shares with us)
to an inadmissible one means orchestrating an expansion of evidence. This act of
expansion is even more dramatic when it comes to Perry Smith. Whereas Capote leaves
the reader uncertain about whether he believes Dick deserves a successful insanity
defense, his sympathy for Perry—and for Perry’s defense—is more evident. One way he
shows this sympathy is by scattering throughout the book lengthy explanations of the
challenges that have shaped Perry’s life and perhaps led him to commit this horrific
crime. We receive detailed accounts of Perry’s childhood, prison experience, and chronic
pain. When it comes to the trial, Dick and Perry are briefly put back on equal footing, as
the initial narration of the admissible testimony is nearly as short as its counterpart for
Dick:
Dr. Jones was now recalled, and following the preliminaries that had
accompanied his original appearance, Fleming put to him the crucial query:
“From your conversations and examination of Perry Edward Smith, do you have
an opinion as to whether he knew right from wrong at the time of the offense
involved in this action?” And once more the court admonished the witness:
“Answer yes or no, do you have an opinion?”
“No.”
Amid surprised mutters, Fleming, surprised himself, said, “You may state to
the jury why you have no opinion.”
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Green objected: “The man has no opinion, and that’s it.” Which it was,
legally speaking.
But had Dr. Jones been permitted to discourse on the cause of his indecision,
he would have testified: “Perry Smith shows definite signs of severe mental
illness […]” (296)
True, even the evidence that is admitted indicates a difference between Perry and Dick’s
mental state: the mere fact that Dr. Jones cannot come to a decision suggests that Perry
poses a problem for the legal standards of evaluation. But the nature of this tension
remains ambiguous in the courtroom, where the forensic psychiatric testimonies for Perry
and Dick are of similar lengths. The conflict becomes clearer only in the literary text,
which can render the legally inadmissible evidence and thus clarify the source of Dr.
Jones’s confusion. Here, Capote’s spends more time exploring Perry’s mental state than
he spent exploring Dick’s. He includes more information from Dr. Jones’s findings,
although because Capote abridges both statements with ellipses, it is unclear whether this
difference in length reflects a difference in Dr. Jones’ findings, a difference in Capote’s
representation of them, or a combination of both.
In addition to an expanded version of Dr. Jones’s statement, Capote includes a
ten-page description of relevant psychiatric research. Capote’s alternative testimony rests
largely on academic work later produced by Joseph Satten, “a widely respected veteran in
the field of forensic psychiatry” (298), who consulted with Dr. Jones and who came to
believe that Smith matched the profile of a kind of murderer he and several colleagues
outlined in a 1960 article entitled “Murder Without Apparent Motive—A Study in
Personality Disorganization.” Capote both synthesizes and quotes this article at some
length, presenting the psychiatrists’ argument that,
… murderers who seem rational, coherent, and controlled, and yet whose
homicidal acts have a bizarre, apparently senseless quality […] are predisposed to
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severe lapses in ego-control which makes possible the open expression of
primitive violence, born out of previous, and now unconscious, traumatic
experiences. (299)
The parallels to Smith’s biography are apparent to the reader; indeed, the reader realizes
that Capote has so attentively chronicled Perry’s past with the intention of drawing out
the similarities between Satten’s subjects and Perry. Capote never explicitly claims his
opinion of the case, but rather arranges the elements so that the reader can conclude that
Perry experienced a psychic break at the moment of killing Mr. Clutter. Capote’s form of
argumentation consists of laying evidence before the reader in a particular pattern.
In fact, for all the emphasis on the difference between the legal and literary trials,
they are both sites of conflict between the implicit and the explicit. The legal trial often
requires talking in circles around inadmissible facts—in the example offered at the
beginning of this chapter, describing a photograph but not presenting it. But the literary
trial is not necessarily any more transparent. Capote argues that Perry and Dick have been
abused by the legal system, but this argument exists only at the level of implication: in
the jurors’ confessions of partiality, in the description of the widely publicized Clutter
estate sale that happens just before the trial, or in his taxonomy of the other inmates on
death row. Capote assesses Perry’s sanity by carefully editing together excerpts from
Jones’s assessment, Sackett’s observations, and Perry’s own self-description. In doing so,
he relies on juxtaposition as a means of forcing the reader to perform the evaluation for
herself. Unlike Dr. Jones, he does not present himself under oath as an expert, or respond
directly to the yes/no questions of the M’Naghten test. Capote himself never has to
decide about Perry’s guilt or his sanity; he simply passes that uncertainty onto his
readers.
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This uncertainty is precisely the benefit of the literary (re)trial. By introducing
more evidence than was admitted in the legal trial, Capote expands upon the courtroom’s
capacities, with the apparent motive of doing justice to the complexities of the case. As
he explained in a famous interview with Playboy:
But Perry, once he was inside the Clutters’ house, didn’t really want to kill; he
was reluctant about it, thought the outcome was inevitable from the moment he
saw Mr. Clutter. Do you remember what he said? ‘I didn’t want to harm the man.
I thought he was a very nice gentleman. Soft-spoken. I thought so right up to the
moment I cut his throat.’ Insanity? Perhaps; but no court would recognize it as
such.213
Later in the interview, Capote was asked directly about the M’Naghten Rule. He replied,
“It’s completely black and white; you have to be literally foaming at the mouth to be
classified as insane under this rule; anything short of that and the courts have no choice
but to adjudge you sane. […] while by any remotely civilized legal standard, he should be
incarcerated in a mental institution.”214 The “literally foaming at the mouth” line—which
deals in slippery slopes, extremes, and physical displays of illness—is precisely the kind
of line that has most tended to interest scholars writing about the insanity defense. But if
we move past this question about symptom and affect, we can also see how Capote’s
statement indicates a deeper discontent about courts’ impotence under the law (“no
choice but to adjudge you sane”) and a desire to use literature to push back against legal
norms. Capote seems to be using the In Cold Blood publicity tour as a chance to promote
an ideal “remotely civilized legal standard” that would take a more complex approach to
insanity. This is not to say that Capote saw himself as an advocate for the insanity
defense or that advocacy was his primary goal in writing In Cold Blood, which he began
months before knowing that the M’Naghten Rule would be central to the case. But his
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statement suggests that he perceived literature as an opportunity to illuminate a grey area
between “black and white.” This is done by presenting evidence that “no court would
recognize”—evidence that is inadmissible in court. The payoff is ambiguous, because the
book offers no verdict, certainly not one that is legally binding. Capote’s own
motivations in including so much detail are also ambiguous: is the exhaustion of evidence
an ethical choice or a narcissistic performance of literary skill? The literary trial always
exists in a grey area where sanity is more complex than yes and no and morality is more
complex than right and wrong. The decisions the justice system must make, literature can
suspend.
Time, too, is suspended in In Cold Blood’s rendition of the trial. The Satten study
upon which Capote relies was not published until July 1960—several months after the
verdict was issued in Smith and Hickock’s March 1960 trial. Even without the
M’Naghten rule the findings could not have been included in the trial, because they had
not been published and the defense attorneys—and even Dr. Jones—do not seem to have
been in contact with Satten. Capote was only able to access those findings for In Cold
Blood because so many years passed between the trial and the book’s publication.
Capote’s text restages the trial based not only on evidence that was not permitted into the
courtroom, but also on evidence that did not yet exist. The time lapse between the legal
trial and the final literary narration allows Capote to introduce evidence that was not
retrievable at the time of the legal trial. The retrospective addition of evidence can create
a circular logic wherein evidence gathered as a result of the trial is used as proof that the
original evidence used at trial was incomplete. In the case of In Cold Blood, it is unclear
whether Satten had actually finished his article before the trial. His work may also have
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received additional publicity between 1960 and 1965 as a result of the Hickock-Smith
verdict, in which case Satten may have thought of Smith when writing or editing his own
article, meaning that Capote could be using a Smith-inflected article about other
murderers to prove similarities between Smith and those murderers. This circular logic is
a casualty of the text’s simultaneous claim to immediacy (Capote is present at the trial)
and perspective (Capote is writing the account after the trial). It points, tantalizingly,
towards the difference in temporalities that both complicates and enriches the relationship
between literary and legal trials.
The temporality issue is part of a larger aesthetic conflict between law and
literature. The moment when the court prevents the chaplain from circulating the
photographs of Perry’s painting of Jesus illustrates this conflict. It also demonstrates how
the narrative structure of expansion, which Capote most overtly explores in the situation
of forensic psychiatry, also characterizes the representation of other evidentiary issues.
As a genre, the novel errs towards including the image of Jesus, even if it complicates the
legal case; its aesthetics privilege the use of detail to conjure emotion and empathy. At
the same time, it is notable that a photograph of the Jesus painting is not included as an
appendix in Capote’s original text. Indeed, he includes no images, instead relying on his
own ability to describe—the same descriptive act that is permitted in the courtroom. This
feature of the text both indicates an overlap between what is permissible in literary and
legal trials, and suggests that the author, by virtue of his temporal estrangement and
particular skill, is uniquely qualified to describe the evidence (in this case, the painting)
in a way that witnesses at the legal trial are not. Meanwhile, rather than seeking personal
detail that can elicit sympathy, the legal trial—through the procedures of evidence
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exclusion—requires information to be not prejudicial. If it is the author who ensures
empathy in the literary trial, in the legal trial it is the judge who removes empathy in
favor of an unbiased evaluation. But this lack of bias is itself an aesthetic. The incident of
the Jesus image in In Cold Blood, as well as the representations of curtailment of
psychiatric testimony, exemplify a literary interpretation of the aesthetic of due process.
So on one hand we have the literary aesthetic, premised on surplus, detail, recursive
temporality, bias, and empathy. On the other hand, we have the due process aesthetic,
which glorifies standardization, brevity, non-bias, expeditiousness, and adherence to
official procedure. The tension between the two generates the aesthetic of the legal
procedural, which thrives at the interstice of literature and due process.
The treatment of evidence exclusion reveals an immediate conflict between the
meaning of justice in law and the meaning of justice in literature. In law, justice is
delivered when the verdict is given, when a person who committed a crime is punished,
when all the rules of procedure have been followed, and when bias has been removed as
much as possible from the proceedings. In literature, justice is delivered when the reasons
for a crime have been thoroughly explored, when the humanity of every individual
involved has been acknowledged, when as many voices as possible have been heard, and
when the crime’s emotional ambiguities have been fully explored. Capote offers no
verdict as such in In Cold Blood, and if there were, it would be anathema to the book’s
literary goals of urging the reader to “draw their own conclusions.” Legal justice in the
age of due process often relies on the exclusion of inculpatory evidence, whereas literary
justice involves the inclusion of exculpatory evidence; in this instance, psychiatric
testimony. Remember that Kenneth Tynan complained that he had “failed to persuade
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him [Capote] that he (or the New Yorker) ought to provide Perry and Dick with the best
available psychiatric testimony”—but of course, the text of In Cold Blood demonstrates
that Tynan had succeeded, or at least that Capote had sought out such testimony.215 The
difference was that the place Capote provided this testimony was not in the courtroom,
but in the book.216 Is that outlet insufficient? How can we square a recognition of the
value of literary accounts of the law with a disappointment in the legal outcome—a
disappointment that the literary text itself manufactures? The circularity of the question
matches the persistent difficulties that the insanity defense continues to pose—the
standards of culpability being, as Robert Weisberg explains, either illegible or selffulfilling in the context of a psychopathic defendant.217 In Cold Blood can simultaneously
urge and quench our dismay because, as the book fleshes out the opposing aesthetics of
law and literature, it also stages a conflict between legal and literary forms of justice. By
enacting that dialectic, the text portrays the simultaneous disappointment and delivery of
justice. That contradictory impulse has become a signal feature of the legal procedural
genre, a genre that stakes its claim to legal relevance by insisting upon its unique ability
to expand and explain evidence.
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CHAPTER 3
THE HOLLYWOOD PRODUCTION CODE AND THE CINEMA OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE

On 24 July 1934, Production Code Administration (PCA) official Vincent G. Hart
wrote a memo to press agent J.J. McCarthy elaborating on the PCA’s objections to the
film Crime Without Passion, which had recently been submitted to the PCA for approval.
Hart’s complaints were quite different from what censorship scholars might normally
expect. The bulk of them were not about sex, violence, or obscene language, but about
the way the film discussed criminal law. Hart wrote,
As suggested in our letter of May 23, 1934, all of Gentry’s dialogue with
reference to the Bar Associations, Grand Jury, Judges, Supreme Court and a slur
on the clergy should be deleted irrespective of the fact that they are placed in the
mouth of a character who will be discredited as an unethical attorney.218
Offensive remarks about bar associations are less titillating than nudity or dead bodies,
but their apparent blandness conceals what would turn out to be a massively influential
strand of censorship in Hollywood film. Why should it matter that the lawyer is later
discredited as unethical? What makes the dialogue about judicial authorities so
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problematic?219 And if these prohibitions extended to other films—as indeed they did—
then what was the net impact of such a systematic glorification of the judicial system?
In order to answer these questions, it is essential to understand the scope and
context of the PCA’s interventions into the law. Between 1934 and 1968, the PCA
certified film releases for approval by state censor boards, using a censorship guideline
crafted in 1930. This censorship system, which guided studios from conception through
final edits, prompted films to develop a multivalent, metaphorical language for
addressing controversial subjects.220 But while the PCA’s sex and violence prohibitions
are well-known in film studies for their influence on cinematic metaphor, few scholars
realize that the Production Code also censored representations of the law, and that these
restrictions likewise had an indelible impact on midcentury American film. The
subversion of legal restrictions was somewhat less robust than the resistance to sex and
violence, partly because the relatively unsensational nature of legal procedure gave
filmmakers less incentive to challenge the restraints on the representations of law. Even
when Code enforcement relaxed in the 1950s, the courtroom drama genre remained
committed to a cinematic narrative that unified law and justice. American culture was
pervaded by a vision of the law as democratic, infallible, and logical—a vision that was,
thanks to the films’ national distribution, nationally standardized.
Methodologically, this chapter considers the relationship between censorship and
finished product, text and context, within the framework of ongoing debates about
historicism in both literary and cinema studies. Instead of celebrating the auteur or
219
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focusing on individual artistry, I follow Richard Maltby’s lead, in his critique of the rise
of Hollywood as a capitalist enterprise, of understanding Hollywood as an industry
driven by systems, economic incentives, and tactical decisions about audience turnout.221
Lea Jacobs has pointed out both the promise of PCA correspondence as a source for
determining censorship’s effect on finished films, and the correspondence’s limitations,
especially the fact that many PCA discussions apparently took place verbally rather than
by letter.222 Jacobs primarily uses PCA documents in combination with the final script to
justify an attention to certain passages, and to examine the ways in which difficult
moments came to be represented.223 The suggested revisions, in both their focus and their
proposed solutions, merit examination both for their unusually detailed reflection on
cultural symbols, and for the PCA’s direct influence on the finished products. Audiences
played a role too: the PCA carefully tracked audience responses on the level of the
individual reaction letter, and the question of profitability meant audience response
mattered even more in the aggregate.224 Yet these responses were only available after the
release of an individual film, which complicates their relevance when we are examining
films as individual cases; the PCA documents themselves provide an otherwise
inaccessible insight into the conditions of production for particular films.
As an interpretative maneuver, censorship is by nature never one-dimensional or
objective. The way in which a particular restriction is enforced depends on both the
censor and the author, especially when there is a back-and-forth, as there was in the case
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of the PCA. They might decide to rewrite a line to stay just above the threshold of
acceptability, or to make that line central to some barter about which lines can be
sacrificed, or ignore the problem entirely, or to remove the problematic scene altogether.
In some cases, the PCA documents give insight into the circumstances under which
certain changes were or were not proposed; in other cases, the justification and its
translation into the finished film remain ambiguous. Where possible, I attempt to explain
the degree of insistence upon or resistance to particular interpretive decisions. Where that
information is not present, I still consider the documents to be important testaments to the
conditions of production and incorporate them accordingly, with an awareness that these
particular interpretations of the Code regulations were themselves subject to another
interpretation at the moment of implementation. To me, these double layers of
interpretation do not disqualify the PCA documents as tools for literary historical
analysis, but rather characterize the palimpsestic nature of both historical testimony and
literary production.
The relationship between text and context is an even larger question that has
ramifications for all of literary history, not only cinema history. Familiar historicist
theorizations posit popular culture as both an instance of and a resistance to ideology.225
Older work in the field of law and literature tended to focus either on analyzing law using
literary techniques, or on legal tropes in literature, but this essay engages with recent
critical descriptions of law and literature as mutually constitutive elements of an
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ideological system.226 In his analysis of movie violence, Stephen Prince critiques a
similar tendency among film critics who focus on social history to “run the risk of
treating movie violence as a dependent variable, as a subset of the larger social or
historical categories that have pride of place in the analysis.”227 Not only do such
hierarchies of focus “mask … power relations,” as Prince argues, they also obscure the
ways in which films influence those power relations—here, by indicating to the
American public that the justice system is infallible. In this article, the shared historical
context of law and films about the law means both that they responded to similar
historical circumstances, and that each one was a historical circumstance for the other. In
other words, early cinematic representations of the law did not perfectly represent real
legal procedure, but rather—thanks largely to the PCA’s heavy censorship—fictionalized
the system and thus created a new public imagination of criminal law that persists to this
day.

The Birth of the Code: 1930-1934
Several excellent monographs describe how the PCA, building upon examples
previously set by state censor boards, sought to limit explicitly sexual or violent material
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in response to religious, moral, and sociological concerns.228 These analyses focus both
on the content of what was censored and, in Stephen Prince’s Classical Film Violence,
the formal requirements and consequences of such censorship.229 Nudity, violence, and
sexual intercourse are among the areas of censorship that have received the most analysis.
Several scholars have also specifically examined the Code’s limitations on the
representation of queer content.230 Ellen Scott adds to this formidable body of research an
account of how the PCA censored miscegenation, African-American civil rights
agitations, and complaints about racial injustice. Her account intersects with mine in a
number of ways, and provides such a skillful analysis of the PCA’s role in constructing
blackness that I have not attempted to repeat her work here. One difference in our work is
that in Cinema Civil Rights, the emphasis is on cinema’s suppression of the civil rights
movement, whereas I focus on censorship’s consequences for the imagination of criminal
justice.231 Overall, these histories of PCA censorship tend to ignore the Code’s concern
about maintaining the integrity of the law. Where film censorship scholars do mention the
law, they usually use it synonymously with violence, presumably because the gangster
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movies of the early 1930s often made police the target of screen violence.232 But the
Code’s prohibitions against representations of the law extended far beyond the depiction
of violence. Previous scholars do not fully account for—and often do not even mention—
the PCA’s deliberate, programmatic omission of negative portrayals of the justice system.
The importance of law to the censors is immediately evident upon glancing at the
Code: its two major sections were labeled “Crimes Against the Law” and “Sex,” in that
order. (Subsequent well-known Code sections, such as the prohibitions against vulgarity
and the ridicule of religion, were much shorter.)233 These two primary interests had also
structured the Don’ts and Be Carefuls, preliminary guidelines given to studios in 1927,
but the Code expanded and formalized the rules. The general emphasis on the moral
quality of law can be seen in the Code’s three general guiding principles:
1. No picture shall be produced which will lower the moral standards of those
who see it. Hence the sympathy of the audience shall never be thrown to the side
of crime, wrong-doing, evil or sin.
2. Correct standards of life, subject only to the requirements of drama and
entertainment, shall be presented.
3. Law, natural or human, shall not be ridiculed, nor shall sympathy be created for
its violation.234
The Code invested its enforcers with a great deal of interpretive power in determining
what they considered to fall outside these boundaries. Not only were implicit and explicit
endorsements of criminal activity were forbidden, but any scene that suggested that the
legal system was imperfect or corrupt was also prohibited.
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These interdictions were repeated and clarified in the three principles that began
the “Crimes Against the Law” section:
The treatment of crimes against the law must not:
1. Teach methods of crime.
2. Inspire potential criminals with a desire for imitation.
3. Make criminals seem heroic and justified. 235
As the Code itself and its later applications demonstrate, the first and third actions were
forbidden because they might bring about the second outcome: inspiring imitation.
Tellingly, despite the interest in violence that structures other parts of the Code, this
section ignores the individuals hurt by crime and focuses on the damage that crime does
to the law in the abstract. While many of the more specific guidelines in the “Crimes
Against the Law” section dealt with the representation of courtroom procedures and the
behavior of law officers, these overarching principles emphasized characterization and
message. Misplaced sympathies, or a perception of criminals as “heroic and justified,”
might give viewers a “desire for imitation” that could lead to crime. Films that gave an
understandable reason for the criminal’s behavior met with instant disapproval.
Correspondingly, if sympathy should not be given to the “wrong” group, it must also not
be taken from the right one: the Code insisted that law officers as a group could not be
maligned, and that individual law officials could only be shown to be corrupt if they were
brought to justice in the end.236
There were several historical reasons why the Production Code authors may have
chosen to focus on law. The first was a new sociological understanding of crime that
235
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suggested criminality was contagious. Fear that audiences would imitate crime they saw
was acute in the late 1920s and early 1930s for a number of reasons. At the turn of the
twentieth century, courts had witnessed the rise of socialized law, an approach that held
that criminals’ actions were the result of their social and environmental factors.
Bureaucrats began trying to develop preventive measures that would reduce crime by
improving the surrounding environment.237 Their definition of social and environmental
factors included genetic traits that were beyond an individual’s control; this particular
branch of psychological and biological investigation led to the incorporation of eugenics
into criminal procedure.238 The sociological approach to crime required large amounts of
data, running large-scale studies to gather as much information as possible about the
circumstances that preceded the commission of crime. Authorities believed that enough
data-gathering could help them solve crime by reducing the circumstances that would
give rise to it. As a result, they created units such as Chicago’s Psychopathic Laboratory,
which ran tests to describe and deduce criminal behavior.239 Previously designed to weed
out evil individuals, the justice system now focused on instituting preventive measures in
at-risk communities, catering to the new belief that external forces could cause individual
criminality.
Explicit representations of crime had to be censored in order to “avoid the
hardening of the audience, especially of those who are young and impressionable, to the
thought and fact of crime.”240 The possible corruption of youth by films was already the
subject of extensive psychological studies run by the Payne Study and Experiment Fund,
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which between 1929 and 1932 conducted a series of research reports on films’ dangerous
effects on young viewers. Despite their highly questionable research methods, the studies
became a crucial source of evidence for politicians seeking tighter control over cinema’s
loose morals,241 and a justification for the Hays Office’s attitude towards movie
audiences. Such studies legitimized the intense paternalism that can be seen throughout
PCA records, where they positioned themselves between the hedonistic studios and an
innocent public infinitely vulnerable to corruption. Public interest in these sociological
approaches was increased by what may have been the second reason for the Code’s
emphasis on positive descriptions of the law: a crime wave—or at least the perception of
one—that peaked around 1924 or 1925.242 By 1929, this wave had ended and murder
rates had fallen by 20 to 40 percent across American cities, but the crime panic did not let
up. Instead, officials responded belatedly to the rise with a highly politicized “war on
crime” campaign that involved more frequent federal intervention in local crime-fighting.
Meanwhile, legislators worked to root out lazy or self-interested public officials, and to
impose more draconian punishments on criminal offenders.243
A third reason for censoring representations of the law may have been the close
and often vague relationship between the MPPDA and the government. The list of Don’ts
and Be Carefuls had been approved by the Federal Trade Commission, and Will Hays,
the head of the Studio Relations Committee (SRC), had previously been the Postmaster
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General of the United States.244 Later in the 1930s, as the New Deal expanded federal
trade regulations, this relationship became even more apparent. Finally, a fourth reason
for the inclusion of law in the PCA guidelines may have been the continued problem of
lynchings, especially in the South, which represented a highly visible rejection of
institutionalized law. The Commission on Interracial Cooperation had been founded in
Atlanta in 1919 to work against lynchings and mob violence.245 In 1931, the CIC
launched the Southern Commission on the Study of Lynching, which investigated the
spread of lynching through the South.246 Federal and state governments therefore had a
vested interest in curtailing complaints about the justice system, which may in turn have
influenced the censor boards and the PCA to limit such representations.
Between 1930 and 1934, the oligarchical studio system carefully controlled
productions; state censor boards persisted; and it appears that submission of films to the
SRC for approval was mandatory as early as 1931.247 However, the Code was applied
much more weakly than it was in later years. For this reason, and because advances in
technology and in the studio system allowed studios to produce complex feature films
with unprecedented levels of ambition and polish, this early period is often known as the
Pre-Code Era, or the golden age of Hollywood. In addition, the Great Depression limited
viewers’ budgets for entertainment while strengthening their desire for escapist stories.
As the Depression continued, a vein of anger and trauma opened up in an impoverished,
unemployed, and starving nation, creating a need for films that indulged popular
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frustration with bureaucracy while also offering escapist fantasies.248 The end result was
a number of sexually charged films such as She Done Him Wrong (1933), King Kong
(1933), and The Story of Temple Drake (1933), as well as the birth of the gangster film
genre. Gangster films such as Little Caesar (1930) and Scarface (1932) leveraged public
frustration with bureaucratic chaos to produce sympathy towards the criminal
characters.249 In gangster films, the gangsters became glamorous antiheroes while, in
contrast to the Code’s rules, law officials were shown as corrupt, cruel, and vengeful.
Culture critic Robert Warshow pointed out the massive cultural impact of such
representations when he said in 1948 that it did not matter whether gangsters were
everywhere or nowhere in real life. “What matters,” he wrote, “is that the experience of
the gangster as an experience of art is universal to Americans” (100).250 This vision of
the American gangster was initially crafted in the comparatively low censorship of the
Pre-Code Era, although the genre would continue into the later 1930s with James Cagney
vehicles such as G-Men (1935), Angels with Dirty Faces (1938), and The Roaring
Twenties (1939).251
The studios had a vested interest in maintaining a system of self-regulation, but
they also wanted to appeal to audiences as much as possible. These double priorities
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caused them to push the envelope of representation.252 The SRC engaged in weeks of
back-and-forth with screenwriters and studio heads, but loopholes in MPPDA procedure
allowed studios to obtain box-office releases without performing all of the requested
revisions. SRC officials also routinely permitted films to allude to scandal, allowing them
to meet censor boards’ strictures without making more substantive changes.253 Yet
sometimes they cracked down on what they saw as especially dire violations of the Code.
One of SRC’s more severe early reactions to a film script’s representation of the law was
the 1931 film adaptation of Theodore Dreiser’s An American Tragedy. The novel follows
a protagonist who drowns his pregnant lover in a combination of accident and
callousness, then stands trial for her murder. There were several obvious pitfalls related
to illicit sex, which Will Hays suggested resolving by altering the story to focus on the
relationship between the murderer and his mother.254 The depiction of the district
attorney as corrupt and politically motivated was another point of contention, and one
that Hays ordered struck from the film. He also disliked the references to “the influence
of mob psychology on the conviction.” As evidence of this influence, he named “threats
flung at Clyde, the open cry in court: ‘Kill the dirty sneak now,’” and the browbeating of
one juror in the jury room to make him agree to a verdict of guilty.255 His complaints in
this regard resonated with the relatively recent Supreme Court decision Moore v.
Dempsey (1923), which ruled that trials dominated by mob rule deprived defendants of
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their right to due process.256 The memos do not make it clear whether Hays specifically
wanted to match Supreme Court doctrine within the film, or whether he simply wanted
the film to reject any sense of the courtroom as uncontrollable or biased. In any case, the
exchanges about An American Tragedy exemplify the complex ways in which censorship
did exist during the Pre-Code Era, as the SRC practiced applying the Code and generated
the procedures that would soon be enforced more strictly.
The Hays Office’s mounting dissatisfaction with studios’ deployment of Code
regulation came to a head in 1933 and 1934, when several events combined to increase
studios’ commitment to enforcing the Code. The Payne Fund had generated negative
publicity for the film industry and growing political support for censorship; Will Hays
was especially concerned with these findings, to which he referred throughout 1933 and
1934.257 Roman Catholic clergymen and churchgoers added to public pressure by trying
to establish a national censorship organization.258 Film magazine publisher Martin
Quigley was disappointed with the SRC’s application of the Code, as was MPPDA staff
member Alice Ames Winter, who complained that the SRC focused on censoring details
rather than the general tone of films, which meant that overall scandalous scenes received
Code approval as long as they avoided specific problematic language.259 Hollywood’s
relationship to the government also changed with the New Deal and the 1933 National
Industrial Recovery Act, which gave the federal government legal justification for
controlling the film industry. The newly appointed NRA divisional administrator for
cinema, Sol Rosenblatt, made it clear that if the studios did not clean up their act, the
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government would step in and do it for them.260 Faced with mounting pressure, the
MPPDA formally established the Production Code Administration in 1934, and Hays
appointed his disciple Joseph Breen to run it. Thanks to Hollywood’s extensive vertical
integration, films without the PCA seal of approval were barred from theatrical release.261
The legal procedural film that developed throughout this era of censorship had
specific identifiable characteristics. These characteristics emerged as features of the genre
because they responded to specific complaints by the PCA designed to combat larger
abstract issues and instill specific ideals. See Table 5 on the following page:
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Table 5: Characteristics of the legal procedural film as functions of Production Code
censorship
Overarching
Ideal
No sympathy for
criminals
Crime receives
punishment

Section of Code

Specific Complaint

Characteristic that Emerged

RUGP I

Criminals should not
“seem heroic and
justified”

Clear distinction between
protagonists and antagonists,
little moral ambiguity

Not explicit

No suicide to escape
justice

Films end with arrest or trial

GP 3; RUGP III

No humorous
representations of
courtroom

Solemn courtroom
atmosphere

Not explicit
No positive
references to lynch
mobs

Legal system is
ultimate authority

Not explicit
RUGP III(2)

System is
fundamentally
good

Law should be
consistent
No corrupt system,
only corrupt
individuals

Lynch mobs attacking
innocent people must be
punished; mobs attacking
guilty people must be
replaced by punishment in
court of law
Minimize diff. between state
and federal justice
“Good” lawyer acts as foil to
the “bad” lawyer

Not explicit

Corrupt officers of
the law must be
punished by the end

Denouement where the
corrupt official is
apprehended and punished

Not explicit,
despite def. of
“natural” “human”
law in RUGP III

No implication of
opposition between
institutional law and
moral law

Institutional justice and
moral justice are unified by
the film’s end

No specific
references to
forensics,
fingerprints, etc.

Investigation is only talked
about in abstract terms

No representation of
how to commit the
crime

Murders are not shown
directly

PA 2
Films should not
instruct criminals
in how to commit
crimes
PA I(1)
RSP I(a), I(b),
III(D)

Accurate
Filmmakers express
representation is
resonance between reality
important,
and film, but realism comes
educational influence second to other censorship
is more important
concerns
Abbreviations refer to sections of the Hollywood Production Code of 1930. GP: General
Principles; RUGP: Reasons Underlying General Principles; RSP: Reasons Supporting
Preamble; PA: Particular Applications
Film has a unique
moral
responsibility to
its audiences
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Early-Stage Censorship
In the examples of PCA correspondence that follow, we see a variety of ways in
which the PCA interceded in film production to ensure adherence to the Code. The most
important facet of PCA censorship was that because studios usually communicated with
the PCA, censorship occurred early on and throughout the production process.
Filmmakers sometimes asked the PCA to look over synopses or to consult on a film’s
basic pitch. Even titles could be discussed in terms of the Code: in 1964, a lawyer
responded to a question about copyright on a film title, “I am of the opinion that the title
HOW TO MURDER YOUR WIFE is available but (query) does it violate the Production
Code?”262 (It was decided that it did not, and the film was made and released under that
title.) Studios would almost always send the PCA a draft of the script so that PCA
officials could point out potentially problematic parts, as Joseph Breen did in 1946 about
the film Boomerang!:
the script still contains one item which is unacceptable from the standpoint of the
Production Code. This is the indication that Harris commits suicide in order to
escape the hand of justice in connection with his crimes. If this suicide is to be
retained, it will be necessary to remove any suggestion that his activities were
criminal and merely indicate that he commits suicide because he is financially
ruined.
The lines in the script which seem to us to suggest the criminal activities are: page
116, the underlined words in the line, “I’ve sunk every cent I own into it, and
some of the bank’s—“; and the two references to phony corporations on pages
151 and 155. It will be necessary to clear up this point before the finished picture
can be approved.263
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Far from stamping a decisive “Yes” or “No,” Breen and his colleagues and successors
took a close and editorial approach to the script, paying attention to what specific
elements would have to change for the plot to make sense, and thinking through the
rational progression of the story as a whole. They always added a comment at the end of
their script comments that their final decision would depend on the finished picture. This
model of censorship, based on exchange between the censor and the filmmakers, is very
different than models of censorship (including the kind performed by state and foreign
censor boards) that would either reject the film outright or simply remove the offending
parts without adjusting the rest of the narrative. The PCA model affords the maker more
creative control, but it also creates the illusion of an uncensored piece—a film that
independently and organically embodied the PCA’s ideals. In this way, the earlyintervention model of censorship may actually naturalize the ideas of the censoring body,
even as it purports to allow makers a way to adjust representation.
At its most extreme, early-stage censorship prevented films from being made
altogether. This form of censorship was both the most invisible and the most influential
form of PCA censorship, because although the PCA could not prohibit the film from
being made, studios would not move forward with producing a film that they knew would
not be approved for release. The PCA often framed their objections as ways to prevent
the studio from experiencing headaches or financial difficulties down the line, as in this
cautious response to a 1934 proposal for a film called Guns:
You will have in mind the experience we had with the Wallie Beery picture, THE
BIG HOUSE. The records here in the matter indicate that there was considerable
trouble in a number of places because of the prison break. I do not recall the
details in the matter, but I have a notion that the “break” in THE BIG HOUSE
was a successful break. You will have in mind, of course, that the State of Ohio
held the picture up and refused to license it for exhibition there. Later on, after
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considerable expense and no little trouble, and as the result of a court action, the
picture was allowed to be shown. However, much will depend upon the script
prepared from this synopsis. I would say go ahead and prepare the script, having
in mind always that you are dealing with dangerous material.264
The material was evidently too “dangerous,” and the threat of court action and
“considerable expense” too worrisome to the studios, because after significant back-andforth between the studio and the PCA, the film seems to have died on the vine and was
never produced. Another film that was nixed early on for its representation of the law was
The Valiant, which RKO sought to produce in 1946. The film was supposed to be a
historical piece, set in 1909 in Oklahoma, “the most lawless region in the United
States.”265 The protagonist, a lawyer in this area, was “one of a dozen magnificent
shysters, as skilled at drawing guns as they were tears from the eyes of backwoods
jurymen and winning acquittals for bankrobbers, trainrobbers, and murderers, whom they
sent forth to collect fancier fees.”266 It was immediately evident to the PCA that this
representation would conflict with the Code’s insistence on positive representation of law
officials. The PCA went back and forth with RKO several times, but in their final
exchange on the subject, Breen wrote,
As to these proposed changes, paragraph two gives us grave concern where you
mention your lead’s “legal gymnastics.” If it is your purpose to show guilty
persons being freed by his efforts, there must, of course, be no unethical conduct
by your lead, fabricated or perjured evidence, and no suggestion that justice is
being perverted.
If your lead indulges in unethical and illegal practices, it will be necessary to
show these to be wrong and for him to be punished. The mere fact that he uses his
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money for laudible [sic] purposes would not excuse his unethical conduct in this
connection. It is important further that if his conduct warrants punishment, his
death be the direct result of such acts rather than as in the longer treatment
submitted, due to the acts of an illegal organization.267
RKO evidently decided that it was not worth moving forward with the film, because there
are no further files about The Valiant in the archive, and no film with its title and plot was
ever released. The suppression of this film was completely invisible from outside—more
invisible than if a censor board had refused to release it, because the film was never
made. As far as audiences knew, no filmmakers were even trying to make films starring
unethical lawyers or critical views of the legal system. There were no black-market
copies of The Valiant. There were no rumors about its content. The film simply did not
exist.

Moral Visionaries, Legal Arbiters (1934-1937)
The 1934 film Crime Without Passion was produced and released just as the SRC
was transitioning into the PCA and censorship became more formalized. Its original
script presented three major obstacles: the suggestion of an illicit sexual relationship; the
character of an unethical lawyer who made slurs against various legal institutions; and an
ending where the culprit committed suicide and thus escaped the course of justice. This
last element caused the most concern; in fact, throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the
problem of criminals’ suicide was one of the PCA’s most persistent problems in the
representation of law and punishment. In July 1934, Vincent Hart of the newly created
PCA explained the problem as it pertained to Crime Without Passion thusly:
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The most important part of the picture, in my opinion, is the ending where Gentry
is allowed to commit suicide in the outer office of the police station, establishing
the fact that the criminal has defeated the law. In order to have this picture
conform to the provisions of the Production Code - “Law should triumph over
crime and the criminal” —— this may be established by having the ending
changed to have the criminal reach for the gun and as he takes the gun in his hand,
have the law, through its officers, prevent suicide, and take Gentry into
custody.268
But within a few weeks, the manner by which Gentry obtained that gun became an equal
cause for concern:
The fact that a criminal comes into possession of a loaded weapon in the District
Attorney’s Office and particularly that the District Attorney himself is portrayed
as having encouraged suicide as a means of evading legal punishment cannot, in
our opinion, be reconciled with the provisions of the Code, stipulating respectful
treatment for officers of the law, etc.269
As this final complaint indicates, resolutions were an ongoing source of consternation for
the PCA. The PCA required killers to face justice, which meant that criminals could not
be shown escaping justice through death—whether they were killed by their enemy,
committed suicide, or died in accidents. From the Code’s perspective, such endings failed
to deliver the criminal into the hands of the justice system and prevented him from
answering to the law he had broken. However, this reaction demonstrates that the abstract
language of the Code forced officials to theorize sometimes unclear connections between
the Code’s ideals and the specific events of the film. Their logic was often tenuous, as it
is here, where suicide is shakily equated with disrespect towards officers of the law.
Although the PCA repeatedly referred to the Code in their instructions to
filmmakers, they also sometimes considered themselves arbiters of legal ethics and would
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elaborate upon the Code in order to resolve morally controversial opinions. The extent of
administrators’ philosophizing and the elasticity of the Code are evident in the exchanges
about the 1936 film The Crime of Dr. Forbes. Originally titled The Mercy Killer, the film
centered on a young physician who had helped an ailing patient commit assisted suicide,
known at the time as “mercy killing.” When the screenwriters originally submitted the
script to the PCA, Breen was shocked. His report deviated from the usual specifics of the
Code provisions, delving instead into a reflection on the moral parameters of mercy
killing:
… it is our judgment that ‘mercy killing,’ so-called, is, in reality, murder, and
must be treated as such under the provisions of the Production Code […] … in all
lands have consistently maintained that it is the province of a physician to cure
and not to kill. True, there seem to be in certain places throughout the world,
individuals, or groups, who have set themselves up in opposition to the generally
accepted theory that mercy killing, so-called, is murder. These argue that such
killings are justified as deeds of mercy. But the overwhelming evidence - from
legislators, from governments, from moralists, from teachers, from physicians - is
so positive and convincing that we feel in this office that to treat of “mercy
killing” as other than deliberate murder would be to flaunt the judgment of those
generally agreed to be most competent to judge such matters.270
In Breen’s model, the PCA upholds established sources of authority: legislative, medical,
and educational institutions. His use of the word “judge” indicates an extended judicial
metaphor, which implies that the PCA is a distant and unbiased lens through which the
nation’s cultural scruples pass freely. In his list of “legislators,” “moralists,” “teachers,”
“physicians,” he displaces the evidentiary burden onto the named officials, distancing
himself from the very government that the Code was helping to legitimate. Despite his
emphasis on empirical evidence, Breen never signaled in his letter what this evidence
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actually looked like. Indeed, because these discussions took place behind closed doors,
Breen had no need to prove any of his allegations. Simply alluding to the evidence was
enough to legitimize a change in the screenplay and thereby change a major cultural
document related to assisted suicide.
The PCA took care to ensure that films’ legal procedure matched the legal ethics
they wanted the film to espouse. In Dr. Forbes, this procedural emphasis landed on the
distinction between murder and manslaughter:
In the first draft script read by us, Dr. Michael is tried for the crime of murder and
the jury returns a verdict of guilty of manslaughter. In our judgment this is but
additional evidence of the failure of the entire story definitely to establish the
crime as murder and, consequently, as wrong; and straddles the whole problem.
Under the Code, murder must be definitely characterized as murder, and not as
manslaughter, or something else. These are two entirely different crimes. It is our
judgment that a “mercy killing,” so-called, is deliberate murder and not a killing
rightfully to be classified as manslaughter.271
In case the screenwriters had somehow missed this alteration, Breen stated it again as the
final condition for acceptance: “the jury will bring in a verdict of first-degree murder.”272
Legally, the difference between murder and manslaughter is that the former involves
malice and mens rea, and therefore infers more culpability and is subject to harsher
punishment. From Breen’s perspective, the problem with the jury returning a verdict of
manslaughter was that it implied that the jury sympathizes with the defendant and
believes the crime to be justified. Even worse, it implied that sympathy had influenced
the trial’s outcome, which jarred with the PCA’s overall understanding of law as fixed
and immutable.
271

Breen memorandum, January 29, 1936, in “The Crime of Dr. Forbes,” PCA Records.
Accessed through Archives Unbound.
272
Breen memorandum, February 5, 1936, in “The Crime of Dr. Forbes,” PCA Records.
Accessed through Archives Unbound.
158

Although the particular trial was meant to illustrate and shore up the power of the
law more generally, ultimately the PCA wanted the law to dominate the trial. Individual
trials were too much at the mercies of individual sympathies and situations, and their
representations therefore risked being interpreted as challenges rather than buttresses to
the law. The depth of this concern can be seen in a particularly worried memo from
Breen about Dr. Forbes,
This story, or any story, dealing with mercy killing, will throw out the suggestion
of mercy killing - the suggestion is inherent in the story, no matter what the Code
says about it; and who can tell what effect the telling of this may have on those
who see it? May it not be that some thoughtless mother, for example, with a
crippled, or deformed, or under-privileged, child might get out of this story a quite
definite suggestion as to how to evade her burden? May it not be that a
thoughtless child might get from this picture the suggestion as to how to rid
himself of a burdensome parent?273
As Breen saw it, films were risky because the emotions they provoked had unforeseeable
consequences. Affective reactions such as a mother’s sorrow or a child’s petulance could
quickly escalate into murderous action. This logic built directly on the Payne Studies’
questionable claims about the dangerous effects of viewing violence in film. This rhetoric
expanded the possible domain of censorship infinitely outwards, insofar as anything that
could conceivably create an emotional reaction became a site for the incitement of
criminality.
Concerns about the uncontrollability of emotion also surfaced in other PCA
correspondence. Throughout the PCA’s existence, for each film that passed through the
PCA offices, a worksheet called “Analysis of Film Content” was filled out. The sheet
included questions about setting, characters, plot elements, and more, which ranged from
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the general (e.g., whether the film was educational, political, etc.) to the highly specific
(e.g., assessors were asked to list every kind of violence shown, to quantify the
socioeconomic class of every setting, and to list every non-white or foreign character and
the nature of their representation). The 1949 version had an entire section called “Crime,”
which asked questions such as:
Does justice triumph primarily through the efforts of: Agents of the law ( )
Private citizens ( ) Both ( ) Not clear ( ) Question irrelevant ( )274
The questionnaires were changed over the years, but their overall structure was
consistent, as was their role in the PCA assessment process. These worksheets were
frequently unremarkable, for the simple reason that each film for which a worksheet was
completed had already had its script vetted by the PCA before production. Unapproved
scripts did not usually get produced. The specific format and content of the worksheets
varied over the years, and the questions reveal what the PCA was looking for when they
watched films. Part of this questionnaire shows the PCA’s particular concern over the
tone of representations of the courtroom. For example, the 1943 version of the
questionnaire included a section that read:
COURT SCENES: ______________ HOW TREATED? DIGNIFIED ______
COMIC ______275
In 1957, the corresponding question looked like this:
Is courtroom depicted: Yes ( ) No ( ) Dignified ( ) Otherwise ( )
If depicted, describe: ____________________________276
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The motivation behind this line of questioning can be seen in the conversations about
Adam’s Rib (1949), which received the following assessment:
Is courtroom scene(s) shown during the picture? Yes ( X ) No ( )
How is courtroom scene(s) portrayed? Dignified ( ) Otherwise ( X ) Dignified &
Comic277
In preliminary discussions about the script, before the film had begun shooting, Breen
wrote,
In these Court Room scenes, in which Miss LaPere and some of the others appear,
it will be necessary for you to be careful that the action does not suggest that the
conduct of an American Court of Law is hardly more than assembly of buffoons.
This, we feel, is very important.
We can understand how these scenes can be shot to indicate the point involved
and possibly provide a good deal of genuine laughter. Our point is that they
should not be photographed or played in such a way to suggest to the audience
that the whole thing is mere buffoonery, and, consequently, a travesty on the
administration of justice.278
Humor was seen as disrespectful towards the justice system, based on the assumption that
laughter would undermine the authority of the system. This particular piece of
correspondence also illustrates the PCA’s understanding that the actual film could be
“photographed or played” in ways that would communicate meaning that was not made
explicit in the script. That recognition was repeated at the end of almost all letters that the
PCA sent approving scripts, when they added a boilerplate disclaimer that final judgment
would be based on the finished film. By including a section about whether the courtroom
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was treated as “dignified” or “comic,” the PCA offered a secondary test of tone that
would also catch variations, implications, and cinematographic and acting choices that
might undermine their original ruling.
Breen’s concern that American courtrooms not be presented as an “assembly of
buffoons” also stems from the Code prohibitions against showing officers of the law as
inept or, worse, corrupt. Those prohibitions were central to the internal debates about the
1937 film They Won’t Forget, originally titled In the Deep South, which also illustrates
the PCA’s concerns about the representation of mob justice. The plot of the film, which
was set in Georgia and based on the real-life murder of Mary Phagan, was summed up
nicely by a horrified Breen in a response to studio head Jack Warner:
The story, as we read it, is basically the story of stark perversion of justice. It is
the story of the condemnation, under the law, of an innocent man, charged with
murder, the conviction being brought about by a corrupt and dishonest
prosecuting attorney, in collusion with a corrupt and dishonest police department
and a corrupt and dishonest lawyer…279
In the original treatment, this spectacularly corrupt trial ended in townspeople hunting
down the defendant and lynching him. Breen imagined an approvable alternative in
which “the dishonest district attorney, the dishonest policemen, the crooked lawyer for
Trump, the dishonest jurymen, and the perjured witnesses are all punished by the
processes of the law.”280 Every representation of an unethical or untruthful officer of the
law would have to be remedied to show punishment for that behavior—but this would
mean transforming the film’s ending and removing the film’s entire narrative drive.
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It was difficult to imagine how a screenplay could recover from such major
structural violations of the Code. How could a film entirely about a lynching that occurs
at the hands of corrupt officials ever pass the Code’s requirements? But it did pass, and
the abundance of documentation about the film makes it a good example of how PCA
approval worked during the late 1930s. Breen was initially skeptical that the film could
work, but a meeting with the screenwriter and director heartened him. The three men
agreed that a revised script could satisfy Breen’s objections in the following ways:
Instead of indicating that there has been a serious perversion of justice, by way of
collusion of the district attorney, Foster, the lawyer, and the jurymen, which
results in the conviction for murder of an innocent man, the new version will
remove this entirely. A new story is to be written, the basic point of which will be
that the man will be convicted, honestly, on circumstantial evidence. This is
important. Whereas in the present script the innocent man is convicted as a result
of perversion of justice, in the new script he will be convicted, honestly, upon
circumstantial evidence.281
After the revised script was approved and the film had already begun shooting, Shurlock
contacted Breen with further misgivings and indicated that they had not yet rendered a
final decision.282 The film still included two perjured testimonies, neither of which was
punished, as well as the implication that the victim was lynched by “the masked mob.”283
He wondered whether the problem would be solved by “indicat[ing] briefly that the
lynchers were captured and punished.”284 As he wrote to Warner, “We suggest not
showing in any detail this section of the mob taking Hale away, but shooting it as much
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as possible by suggestion.”285 Here, we glimpse the contradictions that inhere in any
censorship system based on subjective interpretation: while the PCA in other cases
objected strenuously even to the intimation of violence, in this case they permitted and
even encouraged extralegality by suggestion.
These changes were made to the PCA’s satisfaction. The film that came out that
year under the title They Won’t Forget was no longer an explicit condemnation of the
corruption of the justice system, but rather a portrait of a man wronged by circumstantial
evidence and the correct carriage of law. At the end of the film, the ambitious and still
corrupt district attorney asks his collaborator if he thinks the defendant was guilty. The
reporter replies, “I wonder.” This exchange is pregnant with questions about the degree to
which self-interested and biased officials can manipulate the law to convict an innocent
man. Yet because of the Code, these questions could not be answered or even explicitly
raised. They Won’t Forget was one of many films whose initial challenges to the judicial
system were suppressed by the Code, transforming a film about a failure of government
integrity into a tragedy of circumstance. However, even the altered film did not reach all
audiences. Mrs. Alonso Richardson of the Atlanta censor review board cheerfully wrote
to Breen:
You will be interested to know that we have succeeded in keeping THEY WON’T
FORGET out of the state entirely. Written by an Atlanta man, recalling one of the
darkest pages of the state history, capable of reviving conditions which would be
ghastly in the tragedy of results; - exhibitors, newspapers, populace have joined us
in asking that this thing will not be done to our state. The common consent has
been obtained, and we will not have the picture in the state. Nobody wants it! not even the most morbidly curious!286
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The PCA approval process was, of course, nominally designed to hasten censor
approval—a fact that the PCA auditors refer to several times in their comments on this
particular film, using the censor boards as an excuse to justify the deletion of
controversial material. Yet letters like Richardson’s reveal that this process was not
altogether fluid, and that the PCA as a federal body could not always pre-empt every
state’s complaints. Moments of local resistance still surfaced in response to the tide of
national film decency standards.

Removing the Details (1937-1944)
The PCA continued to censor films successfully through the remainder of the
1930s and the early 1940s. The film noir genre, which emerged out of the hardboiled
crime novels of the 1930s, was particularly affected by the PCA’s work. Many of these
changes involved the representations of violence, as in the gangster films outlined
above.287 Although many of these films were not courtroom dramas, the PCA censored
them based on rules contained in the “Crimes Against the Law” section of the Code.
Understanding the censorship battles over film noir therefore requires an attention to the
particular ways in which the Code prohibitions about law—as opposed to, and in
conversation with, the prohibitions about violence—guided their development. Much of
the concern was related to the too-detailed representation of crimes, as Breen articulated
in one part of his response to the 1943 film The Falcon in Danger: “Page 87: In scene
168 where the man is shown setting fire to the rubbish - this entire scene will be deleted
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by political censor boards, because it shows in detail the action of arson.”288 This detail
was seen as problematic because it might offer guidance on how to commit a crime.
A similar issue about detailed representation arose in the case of the 1944 Billy
Wilder film Double Indemnity, which features a woman who manipulates her lover into
killing her husband for his life insurance policy. All PCA files are precise to one degree
or another, but the Double Indemnity censorship case is especially well-documented for
three reasons: the film was very successful; it was adapted from an existing story; and
James M. Cain, the author of the original story, was an outspoken critic of the PCA.
When Cain first published “Double Indemnity” as a short story in 1935, it unleashed a
spirited bidding war in Hollywood for the film rights. According to Cain, the price for the
rights was pushed up to $25,000—until Breen tanked the deal by declaring to an MGM
executive that the narrative itself was so strongly in violation of the Code that it was
“almost certain to result in a picture which we would be compelled to reject.”289 In
response to Breen’s warning, the Double Indemnity bidding quickly stopped and plans to
produce the picture stagnated. Cain later claimed that the disavowal had cost Cain more
than $10,000, and he insisted that the PCA owed him the difference. Criticizing the
“nonsensical” and arbitrary nature of the Production Code rules, Cain complained, “A
studio can obey everyone and be salacious—violate them and be decent.”290
Cain went on to adapt the story into a novel in 1943, at which point interest in the
rights peaked again. Paramount executive Luigi Luraschi submitted to the PCA a
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treatment and draft of the Double Indemnity adaptation, written by Billy Wilder and
Raymond Chandler. Although Breen did not reject it outright, as he had threatened to do
eight years earlier, he had several complaints, including a sequence showing the disposal
of the body, which he deemed to be in violation of the Code.291 He also told them that the
screenplay violated MPPDA policy against representing fingerprint analysis—a
prohibition not mentioned in the Production Code, but referred to in documents as the
“fingerprints rule”—and objected to the line “And listen, don’t handle that policy without
putting gloves on.”292 Breen’s problem with both lines was that they indicated how a
criminal might commit a crime and evade justice. Although they did not show violence,
Breen thought they enabled criminality as effectively as, according to the Payne Studies,
the representation of violence did. Here, the problem was not that the law officials were
corrupt, but that the crime was so precisely rendered that it could be imitated—which ran
directly against the central tenets of the Code’s “Crimes Against the Law” section.293
The film’s ending also posed a major problem for the PCA. On one hand, the
Code stipulated that criminals had to face justice. On the other hand, only some types of
justice could be shown: execution scenes were verboten because their gruesome nature
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Reacting to the finished film, Cain protested this causality sequence: “I have just seen
“Double Indemnity.” In my opinion it is one of the finest pictures ever made. It does not
depart from my story in any of the parts to which the Hays office took exception. The
murder is committed in exactly the same way that it is accomplished in the book, down to
the smallest detail. Yet the reaction of the preview audience was one of admiration, with
no indication that one of them expected to go out and commit a murder. Indeed, I heard a
number of remarks to the effect that it was a dreadful warning of the utter impossibility of
getting away with murder.” Interestingly, although Cain discounted the PCA’s assertion
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might disturb viewers. The film’s first drafts ended with the killer’s execution, but in
December 1943, Breen reminded Luraschi to remove the scene:
As we advised you before, this whole sequence in the death chamber seems very
questionable in its present form. Specifically, the details of the execution in scene
E-2 and E-5 seem unduly gruesome from the standpoint of the Code, and also will
certainly be deleted by censor boards.294
Despite Breen’s warning, the scene was filmed and paid special attention to what Jeffrey
Meyers calls “the morbidly realistic details,” and what Wilder listed as “pellets dropping
and the bucket and the fumes…”295 But Wilder did not manage to smuggle the scene into
the final version of the film. Instead, the film ends with the wounded Neff dragging
himself to a threshold where he waits for the police to arrive.296 His death by the gunshot
he sustained in the struggle with Phyllis—the gunshot he has been nursing during the
entire frame narrative—would, of course, be impermissible because he would escape the
justice system. As interpreted by the PCA, therefore, the “Crimes Against the Law”
section of the Code was responsible not only for films’ insistence on the delivery of
justice, but also for the annexation of any hints that justice might be bloodthirsty or
torturous. The jettisoning of the execution scene also circumvented the increasingly
contentious issue of capital punishment, which had peaked in 1935—coincidentally, the
same year the short story version was first published—but had already begun to decline
by the time Double Indemnity was finally produced.297
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Uptick in Legal Dramas, Postwar and Pre-Burstyn (1944-1952)
The representation of law in films changed after the end of World War II, thanks
to historical events such as the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the subsequent
postwar economic boom and rise in American geopolitical power, the development of the
Cold War, and the progression of the Civil Rights Movement, all of which drastically
changed the public rhetoric around trauma, guilt, violence, and justice. The Nuremberg
Trials and the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) trials also put trials on
the national and international stages. The HUAC trials especially targeted the film
industry, which for various reasons, largely related to the release of films that favorably
depicted the Soviet Union, was considered to be a hotbed of Communist activity.298
Industry figures were forced to inform on one another, and those who refused to
participate—the “unfriendlies”—were blacklisted. This process polarized Hollywood and
led in later years to a number of cinematic representations of accusation, mob behavior,
and testimony, many of which involved courtroom scenes. Some films, such as High
Noon (1952), criticized the mob mentality that led people to incriminate their peers
(Arthur Miller’s play The Crucible was a prominent theatrical example); other
filmmakers, such as Elia Kazan in his film On the Waterfront (1954), sought to justify
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their cooperation by explaining the psychological circumstances that had led them to do
so.299
In this environment, audiences suddenly found themselves encountering ever
greater numbers of films depicting courtroom trials. These films included Boomerang!
(1947), in which a vagrant is wrongly accused of murder and protected by the prosecutor,
who refuses to try him; The Accused (1948), in which a college professor kills a student
in self-defense after he assaults her; An Act of Murder (1948), a mercy killing film; and
Adam’s Rib (1949), a Hepburn-Tracy comedy that also tackles gender bias in the law.
These films were released following a major transition for the PCA: Will Hays had
retired in 1945, leaving the MPAA under the leadership of Eric Johnston, who began to
quietly advocate for controversial films that might be box office successes as long as they
were not censored.300 But the films were also positioned on the brink of an important
moment in the history of Code enforcement, a 1952 decision that would weaken
censorship. As a result, these films are somewhat chimerical compared both to their
prewar predecessors and their 1950s variants. Although they would received more
censorship about law than 1950s films did, they also pushed the boundaries of Code
acceptability. For example, The Accused touches upon issues of sexual assault that would
continue to intersect controversially with law films and television shows in later decades.
Early drafts of Adam’s Rib, the film whose comic tone had previously created concern,
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also implied certain moral failures of the law that were very concerning to the PCA.
Breen wrote in response to the script,
Page 73: Madeline’s speech at the bottom of the page might well be rewritten,
against the possibility that it may give serious offense to intelligent patrons who
will not be willing to accept her statement that there are “two moral codes.” Note,
also, the line at the top of page 74—“Moral Law Unfair to Female Sex.”
[…]
Pages 97 et seq: I think it will be well not to talk too loosely about “moral codes”
— unwritten or otherwise. “Equality before the law,” or such expressions as “the
unwritten law” would be acceptable, but any raising of the question of the moral
code is likely to prove offensive.301
But An Act of Murder, in its finished version, managed to espouse that very distinction
between moral and legal justice. Bringing back the headache of the mercy killing film, An
Act of Murder described the trial of a judge who intentionally crashed his car to save his
wife from her painful death to a fatal illness. Like its earlier counterpart The Crime of Dr.
Forbes, An Act of Murder probes the boundaries of moral guilt in the court of law. An Act
of Murder ends in the acquittal of the defendant, getting around the Code by having a
medical expert discover that the wife had actually died of a suicidal drug overdose that
she took before getting into the car.
Meanwhile, another film, Kiss of Death (1947), pushed against almost every
single one of the PCA’s pressure points about the law:
It presents the law enforcement agencies of this country as utterly futile in their
efforts to bring criminals to justice without the aid of stool pigeons […] Further,
the jewel robbery is excessively detailed; the details of Maria’s suicide could not
be approved; Schulte, a police officer, is portrayed in an excessively brutal
manner; there is an improper attitude toward, and portrayal of, Judges on the
bench; the showing of the excessively brutal murder of Mrs. Rizzo could not be
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approved; the unmistakeable objectionable inference that Eudo [sic] and ‘The
Blonde’ are living together out of wedlock is unacceptable; the suggestion that
Eudo is a dope addict and the [sic] of a dope den are totally unacceptable; the
indication of a brothel would have to be removed.
Further, it should be indicated that Rizzo has been picked up by the police
rather than that he committed suicide.302
The PCA’s demands were not entirely met; the finished film still shows Udo pushing
Mrs. Rizzo down the stairs in a wheelchair, a scene that Pennsylvania censor boards
ordered to be deleted entirely from the film’s showings in the state.303 Similarly, Rizzo
neither commits suicide nor is picked up by the police; rather, he skips town before Udo
can reach him. However, in accordance with the PCA’s demands, Udo’s fate changes
from being killed in gunfire in initial drafts, to surviving his shooting in order to be
arrested.304 As the Kiss of Death objections indicate, the prohibitions against the
representation of the law were not enacted separately from the prohibitions against sex,
drugs, or obscenities. Rather, the PCA drew from all sections of the Code when censoring
films, and the sections on the law and on sex worked in tandem to create boundaries
around morally acceptable content.
Meanwhile, a major change to censorship law was brewing. In the 1948 United
States v. Paramount Pictures antitrust decision, Justice William O. Douglas mentioned in
passing that film, like newspapers and radio, was protected by the First Amendment.305
Popular sentiment agreed with him, and the film industry must have anticipated that the
Mutual decision could not long remain intact. In response to the Paramount ruling and
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increasing competition from television, even the MPPDA itself began advocating for the
complete elimination of censorship.306 Then, in the 1952 case Burstyn v. Wilson, the
Supreme Court held that films were works of art and thus subject to free speech
protections. Because it functionally disabled state censorship boards, Burstyn divested the
PCA of much of its power. Notably, the Court left open the possibility of censoring
obscene films; it held only that, “a state may not ban a film on the basis of a censor's
conclusion that it is ‘sacrilegious.’”307 Despite their explicit statement that obscenity
might still be censored, their position on sex and extreme violence remained ambiguous,
as they also contradicted the Payne Studies’ concept that representations of sex or
violence would damage young minds. Controversial representations of religion, morality,
and law were, however, now clearly protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Naturally, the PCA now had little recourse to the claim that censor boards would reject
films if they were not PCA-approved. Because of the vertically oriented system, the
studios still submitted their films to the MPPDA to ensure theatrical release, and the PCA
continued to review the films. But the Code’s teeth were dulled by the decision.308
Furthermore, after Burstyn, the MPPDA itself began to advocate for the complete
elimination of censorship. The shift in protocol came as a result of several factors,
including the effects of the Paramount antitrust rulings and the increased popularity of
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television.309 In this environment, the PCA’s place within the Hollywood hierarchy was
increasingly ambiguous.

Post-Burstyn Realism (1952-1959)
There are a few approaches to understanding the relationship between the Code’s
restrictions and the law films that emerged after Burstyn. One compelling interpretation is
that the PCA, by expressing their fear about certain risky elements in the 1930s and
1940s, had actually ensured those elements’ inclusion in future cinema. PCA officials
designed a policy that represented the legal anxieties of their particular era, many of
which clearly related to criminal justice; as the Code continued to be enforced throughout
the following decades, therefore, it became a document that reified certain values and
ensured the persistence of those concerns in the medium it controlled. An alternative
explanation is that when the Production Code began to weaken, studios that had chafed
against the censorship of their earlier films may have wanted to push against the
weakened Code in exactly the spots where it had once constrained them. Finally, the
Code’s prohibition of certain representations of the law may have drawn the attention of
studios who knew that the forbidden sells and prompted them to include these elements in
order to increase audience attendance. None of these explanations are mutually exclusive,
and indeed, the most likely explanation is some combination of all three.
In this new period of film production, audiences and filmmakers became
increasingly interested in accuracy over idealism when it came to representing legal
procedure. When reviewers of I Want to Live! (1958) praised the film as “one of the most
harrowing and yet fascinating pieces of screen realism seen in recent years,” they
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unfailingly celebrated the “numerous small legal interruptions,” the ways in which “the
camera records every gruesome detail of the preparations for the execution,” or the
screenplay that “spares no rough details in detailing Barbara Graham’s early life.”310 A
similar emphasis on accuracy was made in PCA discussions of Anatomy of a Murder
(1959), which further reveal the intersection between prohibitions about sex and
prohibitions about the law. The film, which follows a man’s trial for murdering his wife’s
alleged rapist, was based on a book by Robert Traver. A letter from Otto Preminger, the
film’s director, to Shurlock indicated Traver’s advisorial role:
As you know, Robert Traver, author of the book, ANATOMY OF A MURDER,
is actually John Voelker, Justice of the Supreme Court of Michigan. According to
my contract with him, he is legal adviser on the picture, and has to pass on all
legal details.
He objects particularly to one change in the script; namely, “penetration” to
“violation” on Page 128, Scene 81. He points out that in the statute of Michigan,
and other states, only the word “penetration” is used. He does not understand why
“violation” should be less censorable than “penetration”. Besides, to his legal
mind at least, the substitution of “penetration” with “violation” does not make any
sense at all. I am enclosing some research that he has given me.
Maybe you can see your way clear to withdraw your objection to the word
“penetration”. I am afraid that otherwise we might come in for quite some strong
criticism and even ridicule from the legal profession.311
He enclosed two pages of legal references to penetration in definitions of rape. The
presence of a designated legal adviser, which is today quite common, appears to have
been relatively new; among its peer films, it is most similar to the expert advice solicited
about Catholic confessional procedure in I Confess. The introduction of the legal adviser
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is, in the case of Anatomy of a Murder, a condition of the contract with the author and is
therefore directly linked to the presence of legal procedure in fiction, which underscores
the exchanges that took place across media at this time. It is important that Preminger’s
defense does not debate the scandalousness of the word “penetration”—and the film
makes it clear that Preminger wanted to push the boundaries of acceptability—but instead
appeals to the importance of accuracy. Whether or not he believed that “ridicule from the
legal profession” was the worst consequence of such replacement, he at least recognized
that public censure was a matter of some concern for the PCA, who had positioned
themselves as the intermediary between filmmakers and the public.
Shurlock was largely unimpressed by Preminger’s argument. But importantly,
now that the Burstyn decision had ruled that obscenity was the only permissible grounds
for censorship, the primary way that the legal representations could be questioned was in
their connection to obscene material. He replied to Preminger:
I appreciate the fact that the proper phrase is “penetration;” but I imagine Justice
Voelker would likewise appreciate the fact that a good deal of clinical discussion
of rape, while valid in a court of law, would undoubtedly be considered
unacceptable for discussion before mixed audiences in a movie theatre. I am sure
that if he will read the very last section of his memorandum, and imagine these
sexual details coming over the loud speaker of a public theatre, he will understand
that this is not quite the same as laying down a judgment in a restricted court of
law.
[…] I don’t think I would be doing anybody any favor by withdrawing our
objection, as I think that even our few remaining Censor Boards would feel
entitled to delete it, as being so clinical as to verge, at least from their standpoint,
on the obscene; and Censor Boards are still empowered by the Supreme Court to
delete anything that they think comes under the head of obscenity.312
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Shurlock wanted to establish that there was a difference between the courts and the
cinema. But this attitude was more a holdover from the earlier PCA mentality more than
a reflector of current public opinion. As Shurlock predicted, the Chicago censor boards
did indeed object to the language used, but the decision was quickly overturned by the
courts and the film was released in Chicago within a few weeks. Journalists across the
country sniffed at the hubbub, insisting that the presence of “such candid words as sperm,
sexual climax and contraceptive” did not diminish the movie’s quality.313 Even a more
conservative reviewer in Box Office Digest wrote,
As far as our personal taste goes we would have been much happier if the
dialogue had been less clinical. But we can’t get too excited over the matter.
The word “rape” itself is not a very pleasant one. Still in this hectic
generation we must read it—and our children too—on almost every page of the
daily newspaper.314
The idea that cultural production should reflect the grit of daily life echoes the tenets of
literary realism. In fact, on the literary side of things, obscenity was also under debate;
Anatomy of a Murder was banned in Chicago only two days after the District Court for
the Southern District of New York had ruled that the U.S. Post Office could not
confiscate copies of D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover as obscene material.315
(Of course, representations of the law had never been as strongly censored in twentiethcentury literature as they were in film.) Across media, controversial material was
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receiving increasing legal protection, which enabled representations of legal procedure to
be increasingly realistic.
Overall, the films that emerged post-Burstyn were still influenced both by the text
of the Code that ostensibly bound them and by their generic inheritances from films that
had been strictly policed. As a result, although these films explore different sites of moral
ambiguity within the legal system, they nevertheless end up presenting procedure as able
to answer and surmount these individual challenges. The subsequent years witnessed the
emergence of law films that adhered to a solidifying formula while also presenting
notions of justice that would have been unrepresentable only a decade earlier. In addition
to Anatomy of a Murder, influential examples included the films Witness for the
Prosecution (1957), Twelve Angry Men (1957), and Compulsion (1959), all of which
pointed out inconsistencies in the legal system while still upholding individuals, often
lawyers, as embodiments of an untainted justice. In these films, the law could be
corrupted through manipulation, as with the lying witness in Witness for the Prosecution,
or mere indifference, as with the complacent jurors in Twelve Angry Men; however, some
form of justice usually prevailed in the end, in keeping with the precedent established by
the Code. Furthermore, the history of PCA censorship of the law offers alternative
explanations for traditional interpretations of these classic films. For example, Mark
Tushnet’s reading of Twelve Angry Men argues that the film traces two oppositions: one
between emotion and reason, and one between law and justice. Tushnet argues that the
second opposition, between law and justice, is resolved at the film’s end, when justice is
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fully incorporated into the law and the jury arrives at what appears to be a just verdict.316
Now it seems that this unification is not the unique product of Lumet’s or screenwriter
Reginald Rose’s imagination: rather, it may also be the conscious or unconscious result
of the PCA’s decades-long intervention into popular perceptions of the justice system.
The films that came out of this moment were therefore a peculiar combination of
Code doctrine and recitations of it. The simultaneous processing of these various cultural
and legal influences resulted in the first full-fledged examples of the legal procedural film
as it was inherited by television and later cinema. Films produced during this period were
characterized by several formulaic elements: a robust claim to realism; appeals to specific
legal procedures; the close association they made between Americanness, democracy,
and due process; a resolution that rested on the reunification of law and justice, which
was inherited from the Code-era; a model of the individual case as illustrative of the
wider judicial system; and a belief that criminal law, especially murder trials, were the
moral testing ground of a governmental system.
First and foremost, like its literary counterpart, the cinematic legal procedural was
realist. (The stakes of such realism as it applies across media are described more fully in
the introduction and in the second chapter.) The vast majority of these films were based
on real historical cases, many of which were already familiar to the audiences. Viewers
therefore often encountered a reality claim even before they stepped foot into the theater,
and were prepared to judge the film as a reflection of history. This emphasis on detaildriven realism does not always square with film scholars’ analytical priorities. A group of
sociologists assembling a list of courtroom dramas writes, “For us, accuracy and realism
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are unhelpful criteria. Films, even when they purport to deal with actual cases or
historical events, cannot ever be ‘true’ … There is little point in evaluating courtroom
films on the basis of an artificial test of factual accuracy.”317 But factual accuracy was
something that concerned almost all parties involved in movie production, including
filmmakers, PCA officials, reviewers, and audiences. Memos abound with questions
about how to make scenes accurate; reviews often trumpet the apparent realism of a
scene. Filmmakers met with police officers and other law enforcement officials to ensure
that their portrayals were both accurate and amenable to the police.318 The script for I
Want to Live! (1958), which followed the life and trial of the murderer Barbara Graham,
called for the film to begin with this card:
You are about to see a factual story. It is based on articles I wrote, other
newspaper and magazine articles, court records, legal and private correspondence,
investigative reports, personal interviews - and the letters of BARBARA
GRAHAM.
Ed Montgomery
Pulitzer Prize Winner
San Francisco Examiner319
As in literary procedurals, realism in the cinematic legal procedural relied on an
overabundance of research. As the Double Indemnity debates foreshadowed, this
obsessive research often translated into a fetishization of the detail. When reviewers of I
Want to Live! praised the film as “one of the most harrowing and yet fascinating pieces of
screen realism seen in recent years,” they unfailingly celebrated the “numerous small
legal interruptions,” the ways in which “the camera records every gruesome detail of the
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preparations for the execution,” or the screenplay that “spares no rough details in
detailing Barbara Graham’s early life.”320 (Yes, that is two “details.”) When compared to
the discussions around Double Indemnity, these usages better mirror James M. Cain’s
perception of details as a reality test than they do the PCA’s conviction that details could
be instructional. However, details still retain a didactic purpose; they are cautionary tales,
evidence of a more “gruesome” or “rough” life, and as such they reach through the screen
toward the audience. Among its many other effects, realism in these procedurals reifies
class distinctions in the same way that social problem novels do, by sensationalizing the
“low” under the guise of objective realism.
While literary realism is quite obviously a verbal construction, realism in film relies
equally—even, according to some critics, more heavily—on visual effect.321 Indeed, in
legal procedural films, the reality claims are often first established through image.
Take, for example, Witness for the Prosecution (1957), the story of a man whose
wife testifies against him in a murder trial in order to have herself discredited and her
husband protected through double jeopardy.322 which begins with a wide shot of a British
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courtroom, or what the screenplay calls a “venerable chamber of British justice.”323 The
camera slowly zooms in on barristers arranged in a solemn row. The opening rites of the
courtroom are read out, instructing the courtroom audience (elided here with the film’s
audience) to take the proceedings seriously. During the credit sequence, the films shifts
into a montage of images of London’s law district. None of these scenes or actors are
seen again in the film itself; they serve only to frame the narrative in an illusion of
documentary footage. Although this sequence partly introduces the aggressive and
unconvincing assertions of Britishness throughout the film, it also and more seriously
describes the presence of law in the film. As the camera moves from the generic
courtroom of the opener, to the city, to Sir Wilfrid’s car and then house, the film moves
hypothetical until 1922, when United States v. Lanza upheld the federal conviction of a
man already convicted in state court on the basis that federal and state convictions did not
constitute double jeopardy. In the 1937 case Palko v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court,
led by Benjamin Cardozo, used the frame of selective incorporation to reject a murder
appeal on double jeopardy grounds. Under that ruling, appeals and overlapping
jurisdictions were not grounds for double jeopardy claims; most importantly, states had a
significant amount of leeway in constructing their own laws on the subject. Once the
landscape of total incorporation opened up under the Warren Court, double jeopardy was
implicitly on the table as one of the rights that the federal government had to protect
against state abuse. Surprisingly—given that it was one of the oldest legal tenets—double
jeopardy protection was not fully incorporated into federal law until 1969, when the case
of Benton v. Maryland overruled Palko. In practice, the ruling only directly affected five
states (Maryland, Connecticut, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Vermont). It is unclear to
what degree American audiences of Witness for the Prosecution would have recognized
that the protection described by characters as a national right in Britain was not a national
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from the generic to the specific. This gradual funneling establishes the place of the
individual case within the larger patterns of the justice system.324 The implicit argument
is that while the specifics of the Vole case (that is, everything after the credits) may be
fictional, the system it belongs to is very real. Verisimilitude is not an afterthought.
Rather, it is the frame that justifies the audience’s interest in the Vole case.

Cross-Media Translation in Witness for the Prosecution (1925-1957)
As Witness articulates the relationship between the general and the particular, it
does so in a way strongly informed by Code regulations, which we can see by comparing
the film to its earlier iterations in other media. The film began as a short story written by
Agatha Christie in 1925, which in 1954 was adapted by Christie herself into an
enormously popular British stage version before being brought to Hollywood. Finlay
McDermid of Warner Brothers wrote to the PCA to ask their opinion before moving
forward with the adaptation:
I asked Miss Taylor on the telephone if anyone had asked your reaction to
WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION, the Agatha Christie play which has been
quite successful in London and is apparently going to be equally successful in
New York. We, conceivably, might be interested if Code problems are soluble. I
would appreciate your reading the synopsis and discussing with me.325
McDermid spoke with a PCA official over the phone a few days later. They told him that
based on the synopsis, they believed the “basic story was acceptable,” although they
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cautioned that one scene from the play must be changed in order to avoid suggesting that
Romaine disguises herself as a prostitute.326 Despite McDermid’s caution, or perhaps
because of it, Witness sailed through the approval process very easily, with minimal
revisions, all of which were about profanity or references to an illicit affair.327 Newspaper
reviews of the film celebrated how little it deviated from the source play, mentioning the
introduction of a nurse character as the only change to the story.328
However, as described above, the PCA’s lack of opposition to the film did not
mean that the film adaptation was not influenced by censorship. Whether the filmmakers
and studio executives consciously decided to adhere to PCA guidelines, unconsciously
adjusted the story to meet those guidelines, or had simply inherited particular narrative
tools that had been shaped by the Code, the end product complied with the Code in
several ways that the original play had not. For example, the film version indicates the
kind of resolution to legal narratives that was acceptable to the PCA. Both the play and
the film deviate from the original 1925 short story, which concludes:
“I still think,” said little Mr. Mayherne, in an aggrieved manner, “that we
could have got him off by the—er—normal procedure.”
“I dared not risk it. You see, you thought he was innocent—”
“And you knew it? I see,” said little Mr. Mayherne.
“My dear Mr. Mayherne,” said Romaine, “you do not see at all. I knew—he
was guilty!”329

326

“Memo for the Files,” December 9, 1954, in “Witness for the Prosecution,” PCA
Records.
327
Geoffrey Shurlock to Arthur Hornblow, April 20, 1956, in “Witness for the
Prosecution,” PCA Records.
328
Variety, November 27, 1957, clipping in “Witness for the Prosecution,” PCA Records.
329
Agatha Christie, “The Witness for the Prosecution” (1925). Republished as The
Witness for the Prosecution, Kindle Edition (William Morrow Paperbacks, 2011).
184

In the 1954 play, Christie significantly altered the text, adding a great deal of procedural
detail to flesh the short story out to fill two hours of stage time.330 Mr. Mayherne was
discarded in favor of Sir Wilfrid (although the subplot of Sir Wilfrid’s health problems,
which I will address momentarily, was not yet developed). Christie also discarded the
original ending, introducing the character of Leonard’s lover and adding this exchange:
LEONARD. (Flinging off all disguise of manner, and showing coarse brutality.)
She’s fifteen years younger than you are. (He laughs.)
(ROMAINE flinches as though struck.)
(He crosses to R. of ROMAINE. Menacingly.) I’ve got the money. I’ve been
acquitted, and I can’t be tried again, so don’t go shooting off your mouth, or
you’ll just get yourself hanged as an accessory after the fact. (He turns to the
GIRL and embraces her.)
ROMAINE. (Picks up the knife from the table. Throwing her head back in sudden
dignity.) No, that will not happen. I shall not be tried as an accessory after the
fact. I shall not be tried for perjury. I shall be tried for murder— (She stabs
LEONARD in the back.) the murder of the only man I ever loved.
(LEONARD drops. The GIRL screams. MAYHEW bends over LEONARD, feels
his pulse and shakes his head.)
(She looks up at the JUDGE’S seat.) Guilty, my lord
CURTAIN331
Unlike the short story, which leaves the results of Romaine’s confession entirely
ambiguous, the play reveals the legal and emotional aftermath of her revelation. Sir
Wilfrid has left the room, but the judge remains present. The play acknowledges the
330
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procedural implications of her testimony, removing the trick from the hermetically sealed
world of detective-story logic and integrating it into a chain of procedures and
punishments. In the short story, perjury only appears once, when Mrs. Mogson (in reality
Romaine in disguise) demands what will happen to Romaine, and he replies, “She will
probably be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for perjury.”332 The play presents such a
punishment as a much more immediate threat and makes perjury the subject of significant
discussion. In the end, Romaine actively abandons one procedural eventuality for
another. Denying the option laid before her—“I shall not be tried as an accessory after the
fact. I shall not be tried for perjury”—she asserts a different future for herself, albeit one
in which she remains the passive subject of the trial. The closing words “Guilty, your
honor,” which echo the language of a guilty plea, gesture towards the potentiality for a
future case.
In the film, this ending is changed again (though not as drastically) to show an
army of officers rushing in and arresting Christine. Christine is subsumed not into the
caterwauling mob outside visible through the glass doors, but into the arms of the law. Sir
Wilfrid, who has been in the room the entire time, declares that he is getting ready for a
new case—the defense of Christine Vole.333 The film’s ending supersedes the momentary
triumph of extralegal justice (her murdering him) with the promise of a new trial that will
not tolerate any manipulation.334 Double jeopardy protections prevent Leonard’s retrial
for murder, but the film promises to pass into a new case that will administer justice
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anew. Therefore, although the double jeopardy conceit appears to represent a mechanism
by which legal procedure might disable justice, the structure of the film’s ending actually
reaffirms the judicial system in a number of ways. First of all, there is the promise of a
new trial that will result in a “just” verdict (whatever that may be). When that just verdict
is rendered, the system itself will be acquitted of the charge of failing to deliver justice.
This situation remains, of course, purely hypothetical—it does not have to be realized for
the fantasy to hold sway over the viewer. Second of all, Sir Wilfrid’s mention of a
defense strategy offers the possibility that Christine will be exonerated for a murder that
she committed. This statement could well be a commentary on the lawyer’s appetite for
cases at whatever cost; however, given the sympathy with which Sir Wilfrid and
Christine are portrayed in the preceding moments, it seems more likely to me that this
comment is meant to suggest that Christine’s actions are, if not excusable, at least
understandable. A justice system that exonerated her would therefore be flexible enough
to accommodate sympathy and affect, which would mean that the problems previously
posed by the judicial machine’s quasi-automatic functioning (i.e., double jeopardy) were
an aberration, not the norm.
Additionally, the film carefully replaced criticisms of the justice system with
criticisms of individuals. Consider these two exchanges, the first from the 1954 play and
the second from the 1957 film. They come at parallel moments in the story and serve the
same narratological role.
(play:)
CARTER. Counsel’s Chambers are no place to be funny in. The Law, Greta, is a
serious business and should be treated accordingly.
GRETA. You wouldn’t think so—to hear some of the jokes Judges make.
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CARTER. That kind of joke is the prerogative of the Bench.
GRETA. And I’m always reading in the paper about “laughter in Court.”
CARTER. If that’s not caused by one of the Judge’s remarks you’ll find he’ll
soon threaten to have the Court cleared.335
(film:)
SIR WILFRID. (taking the monocle from his eye) Thirty-seven years? Has it been
that long, Carter?
CARTER. Yes, sir. This is 1952 and that was in October, 1915. The Shepherd’s
Bush murder. The chemist accused of putting cyanide in his uncle’s tooth-paste.
SIR WILFRID. My first murder trial. I was more frightened than the defendant.
The first time I rose to make an objection, my wig fell off.336
The major difference between the two passages is in the target of the joke. The first
exchange describes a generalized group of judges who are indistinguishable from one
another and identified only by their shared relationship with the law. It carries a dry,
implicit criticism that judges are hypocritical in their enforcement of solemnity. Greta’s
observation in the play that she reads frequently about “laughter in Court” also suggests
that the violation of a solemn atmosphere occurs frequently. In the second exchange,
however, the object of discussion is Sir Wilfrid. He pokes fun at himself as a young
barrister, but makes no conclusions about lawyers at large. Although it is a gentle critique
of the unpreparedness of new lawyers, there is no implication of egoism or hypocrisy.
More importantly, there is no implication of a systemic problem of respect. The
redirection of criticism onto the individual rather than the system is in keeping with Code
requirements. The accumulation of such moments throughout the play ensures that the
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law as an ideal retains its solemn cast, even in a film otherwise filled with farce and
melodrama.

The Jury and Democratic Participation in Twelve Angry Men (1957)
As this interpretation might suggest, films such as Witness for the Prosecution set
up an unavoidable parallel between the jury and the audience. In both cases, an imagined
multitude of actors is represented by a single figure (the jury for the jurors, or the
audience for the viewers). The structural parallels between the audience and the jury
serve to remind audience members of the jury’s sympathetic perspective without
undermining their power; at the end of the day, these films remind us, everything lies
with the jury. This reminder is especially forceful in Sidney Lumet’s 1957 film Twelve
Angry Men. Normally, jury deliberation is hidden, snipped away from the main narrative
within the courtroom. Witness for the Prosecution is one such film. Twelve Angry Men,
by contrast, reverses that pattern. Aside from a few minutes in the courtroom while the
judge instructs the jurors, and a minute outside the courthouse at the end, the film devotes
nearly the entire film to the jury’s real-time deliberations within the jury room. During
the deliberations, the vote swings from 11-1 in favor of conviction to a unanimous
acquittal, thanks to the intervention of the white knight Juror #8, who reasons through the
evidence to reveal a reasonable doubt in the conviction. In the process, he reminds the
viewer of the innate subjectivity, unpredictability, and democratic importance of the jury
trial.
Twelve Angry Men insists on the destructive character of the jury’s initial bias and
apathy, but also argues that such problems are surmountable through collective reasoning
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and individual ethical intervention. While the format of the jury has historically been far
more malleable than the film might suggest, this belief in the truth-seeking power of the
collective has remained important for a long time. As jury power ebbed and flowed
between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries, the sense that juries served democratic
interests by disempowering the magistrate and privileging the voice of the people
remained firm. But the problem of how these various subjective actors converged to form
said voice was never fully clarified. Before it upholds the jury as an instrument of justice,
the film troubles the fundamental theory of the jury’s function.
If negative feelings characterize the Twelve Angry Men jurors’ initial decisions to
convict, the subsequent decisions to acquit are rooted in these emotions’ more positive
counterparts: duty, generosity, and empathetic identification—as well as the overarching
power of logic, which legitimizes these new alternative feelings. Despite its initial
condemnation of the subjectivity of the jury system, Twelve Angry Men ends up being a
film that openly embraces democratic ideals of individual rationality and the power of
collective decision-making. This perspective is vocalized by Juror #11, a naturalized
citizen whose background has given him a great respect for democratic tradition.
Pardon. This fighting. This is not why we are here, to fight. We have a
responsibility. This, I have always thought, is a remarkable thing about
democracy. That we are, uh, what is the word? Notified. That we are notified by
mail to come down to this place and decide on the guilt or innocence of a man we
have never heard of before. We have nothing to gain or lose by our verdict. This
is one of the reasons we are strong. We should not make it a personal thing.337
According to Juror #11, a fair trial should not be “a personal thing,” should not involve a
personal investment. In an ideal democracy, he suggests, individualism is minimized in
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favor of community identity.338 For Juror #11, impersonality and distance contribute to
impartiality. It is important to him that jurors are “notified by mail,” that they have never
met the accused; the fact that they “have nothing to gain or lose by our verdict” makes
the nation “strong.” Bureaucracy is not an impediment to a fair trial, but rather a
guarantor of it; the anonymized system of jury notification facilitates impartiality, which
in turn makes the system more fair.339 Notably, this perception is a thoroughly modern
one: in colonial America, townspeople rotated through the juries, and their familiarity
with the defendants or the accusers was seen as a guarantor of a fair trial rather than a
detractor from it.
While juries are one of the few places where increased bureaucracy has not
normally been criticized, anonymity still remains a site of concern for many legal
procedural films. Mistaken identity plots were central devices in many twentieth-century
films about the law. Examples include Boomerang! (1947), The Wrong Man (1957), and
The Young Philadelphians (1959), all of which emphasize how difficult it is to visually
distinguish one person from another. Twelve Angry Men itself emphasizes this possibility,
of course, especially when Juror #8 challenges the testimony of the myopic neighbor.
Mistaken identity plots have of course been mainstays of literature and drama for
centuries, and these cinematic incidents can be read, quite rightly, as interrogations into
the dubiousness of visual appearances. Identity caused particular anxiety in the midtwentieth century thanks to the threat of espionage and a rise in sociological texts such as
David Riesman’s bestseller The Lonely Crowd (1950). When these concerns are
channeled into a genre that privileges procedural detail in the service of realism, mistaken
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eyewitness identification comes to stand in for all the potential failures of the justice
system.
The implicit presumption in a jury system is that because it brings together a
number of subjective attitudes, the jury can arrive at an average or representative opinion.
However, Twelve Angry Men reveals that the process of consensus formation is not
necessarily an averaging of opinions, but can instead be a gradual transformation from
one extreme into its opposite. This perspective questions the interrelation between jury
trial and government representation. The right to a jury trial and the right to government
representation are the two rights explicitly guaranteed by the original Constitution. In
1880, the Supreme Court federalized African-Americans’ right—and that of citizens of
all races—to serve on a jury.340 The same case held, however, that women could be
excluded from jury service. Although Utah began allowing women to serve on a jury in
1898, the equality of their participation remained in flux through the twentieth-century; it
was not nationally mandatory for women to register for jury service until 1975.341 The
practical implementation of these jury norms was somewhat more complicated; many
prominent appeals cases, such as Powell v. Alabama (1932), turned partly on the racial
bias of the jury, and accusations of unfairly composed juries remain common to this day.
The Twelve Angry Men are all white men.342 The possibility of female jurors is
never explicitly raised. As for ethnic or racial diversity, the closest Lumet comes is his
340
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inclusion of one Italian-American juror and one naturalized American citizen. Juror #8,
the moral center of the film, supports these jurors—perhaps because they support him.
But that support does not constitute an argument for racial integration on any obvious
level. Rather, as those two men are brought into Juror #8’s fold, they are reincorporated
into the side of whiteness. (Quite literally whiteness: Juror #8 is dressed in a virginal allwhite suit.) As with the consensus building, the end result is not a plane of heterogeneous
equals, but a group led by a white male who successfully assimilates the rest of the jury
to his position.343 That Juror #8’s position seems more sympathetic than Juror #3’s should
not blind us to the assimilative logic at the story’s heart; indeed, as the film carries out its
didactic project, it relies heavily on Juror #8’s moral righteousness to support its
procedural arguments.
In the end, the decision-making process in Twelve Angry Men turns out to be an
irrevocably personal thing. The jurors’ decisions to change their votes fall into two
categories: (1) collective reasoning reveals that that individual juror belongs to a larger
group dismissed by logical fallacies (e.g., immigrant, poor, elderly), or (2) collective
reasoning reveals that a juror is especially attached to one kind of evidence, and proves
the case based on that evidence.344 Twelve Angry Men shows that juries are as susceptible
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as any social body to persuasive efforts, which throws doubt on the averageness of their
findings. Power is distributed unevenly across the participants, and the formation of
social bonds—the very element that in colonial America was meant to ensure a fair
verdict—exposes everyone to contamination by one another’s ideals. If that rhetoric of
contamination seems out of place in the situation in Twelve Angry Men, it is because the
film’s trajectory of consensus-building arrives at a verdict that we are meant to
understand as fair. However, we can easily imagine a flipped situation in which a jury is
convinced to arrive at an a verdict with which we disagree.345 Much of our assessment of
whether or not this is a “fair” trial therefore relies on Lumet’s techniques for probing our
moral compass, which range from Juror #8’s fiery speeches to the sudden rainfall to
indicate the scene’s emotional overload. In other words, we ourselves are being
persuaded in a particular direction.
In his analysis of Twelve Angry Men, Mark Tushnet argues that the film traces
two oppositions: one between emotion and reason, and one between law and justice.346
The position originally understood as rational thinking (Juror #3’s) is eventually revealed
as highly emotional thinking, while the apparently more affective position (Juror #8’s)
actually follows the logic of deduction. In regards to the second opposition, Tushnet
linked to his patriotism being challenged by Juror #11. His decision therefore hinges on
his identity as an American or as a sports fan. (These identity categories may seem broad
or unimportant, but they are some of the most formative and affect-based group
identifications functioning in American national culture.) In particular, the last hold-out
Juror #3 collapses over his broken relationship with his son before agreeing that the
defendant is not guilty. It is a flood of tears, an overpouring of regret and flouted love,
that quite literally generates the verdict. While the jurors’ decision statuses are fluid, the
actual decisions they make are rooted in identity categories that remain fixed throughout
the course of the film.
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contends that the film is resolved when justice is fully incorporated into the law and a just
verdict is reached.347 Of course, these oppositions are related, too; in Twelve Angry Men,
the final integration of law and justice relies on the triumph of Juror #8’s affect-laden
logic over Juror #3’s deceptively rationalistic rhetoric. This interrelation of justice and
melodrama seems to me to be an inheritance from the detective genre, while the
structural triumph of law and logic seems to reaffirm the legal process as an extension
and perfection of human reason.
Logic and reason only appear to influence decision-making in Twelve Angry Men
because they lead the jurors down the deductive path that winds up unearthing each
man’s emotional splinter. On a cinematic level, reason also ostensibly structures the plot,
insofar as the film could be understood as chronicling how a collective agreement is
reached through the careful examination of evidence. This reading, however, ignores the
fact that the real decisions are made by the overflowing of personal attachments into a
space of uncontrollable affect. Lumet represents a decision-making process that is
intensely biographical both in jurors’ continual references to their own biographies, and
in their competing efforts to describe the boy’s previous life. At various points, this
biography is imagined as a motive for him to kill his father, a reason in itself to convict
him, a justification for mercy, or a reason why he deserves more careful consideration in
the jury room. These interpretations produce a demand for facts, but this demand can
never be fully satisfied, because the entire purpose of their consideration is to establish a
reasonable doubt. As a result, although Twelve Angry Men reveals the extent of jury bias
against defendants, that bias can only be replaced by new biases and new subjective
interpretations. The many hypothetical alternatives that the jurors offer (e.g., “The old
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man heard someone running down the stairs and assumed it was the boy”) tantalize us,
but they can never be established as fact.
In order to achieve a sense of resolution, therefore, Twelve Angry Men places a
heavy burden on the resolution inherently promised by two structures: that of the literary
narrative, and that of the trial. First, the film must insist upon the viewer’s familiarity
with narrative structure, in which the crescendoing series of plateaus and climaxes is
understood to produce an ending. In a film, other elements can also signal to the viewer
that we are at a certain place in the narrative: sound, light, composition. Second, the film
must rely on the viewer’s sense of a trial’s ending as a resolution in and of itself,
regardless of whether the facts themselves have been ascertained. Importantly, although
the film never addresses it, any cultural sense that a trial itself is a resolution arises from
the double jeopardy protections that figure in Witness. Since a defendant cannot be tried
twice, his acquittal is the end of his legal proceedings. From this perspective, an acquittal
can sometimes produce a stronger sense of resolution than the endless series of appeals
that a guilty verdict often implies.
Considering Twelve Angry Men in light of Production Code history suggests that
the unification of law and justice was the result of specific historical and literary
circumstances. While the film had its ending in place by the time the script crossed
Shurlock’s desk, it was very likely influenced by the fact that, for the previous twentythree years, the PCA mandated—strongly up until 1952, and more weakly afterwards—
that the law eventually be shown to be just. Indeed, while the relaxation of PCA
regulations opened up new possibilities for the representation of law, the resolution of the
relationship between law and justice remained a sticking point for 1950s legal
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procedurals. Even films that openly debated the ethics of the law, such as Anatomy of a
Murder, found it hard to let go of the idea that the law might eventually be a mechanism
for the delivery of justice; when the defense attorney ends up being appointed as the
executor for the dead man’s estate, his partner calls it “poetic justice.”

The Split Procedural in Compulsion (1959)
The 1959 film Compulsion was a thinly veiled adaptation of the Leopold and
Loeb murder case of 1924, in which two wealthy and precocious teenagers killed a
younger child just to see if they could get away with it. The PCA was not overly
concerned about the representation of the law in Compulsion, but rather about the film’s
allusions to queerness. Shurlock wrote in a memo after a meeting about the film:
We were assured that neither in casting, acting or direction was there any intent to
suggest homo-sexuality in the finished picture.
We went through the script in detail, discussing various items. Specifically, we
urged that on
Page 28, they omit the line “Any evidence of criminal attack.”
Page 51: The two uses of the word “odd” in this connection will be changed —
possibly to oddball.
Page 76: We urged the omission of the line “There’s something wrong with
me.”348
And in a letter: “As discussed with you during our conference, it will be essential that
there be nothing suggestive of homo-sexuality in the casting and portrayal of your two
leads.”349 There was also some concern about profanity. The reason for omitting the line
“any evidence of criminal attack” is not explained, but it is possible that this refers to the
PCA’s unwillingness to discuss evidence in such a way that might lead viewers to imitate
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the crime. But in general, the PCA had few complaints about the representation of the
law itself, even though half of the film took place in the courtroom.
From the standpoint of assessing the evolution of legal procedurals during the
midcentury, Compulsion is especially interesting because of its form. In the second half
of the film, the defense attorney Jonathan Wilk (based on Clarence Darrow) delivers an
epic closing argument that nets his clients a life sentence rather than the death penalty.
His obviously Progressive defense, which is taken verbatim from the court transcripts of
the Leopold and Loeb case, involves appeals to the boys’ economic backgrounds and
psychiatric states, as well as to a larger sense of community morals. The film’s approach
to crime was heavily informed by the eugenics-oriented socio-psychological laboratories
of the 1910s, partly because it was set in 1924 and partly because Freud’s popularity and
the rise of sociological techniques had ensured such tenets’ continuation in modified
form.350 As viewers, we can test the truth of Wilk’s claims about the boys’ psychologies
because, unlike many earlier courtroom dramas, Compulsion spends a substantial chunk
of time examining the police investigation and interrogation leading up to the suspects’
trial. Half of the film is presented from Artie and Judd’s point of view as they attempt to
elude capture; the other half takes place in the courtroom, where Artie and Judd fade
from focus and the death penalty question takes center stage. Orson Welles’ performance
as Wilk/Darrow remains the best-remembered part of the film, but the first half makes an
equally important contribution to the legal procedural genre by incorporating the police
investigation into the trial narrative.
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The half-investigation/half-trial format remains popular to this day in television
shows such as Law and Order. These shows are often called police procedurals because
many of their main characters are police officers, although district attorneys and defense
attorneys also make important appearances. The police procedural, in turn, is often
understood as the natural evolution of the detective genre; scholars Winston and
Mellerski nimbly describe the police procedural as the revision of the detective novel or
hard-boiled crime novel within the context of bureaucratized government and late
capitalism.351 However, incorporating the generic history outlined above, a case can be
made for disrupting this causation and examining the modern police procedural as an
extension of the legal procedural. The two halves of Compulsion almost exist as two
separate films, with separate protagonists and separate narrative mysteries (will they be
named as the killers? vs. will they be killed?). But they coexist because in order to carry
the second mystery forward, the film must make the audience invested in the matter of
the defendants’ death and to see their death as the death of particularized individuals
rather than abstract criminals. By serving as a confirmatory evidence of Wilk’s claims,
the first half of the film allows the viewer to redirect attention from assessing the
essential “truth” of the crime on trial, to assessing the moral validity of the trial itself. The
interrogation scenes are heavy with dramatic irony, since the viewer knows facts the
police do not. Our prior knowledge of their guilt means that we see these confessions not
as revelations (as would have been the case in a classic detective novel) or as testimony
to take at face value (as in a courtroom drama), but as the unification of all the knowledge
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available to us, which is now shared among all the characters involved.352 What I call the
“split procedural” thus radically changes the epistemological position of the viewer.
In a situation in which the legal processing of material is a revision of material we
have already seen, procedure—meaning the set of specific actions undertaken as part of
the criminal trial—becomes less a mechanism for accessing the subject matter, and more
the subject matter itself. This shift can be seen in the case of interrogations. In Witness,
the examination of Christine only gave her a platform for her manipulation of the system,
deviating from the truth; in Twelve Angry Men, the jury’s evaluation of the evidence
brings them closer to the truth. In Compulsion, however, the procedure’s relationship to
the truth is proven as soon as it is articulated. The ambiguity that drives the viewer’s
engagement with the film thus arises in the interrogation methods themselves. Our
awareness of the defendants’ guilt makes us more attentive towards the police methods
being used, in the same way that knowing the ending of a book makes us more attentive
to the details of the middle.353 It is therefore easier for the viewer to notice, for example,
that Artie and Judd’s interrogations, which represent the hinge point between the film’s
two halves, take place without the presence of counsel, for which Wilk later chides his
clients.354 From the viewer’s perspective, in texts like Compulsion, interrogation and
confession are no longer necessary to obtain the truth. The split procedural accustoms the
viewer to the idea that defendants we know are guilty must be procedurally shown to be
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guilty. Therefore, the split procedural is uniquely suited both to underscore the injustices
of procedure and to reaffirm the importance of procedure in criminal law.
It is interesting to note that the split procedural emerges several years before one
of the most important criminal rights decisions of the Warren Court: the 1966 decision in
Miranda v. Arizona, a case in which Ernesto Miranda signed a written confession without
having been informed of his right to remain silent, his right to counsel, or the fact that his
statements would be used against him in trial.355 When the appeal of his conviction went
to the Supreme Court, on a docket with three other similar cases, the Court ruled that
confessions were not admissible at trial if they had been obtained without the accused
having been informed of these rights. With Miranda, the Warren Court expanded their
recent decisions in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), which held that indigent defendants had
the right to court-appointed counsel, and Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), which held that the
right to counsel applied to pre-indictment interrogations.356 Legal historians have tended
to consider this string of decisions as a unilateral movement by an unusually proactive
Court towards the protection of criminal rights.357 Miranda has sometimes been seen as
bringing together the major criminal rights that had been federalized during this period.358
Miranda was more controversial than these past decisions, however, because it
specifically addressed police behavior. The extension of due process into the police
station upset many legal critics and politicians (most famously, Richard Nixon), who
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believed that Miranda went too far in dictating police behavior and thereby endangered
police’s capacity to capture offenders.359 It was also one of many cases in which the
Court has been accused of “legislating from the bench” or violating the separation of
powers; critics of the decision believed that police behavior should be dictated by
legislatures rather than justices.360
When thought of as an interpretation of the Constitution alone, the Escobedo and
Miranda decisions to expand due process rights normally reserved for trial into the realm
of the police station seems to mark a deviation from the language of the Fourth
Amendment and judicial precedent. The same expansion makes more sense when it is
thought of not as a transference between spaces but as the extension of a linear narrative.
Indeed, in the Escobedo and Miranda opinions, the argument that interrogations require
due process rests on the continuous relationship between the interrogation and the trial:
It is argued that, if the right to counsel is afforded prior to indictment, the number
of confessions obtained by the police will diminish significantly, because most
confessions are obtained during the period between arrest and indictment, and
"any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no
statement to police under any circumstances." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59
(Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This argument, of course,
cuts two ways. The fact that many confessions are obtained during this period
points up its critical nature as a "stage when legal aid and advice" are surely
needed. Massiah v. United States, supra, at 204; Hamilton v. Alabama, supra;
White v. Maryland, supra. The right to counsel would indeed be hollow if it began
at a period when few confessions were obtained. There is necessarily a direct
relationship between the importance of a stage to the police in their quest for a
confession and the criticalness of that stage to the accused in his need for legal
advice.361
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Here, criminal procedure is developed along a linear axis, in which suspects are ushered
through the system by moving from point to point (arrest to confession to indictment). On
a metanarrative level, the arc of history is likewise charted by previous cases that, once
connected, move progressively to create the current opinion. The temporal structure and
the importance of narrative integrity are underlined in the majority decision in Miranda:
More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a
warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures
and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that
point in time. […] This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of
the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. […] Moreover, this
warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced
with a phase of the adversary system—that he is not in the presence of persons
acting solely in his interest.362
In this view, the adversary system takes place in “phases” punctuated by particular
“points in time.” At these points, the procedure is essentially cross-sectioned to judge its
adherence to the newly established standards of criminal rights. The Miranda and
Escobedo decisions move this point of cross-sectioning back further, and in doing so
necessarily reinforce the continuity of the process. Without its repetition within the split
procedural formula, the investigation-arrest-trial-sentencing narrative may not have
reached the point of codification necessary to demand constitutional protection
throughout the process.

Film Outcomes: The Triumph of Justice
The lasting influence of the PCA’s limitations on cinematic representations of the
law can perhaps best be understood through the lens of Frederic Jameson’s argument that
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cultural texts inherently include both rejections and endorsements of the ideology that
works upon them.363 As was the case with its rules about sex and violence, the Production
Code’s regulation of legal representations encouraged a dialectic of containment and
subversion whereby the Code simultaneously limited what was available to audiences
and ignited a thirst for the unrepresentable. When the PCA formally collapsed in the late
1960s, law did not become part of the new MPAA rating system, as sex and violence did,
so open critiques of the justice system were possible. However, after more than thirty
years of PCA action, the Production Code’s holdings on law had become ingrained in
American culture. This history may explain the continued idealization of the law or law
officials in films as diverse as A Few Good Men (1992), The Pelican Brief (1993), and
Erin Brockovich (2000)—films that may show government corruption or failure, but also
show the downfall of corrupt officials and conclude with the triumphant restoration of
justice. Indeed, law censorship’s invisibility has both enabled its persistence and
complicated the identification of its traces, and the subject demands further scholarly
attention in film censorship studies as well as studies of law and film.
Throughout this process of speciation, the most important aspect of the legal
procedural formula remained intact: the eventual triumph of justice. Although the new
legal procedurals emerged in a post-Burstyn moment of relative laxity, they were still
influenced both by the text of the Code that ostensibly bound them and by their generic
inheritances from films that had been strictly policed. As a result, although these films
explore different sites of moral ambiguity within the legal system, they nevertheless end
up presenting procedure as able to answer and surmount these individual challenges. In
363

Fredric Jameson, “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture,” Social Text, no. 1 (1979):
130–48.
204

all three films, that is, law and justice end up unified. This representation, or more
precisely the consistency of this reputation, is the product of PCA intervention. Much had
changed in terms of artistic technique and film technology since Hays had released the
Don’ts and Be Carefuls in 1927, but the emphasis on reaching a just resolution continued
to be a defining characteristic through the mid-twentieth century, influencing decades of
cinema and generations of viewers.
In Anatomy of a Murder, lawyer Paul Biegler tells his client, “The unwritten law
is a myth, Lieutenant. There is no such thing as the unwritten law.” He meant that law
was “written” in the sense that it was laid down on paper; anything beyond what was
codified did not belong to the justice system. Midcentury criminal law was also “written”
in that it was crafted by legislators and, increasingly, by justices. But it was also “written”
in a third way, a way that would have been less self-evident to midcentury audiences but
nevertheless had an important influence on legal culture. Law was written in that it was
produced by creative writing and the fantasies of an idealized justice expressed therein.
Born in the aftermath of Progressive legal reform and in the midst of a new crime
crackdown, the Production Code required an emphasis on the essential goodness of law
that heavily influenced the cinematic representations of law through the 1950s and
beyond. The Code’s insistence that films’ resolutions eventually show American law to
be just were especially influential, as they habituated viewers to the idea that a trial’s
conclusion signaled a criminal narrative’s end. Even as the Code’s power floundered and
ultimately vanished in the late 1960s, the formula continued to prosper. The legal
procedural formula that stemmed from Code enforcement solidified in popular culture the
idea that criminal law was fixed, repetitive, and continuous—a combination of traits that
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justified the expansion of the Fourth Amendment into the public sphere, and laid the
groundwork for the genre’s transition into serial television.
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CHAPTER 4
EPISODIC TELEVISION, THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY, AND THE
SIMULTANEOUS STANDARDIZATION OF LAW AND FORMULA

In a world full of successful legal procedurals, Dick Wolf’s Law and Order
television franchise is especially famous. Law and Order first aired on NBC in 1990 and
gave rise to numerous spin-offs.364 The franchise is known for its ripped-from-theheadlines plot lines, its trademark opener (“In the New York City justice system…”) and
theme song, its melodramatic style, and its formulaic structure, all of which render each
episode immediately identifiable as a member of the franchise. Asked during an
interview about the immense popularity of the Law and Order brand, Wolf replied, “The
basic reason [for the popularity] behind all the ‘Law & Orders’ is that they are truly
stand-alone. There are no serialized elements. As a result, the volume of episodes led to a
certain type of viewing. I’m not saying we have invented it but USA may have invented
binge viewing. It is a formula that has worked remarkably well.”365 Wolf’s claims about
binge-watching make sense: Law and Order came to prominence during a time when,
thanks to DVR, DVDs, and, later, streaming channels, binge-watching was
technologically feasible; this historical reality did likely influence the show’s success.
But Law and Order did not spring fully formed from Wolf’s head, and its success was
not unprecedented. What Wolf calls “stand-alone” elements duplicate formal elements
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that were introduced in early television programming from the 1950s and 1960s—well
before on-demand viewing was available in any form, and at a time when even
syndication structures were under development. Indeed, Wolf directly and explicitly
based the format of his show on the 1960s television legal procedural Arrest and Trial.
Law and Order and other 1990s and 2000s episodic legal procedurals (ELPs) therefore
contain embedded in their formula a set of characteristics that was ideologically yoked to
the simultaneous move towards standardization of criminal rights in the 1950s and 1960s.
I roughly divide television legal procedurals into two categories: episodic legal
procedurals (ELPs)—shows that, like Law and Order, are “truly stand-alone” on the level
of each individual episode, even if a few minor storylines extend through multiple
episodes—and serial legal procedurals (SLPs), which contain courtroom settings but
whose core narratives extend over multiple episodes and seasons. Most midcentury legal
procedurals were episodic rather than serial; although there were some serial legal
procedurals in the 1950s and 1960s, most notably The Edge of Night, the form only
became truly widespread popular in the 1990s and 2000s, with shows such as L.A. Law
(first aired 1986), The Practice, Ally McBeal, and The Good Wife. Here, I examine the
ELP rather than the SLP both because ELPs were popular during this time period, and
because, as I go on to argue, the same elements that made the ELP more popular also
made it uniquely suited to a certain kind of ideology of criminal justice. A key function
of this chapter is to define and characterize the ELP as a genre that emerged out of an
accumulation of individual shows’ branded iterations. Each ELP had its own particular
format, tone, and cast of characters, which it used to carve out space in an increasingly
crowded market of legal procedural shows. Despite this competition, ELPs maintained
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many elements in common, and the repetition of these elements across shows and over
time enabled the formation of a distinct generic structure. Over the course of the 1950s
and 1960s, through tens or even hundreds of episodes of each show, the formula of the
ELP was refined and codified in ways that are still legible in today’s television shows. In
addition to the basic defining elements of a courtroom setting, a focus on criminal
procedure, and an episodic structure in which each episode is based on an individual
criminal case, midcentury ELPs shared many common genre elements. These included an
emphasis on realism and authenticity; a didactic tone; carefully balanced aesthetic
appeals to boredom; a focus on defense attorneys; an attitude that the legal system was
generally good; and an episodic ending that, like in the films discussed in the previous
chapter, unified moral and institutional justice. Embodying both the midcentury
standardization of legal procedure and the simultaneous expansion of the national
television market, the midcentury ELP satisfied and then replicated a cultural desire for
consistency, standardizing diegetic elements into a genre formula in a way that reflected
the (ostensible) national standardization of criminal justice.

Intertwining the Histories of Criminal Procedure and the Episodic Legal Procedural
Television legal procedurals have generated more hand-wringing about the
negative effects of inaccurate representation than any other explicitly fictional medium of
legal procedural. In their introduction to the edited collection How Television Shapes Our
Worldview, Deborah Macey, Kathleen Ryan, and Noah Springer write,
Since its entrance into our homes, television has been the predominant means of
information distribution, and cultural storytelling: it is a medium through which
the public accesses information about most everything. [… ] These [television]
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genres, narratives, and cultural forms are not simply entertainment, but powerful
socializing agents that show the world as we might never see it in real life.366
In recent decades, researchers have paid much attention to how viewing crime shows
influences people’s perceptions of crime and the legal system—and thus, inevitably,
influences jurors’ interpretations of evidence and judgments at trials. Some scholars
argue that even accurate representations of legal systems can be deleterious to law’s
functioning. As Carlson writes, “[Austin] Sarat notes that an increasing number of social
scientists argue that legal institutions may function best when citizens are not too wellinformed about or interested in their operation. Too much information may lead to
‘unrealistic’ expectations and ultimately cynicism and mistrust.”367 A far more common
approach is to argue that inaccurate representations are the primary source of unrealistic
expectations. The term “CSI effect” is frequently used to describe a number of ways in
which the television representations of police procedure influence real-world
expectations about the criminal justice system.368 Susan H. Sarapin and Glenn G. Sparks
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offer an extensive summary of the various alleged consequences of viewing crime shows,
including an increased faith in forensic evidence, more generous assessments of
reasonable doubt, and the outsized estimation of crime prevalence.369 Sarapin and Sparks
undertake an empirical analysis of the effect of crime-show viewing, and their results
(admittedly taken from a relatively small sample size) indicate crime-show viewers’
tendency to over-estimate facts such as the percentage of work force made up of police
and lawyers; the percentage of children murdered; and the percentage of deaths due to
murder. Non-crime-show viewers also overestimate these percentages, but their estimates
are more accurate than crime-show viewers.370
Concern about the real-world impact of television viewing is no new
development. In 1954, Leland Hazard, an early advocate for educational television, wrote
that the television was uniquely suited to education:
Is it any wonder, then, that they should insist upon using some part of so powerful
a medium as television for education?
Why is the medium so powerful? The answer is that television is not bound
by time or space and can appeal simultaneously to the eye and to the ear. These
advantages do not hold for any other medium of communication. The spoken
word, all we had for centuries, was bound by both time and space. It died with the
speaking and carried only within the range of the vocal chords. It carried no
appeal to the eye. Later, the written word broke out of space; a manuscript or
book could travel, but it was bound to the time of the writing and carried no
appeal to the ear. In one sense, until television, there has been nothing new in
mass communication since printing in 1453—five hundred years ago.
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The first mass medium after printing was the motion picture, but its appeal at
the outset was to the eye only. Later, when sound came, it appealed to both the
eye and ear, but still the movie was bound in both time and space. It could not
take account of what might have happened the day after the film was completed.
[…] Radio suffers comparable limitations. True, it is not bound in space because
it may travel instantaneously long distances to find its listener wherever he is with
a receiving set, but it suffers the limitation of appeal to the ear only.
Television is the first medium of communication in all history which is free
of the limitations of both time and space. It is instantaneous.371
Though his logic was specious and his empiricism nearly nonexistent, Hazard’s
commentary aptly represents the high expectations that both critics and creators had for
this new medium. Hazard excludes film from his praises, but the logic was similar to that
espoused only two decades earlier by the Payne Fund Studies, the famous studies about
the influence of violence in film. Like the creators of the Payne Studies, Hazard described
his medium of interest as having a unique power and educational capacity—one that
relied, in a pseudo-Freudian way, on some hidden, “instantaneous,” and subconscious
influence.
The rise of television certainly seemed magical. Television burst into life in the
late 1940s and early 1950s, and commercial television programming quickly transformed
the media landscape by reducing both movie attendance and radio listenership.372 On the
surface, early television presented a fairly clean appearance: the most popular shows
during most of the 1950s were wholesome family sitcoms, most famously the blockbuster
hit I Love Lucy.373 But the medium’s massive commercial success did not come without
issues. The late 1950s and early 1960s were a time of significant transition for the
television industry. Major scandals rocked the industry during these years, fracturing a
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sponsor-centered system of production and replacing it with a network system that
characterized the television industry for decades to come.374 These scandals included the
“quiz-show” scandals, in which producers secretly fed answers to game-show
contestants; the Congressional investigation of radio payola, or radio stations playing
songs for money, a controversy that also influenced television personalities such as Dick
Clark; and a series of FCC corruption scandals.375 Networks used these scandals as
justification for consolidating network control over programming and advertisement in
order to ensure television’s moral integrity. Additionally, the disappearance of the
popular quiz shows following the quiz show scandals meant increased air time for genre
television, especially westerns and family sitcoms. Alongside these industry changes
came major technological innovations. I Love Lucy introduced live studio audiences
whose reactions were recorded as the show was filmed.376 Whereas live broadcasts had
dominated early television, by the 1950s taped programming was widely accepted, and
re-runs became more common, though the syndication industry did not reach its full
potential until the 1980s.377
As these technological advances and cultural shifts continued, and as competition
between television stations led to increasing innovation, shows’ content also slowly
diversified, and the late 1950s witnessed the development of slightly “weirder”
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content.378 Content was also influenced by Hollywood’s increasing involvement in
television: film studios had initially stayed away from television production, but by 1965,
Hollywood studios or independent producers were responsible for 90 percent of primetime network programming.379 By the time television blossomed as a medium, the
Production Code Administration’s power over Hollywood had begun to decrease, thanks
to the anti-censorship Miracle decision of 1952. But television presented new
opportunities and legal justifications for censorship. Despite the decreased role of
sponsors after the quiz show scandals, sponsor intervention continued to be one important
source of controlling output, including in legal procedurals. For example, in Playhouse
90 broadcast about the Nuremberg trials, all references to gas chambers were
systematically and unsubtly deleted from the broadcast, in deference to the American Gas
Association’s concerns that those references would influence viewers’ reactions towards
natural gas in their homes.380 The other major source of censorship was the Federal
Communications Commission, which was formed in 1934 and, as television developed,
expressed interest in excluding certain types of content. As Hilmes explains:
Though broadcasters’ First Amendment rights prevented outright censorship, the
FCC published guidelines and suggestions for responsible broadcasting that
frowned on (among other things) medical quackery, astrology and fortune-telling,
contraceptive advertising, favorable references to hard liquor, racial or religious
defamation, obscenity and indecency, excessive violence, the playing of recorded
music, on-air solicitation of funds, and some violations of advertising decorum,
such as too frequent or lengthy ads or the interruption of serious programs.381
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There was little government oversight of television in the late 1950s, partly because the
government benefited from the free advertising they received through the industry.382 In
the early 1960s, however, FCC Chair Newton Minow and Senator Thomas Dodd led a
rhetorical charge by government officials against television representations of violence.
Hilmes observes that the relationship between the government and the television industry
was far more affable than these protests suggested. Violence in broadcasting was a lowhanging fruit as far as censorship went, but it also fell under the First Amendment
protections, meaning that the government had no legal power to regulate it. Hilmes
argues, somewhat elliptically, that the government pleaded for limits that they had no
intention of actually trying to enforce in order to avoid setting regulations on an industry
whose flourishing was actually largely favorable to them.383
The period of television’s rapid rise was also one of major change to civil and
criminal rights in the United States. As discussed in more detail in the dissertation’s
introduction, during the 1950s the Supreme Court made dramatic steps towards
nationalizing criminal rights by developing new interpretations of the Constitution’s
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee to protect individuals from states’ abuse. Steps
towards these decisions had been taken in earlier decades—in the 1932 decision Powell v.
Alabama, for example, where the Supreme Court ruled that the assistance of counsel in
capital cases was a federally guaranteed right; and in activism efforts that intensified in
the late 1920s and 1930s with the development of the ACLU and the African-American

382
383

Hilmes, 217.
Hilmes, 218.
215

civil rights movement.384 But a liberal Court that had gradually accumulated the
necessary precedents, the intensification of activist efforts, and a postwar environment
that was more hospitable to civil rights claims all contributed to the 1950s and 1960s
being watershed decades for civil and criminal rights. Other social factors that
particularly contributed to the drive to standardize criminal rights included law schools’
desire for uniformity, and frustration on the part of state and local law enforcement, who
were subject to the delayed and often opaque whims of a distant federal court.385 As
described in the dissertation’s introduction, while crucial judicial precedents were set
throughout the 1950s, most of the decisions now remembered as the most influential in
the criminal rights movement were handed down in the early to mid-1960s: Spano v. New
York (1959), Mapp v. Ohio (1961), Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) and Miranda v. Arizona
(1966). By 1968, through these decisions and others, the Supreme Court had decided that
the rights included in the Fourteenth Amendment’s phrase “due process of law” included
protections against illegal search and seizure, coerced confessions, and cruel and unusual
punishment; and the rights to public trial, impartial jury, and counsel in capital cases.386
The concurrent developments of television and federalized criminal rights
intersected most obviously in the form of the episodic legal procedural, whose
codification can be narrowly tracked to an seven-year span between 1957 and 1964. The
beginning of that range marks the first airing of the Perry Mason television show. That is
not to say that the ELP arose out of thin air: Perry Mason was based on the serial radio
show of the same name, which had begun airing in 1943 and was in turn based on a series
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of novels by Erle Stanley Gardner. The circumstances of the television version’s release
already gestures towards how rapidly legal procedurals would proliferate in the coming
decades. Procter & Gamble had successfully sponsored the radio show and wanted to
adapt it to television, but Gardner feared losing creative control and declined to let them
use the Perry Mason moniker. Instead, Procter & Gamble created the television show The
Edge of Night, a serial legal procedural with a soap opera format and a direct resemblance
to the Perry Mason radio show. The show became extremely popular and aired from
April 1956 until December 1984.387 Serial in format, The Edge of Night focused on the
relationships between the main characters and had storylines continue across episodes,
often for multiple years.388 This form distinguishes it from the ELPs I analyze in this
chapter, but it was undoubtedly also responsible for the popularization of legal themes
during this time period.
Meanwhile, Gardner developed his own show with CBS, Perry Mason, which
first aired in 1957 and remained one of the most popular shows in the country until its
conclusion in 1966. At its apex, it was the fifth most-watched show in the 1961-1962
season.389 Whereas The Edge of Night directly adapted storylines from the radio version
of Perry Mason, the authorized Perry Mason television show kept the original’s names
but adhered to a much more episodic format. In every episode, the defense attorney Perry
Mason would take on a new client who had been wrongfully accused of some crime,
investigate the crime himself, and finally discover and reveal the true culprit, often
forcing the guilty party to inculpate himself publicly. The show was famously
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predictable, thanks to Gardner’s requirement that Perry Mason always win, and without
morally compromising himself by representing a guilty party.390
Other episodic legal procedurals swiftly followed. Two very successful shows
from this period were The Defenders, which aired on CBS from 1961 to 1965, and Arrest
and Trial, which aired on ABC in 1963 and 1964. The Defenders follows a father-son
defense attorney duo as they intervene in a number of cases, either at a friend’s request
or, more often, by court appointment. The episodes usually begin either with the crime or
with the father and son receiving the case, and they end with the conflict being resolved
at trial, usually in their favor, but not always. The Defenders was the most socially radical
of the shows and was rocked by several controversies over content. The show’s biggest
controversy was over the 1962 episode “The Benefactor,” in which Larry and his son
defend an abortion provider. The sympathetic representation of abortion provoked
outrage and caused its usual sponsors to retract their support.391 But the producers did not
back down from the topic: controversial representations were a significant part of the
show’s brand. Whereas Perry Mason embodied the public’s “cherished ideals” of the
legal system,392 The Defenders took a more critical approach, outlining areas of law that
caused problems.
Arrest and Trial fell somewhere between these two poles. It has a bifurcated
structure, with each episode broken into two forty-five-minute-long parts—“The Arrest”
and “The Trial.” (The show’s structure was deliberately reused by Dick Wolf when
creating Law and Order.) These two parts are linked not only in that they examine the
same crime, but also in that the main characters of the respective sections, Nick Anderson
390
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(a detective) and Jack Egan (a defense attorney), are friends and even collaborators,
despite being on different sides of the defense and prosecution. For example, in the first
episode, “Call It A Lifetime,” Anderson is attacked but then rescued by the accused; out
of gratitude, he takes it upon himself to enlist Egan as the accused’s defense attorney.393
Both The Defenders and Arrest and Trial are complex, even ahead of their time, evincing
a startling degree of emotional indecision, hesitation, and fear. At the same time, the
formula of their plots was also iterated on the character level. Each episode was
populated with an endless array of secondary characters in the form of witnesses and the
defendant’s family members, and these secondary characters were often highly
stereotyped—Italian immigrants speaking in heavy accents, nosy and ultra-religious
neighbors, and swooning girlfriends without a clue what the drugs their boyfriends had
been shooting up in their spare time. Flat and interchangeable, these characters created
the illusion of a diverse real world without threatening the smooth functioning of the
formulaic plot.
As these summaries suggest, each ELP had show-specific rules, and each episode
was constructed according to these rules. ELPs were formulaic enough that the plot of
each episode could often be described using the same structure—as if the viewer were
filling in the blanks. For example, Edgerton characterizes the Perry Mason formula in the
following way:
‘The triumph of Perry Mason,’ argues Thomas Leitch, ‘is a triumph of formula.’
In this way, the 271 episodes of this series largely repeat a ritualized plot
structure, which starts with a crime (usually a murder) that threatens to break up a
family or quasi-family unit, followed by an innocent being accused of this
transgression; Perry Mason then takes on the case and eventually ensures his
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client’s release by coaxing a confession out of some witness who breaks down
under his relentless cross-examination.394
Although each ELP varies in its details, each can be described with this kind of
description, which names the returning characters, outlines the arc of the episode, and
may even specify where certain twists come in the narrative. That repetition teaches
viewers what to expect from the show when they tune in each week, setting expectations
both about what will happen at a particular moment (e.g., if a person is accused of a
crime at minute 10 in an hour-long show, they will probably not be guilty; if a person is
accused at minute 50, they probably will be), and about the overall affective experience
the show will provide. Leitch’s comment that Perry Mason is a “triumph of formula”
should not be taken lightly: like sitcoms such as I Love Lucy, ELPs proved the appeal of
repeating and reusing a familiar formulaic structure.
The ELP genre developed as the accumulation of these multiple shows’ specific
brands and patterns. In his seminal work on Hollywood film genre, Thomas Schatz
describes genre as both “a sort of tacit ‘contract’ between filmmakers and the audience”
and (on the level of the individual show) as “an actual event that honors such a
contract.”395 Framed in this sense, the ELP acts both as a “specific grammar or system of
rules of expression and construction” as well as individual shows that serve as “a
manifestation of these rules.”396 To go back to one of the John Cawelti quotes discussed
in the dissertation’s introduction, about literary formulas across media:
Audiences find satisfaction and a basic emotional security in a familiar form; in
addition, the audience’s past experience with a formula gives it a sense of what to
394
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expect in new individual examples, thereby increasing its capacity for
understanding and enjoying the details of a work. For creators, the formula
provides a means for the rapid and efficient production of new works.397
The success of the ELP—and indeed, all episodic and formulaic television shows—
depends on this sense that expectations augment rather than limit viewers’ enjoyment. At
the same time, variation is important, both within the ELP genre as a whole and within
the individual shows. Even as a show’s trademark formula became its primary appeal for
viewers, it also posed some problems for viewer retention. As J. Dennis Bounds writes of
Perry Mason,
In fact, it was the very success of the literary stories posed a problem for the
producers of the television series: how to inject ‘freshness’ into the series as the
audience became familiar with the formula. The requirements of formula and
variation in Perry Mason give rise to the series’ distinctive narrative structure.
Each episode actually comprises not one but two narrative ‘movements.’ The
French critic Pierre Macherey identifies these two separate movements as being
one that ‘establishes the mystery while the other dispels it’ (34). […] It is in this
movement [the first movement] that a ‘problem’ is stated as a crime is committed.
This movement finds the most variation from episode to episode yet has its own
level of necessary formulaic elements. The second narrative movement presents
Mason with a client who claims innocence and compels Mason and his team to
‘solve’ the crime. It is in this movement that the formula finds its least
variation.398
As Bounds implies, some level of variation to keep viewers interested in the series. In
ELPs, that variation usually revolved around plot specifics: who was accused, what crime
they were accused of, the details of the crime, and the particular legal challenges their
case posed.
Thinking about how an individual text functions within its genre, Cawelti writes
that genres allow us to judge individual works in “at least two different ways”:
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(a) by the way in which they fulfill or fail to fulfill the ideal potentials inherent in
the genre and thereby achieve or fail to achieve the full artistic effect of that
particular type of construction. These are the terms in which Aristotle treats
tragedy; (b) by the way in which the individual work deviates from the flat
standard of the genre to accomplish some unique individual expression or
effect.399
Cawelti means that we can use these two modes of judgment to compare a text to its
genre, but we can also think of “fulfill[ment]” or “deviat[ion] from the flat standard” as
being two modes for evaluating an individual episode in comparison to its standardized
formula. In this sense, the relationship between the individual episode and the individual
show is analogous to the relationship between the individual show and the genre as a
whole. This is why, for example, when someone says that an episode of a show is
particularly “good,” they can mean either that it is representative of the show’s formula
as a whole, or that it deviates from the formula in a unique way. Each episode of a
television show is nested both within its specific show and within the television genre as
a whole.
In the same way that we can see variation and consistency within a specific ELP
series, we can also see variation and consistency across the ELP genre, as ELPs sought to
differentiate themselves from one another by creating a specific show identity that would
give them purchase in an increasingly crowded marketplace. Compared to legal
procedurals in other media, this process of brand formation by economic competition is
especially visible in television because series continued over time (meaning show
creators wanted to attract viewers who would return to the same show every week). As
variation arose between episodes and between series, the ELP formula became
increasingly visible as a fixed pattern of repeated elements to which shows had to adhere
399
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in order to be identifiable as an ELP and attract viewers who were interested in that
subject. ELPs’ approaches to realism evolved within this contradiction; reality claims
were an important identifying element of ELPs, but they were also a mechanism for
differentiating shows in the marketplace. For ELPs, realism was not a fixed set of
techniques, but rather an evolving set of strategies that shows could manipulate to stand
apart from their competitors. Moreover, while these strategies sometimes resembled
traditional definitions of literary realism, ELPs also deviated from these approaches and
produced strategies of realism that were specific to television and specific to legal
procedure.

Specific City, Non-specific Court
Midcentury ELPs were often set in recognizable geographic locations, which—
unlike in the Southern Gothic legal procedurals discussed in Chapter 1—tended to be
large metropoles with diverse and comparatively liberal populations (whether or not the
population was represented in that way within the television show itself). Viewers would
usually encounter this city during the investigative phase of the episode, which might be
carried out by the police (Arrest and Trial) or the defense attorney himself (Perry
Mason). In Perry Mason and Arrest and Trial, this city is Los Angeles, where we see an
array of establishing shots of motels or roads with identifiably Southern Californian
elements. In The Defenders, which helped usher in a wave of gritty, on-location shows,
this city is New York. The geographically specific identifiers extend to courtroom
exteriors: in ELPs, viewers are often told through establishing shots that these courtrooms
are real and specific. For example, The Defenders credits feature a shot of Thurgood
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Marshall Courthouse in New York City, while Perry Mason often shows the Stanley
Mosk Courthouse in Los Angeles, featuring the words “Los Angeles County
Courthouse,” before cutting to a courtroom interior.400
However, once characters enter these buildings, we lose many location identifiers.
In the courtroom interior of the Perry Mason episode “The Case of the Watery Witness,”
for example, the only geographically defining characteristics are two flags standing
behind the judge—a California state flag and an American flag, both of which are furled
and difficult to identify.401 In addition to being geographically unmarked, these
courtroom sets are also virtually indistinguishable from the courtroom sets of other ELP
shows, and from the platonic ideal of an actual American courtroom. (Occasionally,
ELPs do sometimes take the show out of the traditional courtroom altogether, as when
Jack Egan in Arrest and Trial assists in a court martial and the trial takes place in a
military courtroom [“Tears from a Silver Dipper”], or when Larry Preston in The
Defenders negotiates a hostage situation within a prison by staging a mock trial [“The
Riot”].402 But these are rare exceptions.) Settings that are outside the courtroom but still
connected to the justice system likewise create a sense of uniformity. Prisons and judge’s
chambers are the most common examples of this type of setting: prisons are usually
shown when the defendant has not been freed on bail and the attorney must go to the
prison to confer with their client; judge’s chambers are usually shown when prosecutors
and defense attorneys are coming to some kind of agreement or plea deal. Both types of
400
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settings are largely indistinguishable from one another across episodes and even across
series. A prison is a prison is a prison, and likewise with judge’s chambers. (Police
stations would also fit these parameters, although interrogation scenes are not as common
in midcentury ELPs as they are in the 1990s and 2000s variations, as is explored more in
the final section of Chapter 3 on the “split procedural.”) The other recurring set in ELPs
the defense attorney’s office, which is usually shown either when the defendant is first
seeking assistance or when the attorney(s) need to debate a larger moral quandary of the
case. These offices, like the judge’s chambers, are usually devoid of personal objects, and
we rarely see the attorney-protagonists outside their professional context.
The emphatically standardized setting that characterizes the inevitable transition
to the criminal justice system in ELPs lends a different weight to the representation of
geographically specific locations earlier in the episodes. When discussing Southern
Gothic legal procedurals in Chapter 1, I described how the development of a federalized
criminal justice system can be seen as the colonization of certain regional modes of
justice by the Northern mode of institutionalized justice. The appeals to geographic
location made in The Defenders, Arrest and Trial, or Perry Mason feed into this pattern
by positioning the metropolis as the canvas for the performance of a successful
standardized justice, a model to which audiences in communities across the United States
should aspire. ELPs thus present a blueprint for a relationship between locale and system
in which crimes that are perpetrated and investigated in geographically specific location
are then transferred into a geographically neutral, nationally standardized system for
punishment. Unlike their contemporaries in Southern Gothic fiction (discussed in Chapter
1) or their later 1990s iterations that put local police departments in jurisdictional conflict
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with “the feds,” 1960s ELPs tend not to probe the distinctions between state and federal
authority, instead representing an abstractly governmental criminal justice system whose
affiliations with the federal, state, or local government are never fully examined. Overall,
there was great consistency in the ways that these three shows treated the relationship
between the courtroom setting and its urban environs.

Detail, Technical Accuracy, and Boredom
Other ELP strategies of verisimilitude involved a more complex admixture of
variation and consistency. Many of these strategies—namely, detail, technical accuracy,
and an aesthetic of boredom—originated with the television show Dragnet. Dragnet was
not a legal procedural as I define it here, because it focused on police investigation rather
than on the court system, but it is widely recognized as one of the most formative shows
in early television, and it played an important role in ELP genealogy. Dragnet was based
on a radio show of the same name that had become a surprise hit when first broadcast in
1949. The popularity of the radio version allowed Jack Webb, the series’s star and
creator, to convince NBC to use telefilm and Hollywood techniques for the television
version, which premiered in 1951 and continued until 1959.403 (It was also rebooted for
three years in 1967.) Both the radio and television versions of Dragnet emphasized their
connections to reality. Their plots originated with real cases from the Los Angeles Police
Department’s archives, and the show’s opening and credits explicitly reference the realworld origins.404 The LAPD credits also note that the LAPD was directly involved in the
show’s production, which matches a pattern of official involvement that had been
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established in 1930s and 1940s documentary filmmaking, which was frequently
sponsored by government agencies.405 Throughout each episode, Dragnet further makes
what Eric Schaefer describes as “highly stylized” appeals to realism, including “constant
references to dates, the time, and weather conditions” and a prologue that insisted the
story was true. Other examples of this insistence included:
[an emphasis on] authentic police jargon, the technical aspects of law
enforcement, and the drudgery of such work. Rather than engaging in fistfights
and gunplay, Friday and his partner spent much screen time making phone calls,
questioning witnesses, or following up on dead-end leads. Scenes of the
detectives simply waiting and engaging in mundane small talk were common. To
save on costly rehearsal time, Webb had actors read their lines off a
TelePrompTer. The result was a clipped, terse style that conveyed a documentary
feel and became a trademark of subsequent series produced by Webb, including
Adam-12 and Emergency. Dragnet always concluded with an epilogue detailing
the criminal’s fate, accompanied by a shot of the character shifting about
uncomfortably before the camera.406
In this account, Dragnet’s particular form of realism resulted from a combination of
causes, including an intentional deviation from one earlier kind of movie (“fistfights and
gunplay”), an intentional adherence to another earlier kind of movie (the documentary),
and practical considerations (rehearsal time). Mittell makes a similar argument that when
he resists the critical tendency to locate Dragnet’s form in film noir, instead arguing that
Dragnet inherited its emphasis on realism and authenticity from the “semi-documentary
police procedural” of the 1940s, while also drawing from other crime film subgenres for
technical elements and ideological claims.407 These accounts of Dragnet’s genealogies
demonstrate that the show’s creators adapted elements from different genres to serve
specific intended ideological or aesthetic purposes, and that in amalgamating these
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sources, Dragnet created its own brand of realism. This brand, which relied heavily on
technical jargon and “drudgery,” was available for successive ELPs to mine, which they
did to varying extents.
For example, Perry Mason rejected Dragnet’s emphasis on “drudgery,” instead
developing a tone that was famously melodramatic. Its trademark trope was the surprise
reveal of the real murderer at the episode’s climax. In these so-called “Perry Mason
moments,” the real murderer, serving as witness, would confess on the stand—or, in one
memorable instance that now lives on in YouTube under the telling title “Perry Mason (Overly?) dramatic ending is unintentionally funny,” sprang up from the viewers’
benches to howl that, “Yes, I killed Ned Thompson! I killed him! I killed him I killed him
I killed him!”408 These ludicrously predictable (and predictably ludicrous) twists not only
suggested a break from reality in each individual instance, but also became less and less
likely each time they recurred. The predictability of these moments, the standardization
across episodes, resist Ian Watt’s claim that “any attention to any pre-established formal
conventions can only endanger” the mission of “convey[ing] the impression of fidelity to
human experience.”409
On the other hand, Perry Mason also adheres to certain tenets of realism. The
show is chronologically ordered, set in a specific and real location, and focuses on the
daily activities of a specific, named, and semi-believable character. It follows Mason
around as he investigates crimes, showing his movements with the precision and detail
typical of Dragnet. Additionally, Mason’s investigations, in which his skills of deduction
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and argumentation inevitably lead to the discovery of the true criminal, endorse
philosophical realism’s central belief that, in Watt’s words, “the position that truth can be
discovered by the individual through his senses.”410 And when it comes to the courtroom,
even when the trial ends in wildly improbable events, the viewer is constantly reminded
of a set of rules for the courtroom that resembles the actual legal procedures of American
criminal trials. For example, we see Mason raising objections during the crossexamination of his witnesses, approaching the bench to talk to the judge, and referring to
legal precedent. Mason thus encouraged a combination of credulity and disbelief that was
partly similar to what Catherine Gallagher, in describing the rise of fictionality in the
eighteenth century, calls “the spirit of ‘ironic’ assent.”411 Gallagher argues that fiction
works by encouraging readers to believe that they are voluntarily suspending their
disbelief, which protects them from a sense of delusion. A similar process occurs when,
for example, we see Perry Mason arguing that a dog should be indicted for assault, as he
does in “The Case of the Golden Oranges.” Most viewers likely accept this representation
as tongue-in-cheek and would not profess to think that such indictments occur in the real
world. But when we watch Mason approach the bench to talk to the judge or refer to
historical legal precedent, we also absorb these procedures as verisimilitudinous and
reflective of real-world legal proceedings in form if not in content.412 Perry Mason
constantly maneuvers between these two poles, maintaining a sense that it is representing
real American legal procedure even as it obviously rejects other basic tenets of
verisimilitude.
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For the creators of The Defenders, verisimilitude of criminal procedure was an
obvious way that they could distinguish their show from the already established Perry
Mason. The New York Times quoted Defenders producer Herbert Brodkin as saying that
his intention with The Defenders was to offer “a realistic portrayal of the legal profession
at work, dealing with real people involved with everyday-type problems. There will be
none of the unconvincing would-be detective work by attorneys and none of the lastminute-witness nonsense.”413 One way of ensuring this “realistic portrayal” was to turn to
experts: the Times reported that on the Defenders set, “[a] legal consultant stands by to
pass on all questions of legal procedures and technicalities.”414 (Consultation of experts
was not a new development for television: filmmakers from this era also consulted legal
experts, but the incorporation of this expertise was complicated by the Production Code
Administration’s ambivalence towards accurate representation, as shown in Chapter 3’s
discussion of the 1959 film Anatomy of a Murder.) Accuracy of procedural detail was
Brodkin’s chosen mode of asserting the show’s verisimilitude. Of course, accuracy is
only a potential economic advantage in a space where viewers take verisimilitude
seriously and would see verisimilitude as a reason to choose one show over another show
or over non-television activities).
The link between authenticity and boredom became a central issue for ELPs.
Erickson writes of the negative reaction to Perry Mason:
One block of viewers who weren’t entirely won over by Perry Mason were the
prosecuting attorneys of America, who took the series to task for creating the false
impression that defense lawyers were always right and DAs were always wrong—
and worse, that a genuine courtroom experience would automatically be as
exciting and suspenseful as what was seen on TV. More than one actual attorney
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griped that spectators and even jurors had approached him in mid-trial to
complain about the dullness of the proceedings and demand that he get on the
stick and force one of the witnesses to dissolve into tears.415
On the surface level, the lawyers’ complaints are about accuracy—“the false impression,”
“a genuine courtroom experience,” “an actual attorney.” These phrases create the
impression that it is a lack of fact that causes the problems. But on a deeper level, the
issue is one of aesthetics, not fact. The problem that real jurors face, and about which the
lawyers complain, is that television proceedings are “exciting” and “suspenseful,”
whereas the real proceedings are “dull.” It is easy to laugh at the jurors’ high
expectations, and in Erickson’s writing, this passage exists mainly as a humorous aside to
the more serious representation of Perry Mason’s success. However, the described realworld conflict between legal experts and viewer-jurors illustrates a unique conundrum of
the ELP aesthetic. Boredom was—and remains—an important affect for the legal
procedural. The idea of boredom as proof of realism can be traced back at least to
Dragnet, which sought to convey verisimilitude by representing supposedly authentic
details of “drudgery,” “mundane small talk,” and “waiting” around. Not only is such
boredom more accurate to the real experience of courtroom life, but boredom can also
convey authority, expertise, and predictability.
The representation of boredom in literature is often understood as a critical
postmodern phenomenon, best embodied in the works of David Foster Wallace,
especially his posthumous work The Pale King. Tony Tulathimutte describes The Pale
King as “entertaining (pun extremely intended) a connection between the experience of
boredom and profound meaning.”416 In a slightly different reading of Wallace, scholar
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Ralph Clare sees the boredom in The Pale King as symptomatic of late capitalism: “It is
precisely this boredom as cultural ‘malaise’ that leaves people desperate for stimulation
in the form of ever-newer products and images, and susceptible to going along with the
cash flow, so to speak.”417 This Baudrillardian formulation, in which overstimulation
generates boredom and indifference, is indicative of the usual way in which the
relationship between boredom and entertainment has been conceptualized in literary
theory. Boredom is simultaneously the unavoidable result of late capitalism and mass
media, and an affective trance that people must resist through concentration; in Wallace’s
formulation, Clare writes, “giving in to boredom is ultimately irresponsible and
childish.”418 The link between childhood and boredom is repeated in Ramsey Scott’s
intentionally opaque “epistolary” essay on boredom and the Hardy Boys series, which
posits boredom as a kind of adolescent crevasse into which people tumble when they do
not work hard enough to be distracted.419 These descriptions of boredom demonstrate
what Patricia Meyer Sparks notes as the tendency to see boredom as an ethical matter.
Despite their pervasiveness, boredom’s ethical dimensions are ambiguous and
contradictory: Sparks writes that boredom can signify either “moral superiority (as in
D.H. Lawrence’s Birkin) or moral inadequacy (Grandcourt in Daniel Deronda, Gilbert
Osmond in The Portrait of a Lady).”420
The key difficulty for creators is that boredom and entertainment are antithetical,
which makes it difficult to represent boredom in an interesting way. As Tulathimutte says
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of Wallace, “The Pale King’s glaring artistic challenge is that discussing boredom with
any mimetic fidelity forces you to be boring, and reading demands the very concentration
that boredom undermines.”421 As a result, authors must turn to specific rhetorical
techniques in order to create a feeling of boredom while simultaneously entertaining the
reader enough that they will continue reading. Tulathimutte writes,
So let’s look at the stylistic maneuvers Wallace employs to keep the reader
engaged. Generally, his approach is polyphonic: high-contrast variations of style,
tone, perspective, diction, lexicon, length, and narrative mode. […]
As a stylist, Wallace is notorious for mixing registers of formality, dialect,
specialty slang, and extended vocabularies.422
Tulathimutte goes on to describe how Wallace uses a “braiding approach” to digress in a
way that does not distract the reader, and how the scale of polyphony increases
exponentially as the book moves on, creating a sense of tension.423 In the aforementioned
essay, Ramsey Scott reproduces boredom through polysyllables, jargon, circularity, and
repetition. Virginia Woolf uses similar techniques in Mrs. Dalloway to conjure the
aimlessness of Clarissa Dalloway’s life. These writers use a free-flowing, stream-ofconsciousness approach, portraying boredom as a constant distracted buzzing of the
protagonist’s or narrator’s mind, an effort to entertain oneself, which allows the buzzing
to be converted into entertainment for the reader.
ELPs use some of these same rhetorical tricks for creating an aesthetics of
boredom, but they reject others. For example, ELPs often feature jargon and repetition.
On the other hand, they repudiate stream-of-consciousness as a technique for three main
reasons. First, the technique is difficult to reproduce in film (although many experimental
films have succeeded) and even more difficult to market to audiences seeking a
421
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repeatable and cathartic narrative experience. Second, stream-of-consciousness would
undermine the ELPs’ desire to show legal procedure as orderly and formulaic. Third,
while modernist and postmodern texts evoke boredom as an existential condition and in
order to critique the nature of human experience under late capitalism, ELPs use boredom
as a lever into verisimilitude and to communicate the moral authority of the legal system.
In the same way that authors such as Woolf, Wallace, and Scott used specific
formal elements to evoke boredom in a compelling way, midcentury ELPs developed a
range of strategies to trade on boredom’s implications of realism while simultaneously
keeping the audience engaged with the show. I characterize six primary strategies that
ELPs used to produce the illusion of boredom while also entertaining the viewer.
(1) Manipulation of cultural expectations. To produce the illusion of boredom,
midcentury ELPs build upon viewer expectations that the law is boring. Jokes about
lawyers’ pedantry or meticulousness are a well-established trope in American culture,
and they are also common through these texts.
(2) Sober tone. Also to produce the illusion of boredom, ELPs emphasize a dry
tone. Attorney characters wear somber suits (with the exception of Perry Mason’s
horrifically ugly plaid suit in the show’s first episode), speak earnestly, and always
remain focused on the legal matter at hand. Humor is not a frequent player in ELPs. If
they crack jokes, as Larry sometimes does in The Defenders, they are genteel and wry—
the kind of joke that generates smiles rather than laughs. If the attorney-protagonist’s
charm and wit sometimes presses the courtroom scene too far towards humor, the judge
character usually swoops in to assert the solemnity of the proceedings. As one judge says
in an episode of Arrest and Trial, “Gentleman, is it not possible to have a sober serious
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trial by law here, rather than another trial of mental agility?”424 This emphasis on a sober
tone is related to, and likely influenced by, the Production Code Administration’s
admonitions about tone in cinematic representations of trials, as described in Chapter 3.
(3) Sensational crime. To increase entertainment value, ELPs redirect attention
to the crime committed. Law may be boring, but its violation is not. Whether by spending
screen time showing the crime being committed, by referring to media frenzies around
the trial, or by showing lawyers interacting with traumatized victims, ELPs interrupt the
dry tone of the legal proceedings by redirecting attention to the original crime’s
sensational circumstances. (This attentive mediation of the amount of crime that needs to
be shown could potentially be likened to film studios’ calibration of sensationalism in
reaction to the Production Code’s admonition against glamorizing crime, but further
archival research on this subject is required to make any definitive statement of
connection.) Journalist Dahlia Lithwick describes how journalism misrepresents crime by
focusing on “the most unusual, sex-based, gruesome crimes” because these stories are
more likely to be deemed newsworthy. A crime’s newsworthiness is judged, Lithwick
writes, not on its averageness, but rather on a slew of characteristics that represent
unaverage crime.425 Similarly, while the crimes represented in ELPs are framed as
representative, especially in shows such as Dragnet, there is always some element of the
crime that makes it narratively unusual—whether that is the defendant’s youth, the
crime’s viciousness, the attorney’s own relationship to the crime, or a unique legal
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quibble. The ELP retains viewer interest by investing in this aberrational element, which
constitutes the variation in the formula.
(4) Relevance claims. ELPs also increase entertainment value by underscoring
the subject’s relationship to the viewer’s life. Twentieth- and twenty-first-century
audiences for legal procedurals understand that the representation of the law, especially if
it is accurate (or perceived to be accurate), can be of immediate relevance to their daily
lives. Lithwick adds that when journalists assess a crime’s newsworthiness, they consider
not only the crime’s exceptional elements, as outlined above, but also “the readers’ sense
of how likely they are to be affected by a similar crime.”426 A sense of proximity to the
represented crime naturally increases readers’ fear and excitement about the
representation. Legal procedurals play on a similar instinct, presenting themselves as a
means of learning more about the criminal justice system, in order to attract viewers. This
educational promise, which I will describe more shortly, would have been especially
potent in the mid-twentieth century, when laws were changing rapidly and the legal
procedural genre was still emergent, so the law seemed especially opaque.
(5) Polyphony. In the same way that Wallace (in Tulathimutte’s description) uses
polyphony to keep the reader “engaged” while also creating a sense of excess that mimics
boredom. ELPs use an equivalent technique, often choosing to turn witnesses into
colorful minor characters with exaggerated accents and backgrounds. Their testimony
provides variation in the courtroom scenes without detracting from the realism of the
process described. The exaggeration of these characters and their different voices is made
even more marked by the relative sobriety of the attorneys. A particularly good example
of this phenomenon is The Defenders, which features a wide range of secondary
426
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characters with often impressive acting chops, to whom Larry responds with unwavering
sincerity, empathy, and staidness.
(6) Narrative interweaving. ELPs weave their boring tonal choices into a
narrative structure to which audiences are conditioned to respond. Periods of dry tone and
legal jargon are interrupted by representations of emotion at intervals that produce a
sense of climax. Victims’ testimonies, criminals’ confessions, and attorneys’
identification with the episode’s central thematic issue are all common moments in the
ELP structure, during which the camera zooms in for a close-up of the emoting face in
order to increase the viewer’s emotional connection to the character. Not only are these
narrative structures and strategies already culturally instilled in audiences because they
are common to many fictional texts, but the reproduction of those narrative structures in
the ELP formula further trains viewers to expect them in this particular genre, and then to
respond accordingly.
Through these strategies, midcentury ELPs exhibit a patchwork of didacticism
and realism, two modes that some scholars have considered antithetical. Building on
Erich Auerbach’s work on mimesis, Brook Thomas defines realism as a type of literature
that posits contractual, horizontally ordered relationships between characters and between
author and reader. To read realist texts is to enter a space where such relations are true: as
Thomas writes, “Readers who enter such a world participate in a moral economy in
which people potentially stand on an equal footing with one another.”427 In its didactic
impulse, the realism presented in ELPs is in some ways closer to sentimentalism than the
nineteenth-century tradition of realism. Differentiating realism from sentimentalism,
Thomas writes,
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Recently some critics have argued that the sentimentalists’ detailed portrayal of
everyday, domestic life qualifies them as realists. Rich in verisimilitude, their
descriptions, nonetheless, continue to be ordered by their authors’ faith in a
transcendental, usually religious, moral order. The realists’ technical innovations
helped to free their presentations from subordination to such an order.428
ELPs may well fail this definition’s test of realism. The kind of order described in ELPs
is not religious, but it is moral, organized around the assumptions that there is such a
thing as justice and that this justice can be obtained through the American court system.
But the concept of realism is important to ELPs, as we can see in the strength of the
reality claims intended by ELP producers, made within the shows, and received by
audiences. ELPs therefore call for a new conceptualization of realism in which the
imagination of a horizontally ordered society where individuals are on an “equal footing”
is enabled by different means. Rather than structuring the text-reader relationship
horizontally, obscuring the author’s own moral attachments, ELPs elaborate a vertical
structure of governmental authority in which submission to that authority is,
paradoxically, what enables the standardization of criminal procedure and equal
treatment under due process.
Those same reality claims also signal the ELP’s deviation from Cawelti’s
definition of formula as inherently escapist:
Since the pleasure and effectiveness of an individual formulaic work depends on
its intensification of a familiar experience, the formula creates its own world with
which we become familiar by repetition. We learn in this way how to experience
this imaginary world without continually comparing it with our own experience.
Thus, as we shall see in a few moments, formulaic literature is a most appropriate
vehicle for the experiences of escape and relaxation.429
The first sentence of this analysis undoubtedly applies to the ELP, which repeats a
formula, intensifies its experience, and creates an identifiable and consistent fictional
428
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world. The second sentence’s applicability to the ELP is more questionable. Through a
variety of techniques for constructing realism, the ELP did indeed invite viewers to
“continually compar[e] it to our own experience”—and, in situations where the viewer
did not have direct experience with the criminal justice system, the ELP presented itself
as an educational authority on the subject. The ELP genre came to depend on a
combination of formulaic predictability and claims of real-world relevance that, despite
their apparently contradictory nature, were in this generic instance mutually constitutive.
Through these paradoxical strategies of representation, ELPs developed a shared
pattern of realism that eventually became a self-fulfilling prophecy. At a certain point, the
ELP became a recognizable enough genre that one ELP’s resemblance to another
constituted its own form of a reality claim. Brook Thomas writes of nineteenth-century
American realism, “in literary criticism too many critics continue to assume that realists
try to find language that corresponds to a preexisting reality. Far from assuming the
existence of a self-contained reality that can be seized, the realists that I treat present
reality as a process-in-the making.”430 Likewise, ELPs were constantly inventing their
own reality and realism. Once ELPs had incorporated verisimilitude into their genre
brand, the mere fact of a procedure being represented in an ELP signaled to the viewer—
even the viewer who had entered the episode in Gallagher’s spirit of spirit of ‘ironic’
assent” —that they should take it as real.

Defense Attorneys and Gideon
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Unlike later adaptations such as Law and Order, which focus on prosecutors,
midcentury ELPs focus on the legal defense of the criminal—not their prosecution. The
protagonists of 1960s’ ELPs are the defense attorneys: Perry Mason in that eponymous
show, Jack Egan in Arrest and Trial, and the Prestons in The Defenders. These defense
attorneys are smart, charming, empathetic, and often handsome. Viewers get to know
these characters almost exclusively through a professional context: while we sometimes
meet their friends, romantic interests, and family members, these hints at external lives
are cursory and diegetically secondary to the episode’s criminal case. They are heroes,
but their heroism is first and foremost of a professional kind. In shows like Perry Mason,
where Perry Mason always defends an innocent person and wins the case, the focus on
the defense amounts to the continual portrayal of the prosecution’s incompetence at worst
and irrelevance at best. Perhaps unexpectedly, although that implicit critique of the police
seems to run counter to the PCA’s insistence that police officers were represented
positively in film, Perry Mason’s overall structure still manages to endorse a PCAfriendly positive view of the justice system. The Homicide detective Lieutenant Tragg
and the district attorney Hamilton Burger are framed as allies of Mason’s to the extent
that they are all participating in a quest for justice, but the structure requires that they be
bested by Mason along the way. Leitch writes that in the quasi-family structure proposed
by Perry Mason, Burger and Tragg fulfill the roles of havoc-wreaking wife and crotchety
uncle, respectively, and zeroes in on how the second season ends by “restoring the
wayward prosecutor to the family unit.”431 In Perry Mason, all participants in the
criminal justice system act in good faith, but in comparison to the prosecution, Mason is
smarter and more moral. Even when he is undertaking illegal or potentially unethical
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tasks on behalf of his client, his questionable behavior is ultimately justified by the
expected truth of his client’s innocence.432 It is Burger and Tragg who in Leitch’s
formulation must be reincorporated into the family following Mason’s inevitable win.
This structure, where in the end Mason rightly triumphs over the nevertheless wellmeaning Burger, lays out a scenario in which the adversarial justice system is a system of
checks and balances that, especially when a particularly devoted defense attorney serves
as the “check,” will ultimately come to the just decision.
One of the most important decisions of the due process system was Gideon v.
Wainwright (1963), which slightly postdates the emergence of the ELP formula. Gideon
v. Wainwright federalized the right to court-appointed legal representation, following a
case in which a man named Clarence Earl Gideon was charged with a breaking and
entering felony in Florida, requested a court-appointed attorney, and was denied because
under Florida law the court would only appoint attorneys in capital cases. Gideon
defended himself, was found guilty, and was then sentenced to five years in prison. He
filed a habeas corpus petition that eventually reached the Supreme Court, which reversed
their relatively recent finding in Betts v. Brady (1942) and held that the state had a duty
under the Fourteenth Amendment to appoint counsel in any criminal trial.433 The
circumstances generating the Betts and Gideon cases were nearly identical, but the
findings were opposite; the fact that the Court could issue such different decisions within
just over twenty years indicates the speed and totality with which the due process
revolution took place. The shift was so extreme that the Gideon decision suggested that
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Betts was a complete deviation from the Court’s earlier “well considered precedents” and
that the right to court-appointed counsel was “obvious”:
In returning to these old precedents, sounder, we believe, than the new, we but
restore constitutional principle established to achieve a fair system of justice. Not
only these precedents, but also reason and reflection, require us to recognize that,
in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and
federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try
defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed
essential to protect the public’s interest in an orderly society. […] That
government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that
lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged
with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials
in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and
national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be
realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a
lawyer to assist him.434
The language of the decision indicates a sense that the extension of the due process
revolution to the issue of court-appointed representation was inevitable, while the
repeated invocations of money (“vast sums of money,” “luxuries,” “the poor man”)
foreground the problem of financial resources as a source of inequality. Whereas some
other key cases in the due process revolution imagined a trial’s “fairness” in terms of the
relationship of the police to the defendant (Mapp v. Ohio and illegal search and seizure,
for example), Gideon strove specifically to establish fairness as equal treatment between
defendants across socioeconomic lines. In keeping with Gideon, ELPs often argue that
the mere fact of representation, even if the party is guilty, is a moral requirement. A
relative of this argument can be seen in The Defenders episode “The Iron Man,” where
the Prestons are asked by a friend to defend a neo-Nazi student who is charged with
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inciting an assault through violent invectives. Several characters discourage Larry
Preston from representing him, but with his usual cool certainty, he insists that living in a
country with free speech requires defending even people whose ideas are anathema to
you.435 (That situation does not involve court-appointment, but many of the Prestons’
other cases do.)
Across the board, the defense attorneys in midcentury ELPs are dedicated to their
jobs, often endangering their own personal relationships in order to protect their client
from conviction. In one episode of Arrest and Trial, Jack Egan declines to take a case
because of his crowded schedule, leading the accused’s father to ask, “You don’t care?”
In response, Egan replies, “I didn’t say that, Mr. Sanchez. I said I’m not taking any new
clients.”436 While defendants or their relatives may initially believe the attorneyprotagonist is detached, uncaring, or distant, by the end of the episode these assumptions
have always been contradicted, as the attorney has gone to every possible length to
ensure the defendant’s release. In addition to their devotion and moral integrity, the
attorney-protagonists are also exceptionally gifted; other characters frequently refer to
them as the best attorneys one could possibly have. In that same Arrest and Trial episode,
Jack Egan’s former law professor receives the following toast before agreeing to defend
the accused: “To the man who wrought more miracles in the courtroom, shook more
cobwebs out of the law, made more judges go back to their homework, the grand old man
of American jurisprudence, a lawyer who never once in his long and brilliant career
failed to measure up to the one qualification: the best there is: Andrew Sheridan.”437 In
the real world, inadequate assistance of counsel is a primary grounds for appeal post435
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conviction; but in the ELP world, all lawyers are adequate. Even if the defense attorney
did lose the case and the accused were convicted (which rarely happens), by showing us
the defense attorney’s competence, the show implicitly precludes a primary basis for
appeal. Each episode thus exhausts the possibility of continuation and insists that the
matter has, in one way or another, been thoroughly resolved. Not only does the episodic
form prevent the ELP from showing what happens after a trial, but ELP content also tells
us that post-trial work is irrelevant and thus creates the illusion that the episodic form
fully represents each case, from beginning to end.

Goodness of Law and Episode Outcomes
As I described in the dissertation’s introduction, legal procedurals feature both
procedural and ideological education. The ELP represents the pinnacle of procedural
education, which intensifies the subconscious effects of the ideological education also
noticeable in other media. In previous chapters, I have described how midcentury legal
procedurals across media manifested the ideology of the due process revolution by
presenting institutional justice as fundamentally just and consistent with liberal views of
individual rights. In ELPs, the ideological phenomenon became fully codified as a
repeatable and distinguishing element of the genre. As the form calcified, ELPs
demonstrated a natural tension between episodic form and the ideology of the criminal
rights movement. On one hand, these defense-centered shows naturally emphasized a
fairly progressive view of criminal rights, because they often sided with the accused and
saw the wrongfully accused as suffering under a flawed system. In this sense, they would
seem to support the drastic changes to the criminal justice system occurring under the
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Warren Court. On the other hand, the episodic structure did not easily allow for
alterations to the criminal justice system, because such alterations would have required
corresponding changes in the ELP’s content and form.
From the perspective of procedural education, the issue is that the ELP presents
itself as a reliable source for information about the criminal justice system. For example,
in “The Benefactor” episode of The Defenders, defense attorney Larry has this exchange
with a witness who was having an illegal abortion at the time the doctor was arrested:
ELEANOR: I’m not sure I’m supposed to talk to you.
LARRY: Why not?
ELEANOR: Well, the district attorney’s office called me and asked me to testify
against Dr. Montgomery.
LARRY: Are you a complaining witness?
ELEANOR: I don’t know, what is it?
LARRY: Have you a grievance against Dr. Montgomery?
ELEANOR: No.
LARRY: Well, you see, as far as the district attorney is concerned, you’re a
material witness. That means you were present when the alleged crime took
place.438
Here, Larry literally explains to Eleanor the meaning of unfamiliar legal jargon. Eleanor
here is a barely concealed stand-in for the viewer, who is assumed to have limited
knowledge about the terminology of criminal justice. The actor playing Eleanor
emphasizes this educational dynamic by playing the scene with an earnest, innocent
expression, her brow constantly furrowed in confusion. What appears to be a
conversation between characters thus actually functions first and foremost a message for
the audience. The frequency of this trope cannot be overstated: it recurs constantly across
ELPs, from the midcentury to the present day. But the validity of this procedural
education depends not only on the accuracy at the time the script is written, but also on
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the stability of that particular procedural form over time. In the case above, for example,
if the distinction between material witness and complaining witness were to change, the
exchange would lose its relevancy claim.
Meanwhile, on the level of ideological education, Arrest and Trial describes
obedience to the law as a moral imperative. In the pilot episode “Call It A Lifetime,”
deluged by callers upset that he is defending a cop-killer, Egan tells his assistant to tell
them “to imagine themselves in Jared’s position, and would they like to be deprived of
due process?”439 In such questions, the anonymous callers function as a stand-in for the
audience, instructing them to empathize and reminding them that due process is a basic
expectation in the American social contract. Similarly, in the same article that
distinguished The Defenders from Perry Mason on the basis of its accuracy and lack of
melodrama, reviewer Alfred Clark wrote that although The Defenders would differentiate
itself through “the twist that Preston & Preston does not win every case it tries,” it would
also follow a clear pattern of moral revelation: “When they lose a case and a possible
client, a moral will be pointed out, each will learn something about human nature and
gain deeper insight into his fellow man.”440
At the same time, ELPs often demonstrate susurrations of a divide between moral
justice and institutional justice along the fault line of procedural regularity. In Arrest and
Trial, Jack Egan frequently delivers short speeches about either criminal rights or the role
of the defense attorney. In the episode “Isn’t It A Lovely View?,” Jack Egan explains to a
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defendant who has confessed to murder why he is defending him despite knowing that he
is guilty: “I’m interested only in protecting your legal rights,” he says. “Your conscience
is your own problem.”441 These murmurings of discord were, however, were usually
quieted by the episode’s ending, which unified moral and legal justice in the service of a
message about the criminal justice system’s basic goodness. Mark Alvey alludes to this
arc when writing about The Defenders’ representation of the law as
…resilient, manifesting a dogged optimism, acknowledging the flaws of the
system, but affirming its merits—that is, its ability to change and its potential for
compassion. The Prestons wearily admitted that the system was not perfect, but
they returned each week to embrace it because of its potential for justice—and
because it is the only system “we” have (a point that has become almost a cliché
on such subsequent legal dramas as L.A. Law and Law and Order). It was this
slender thread of optimism that enabled the defenders to continue their pursuit of
justice one case at a time.442
Despite its supposed admission that the “system was not perfect,” and even though the
Prestons sometimes represent guilty parties and sometimes lose cases, The Defenders still
reaffirms the overall sense that the system works. For example, in the abortion-provider
episode “The Benefactor,” the defendant always knows he will be found guilty.
Eventually, he is, and the judge offers a lenient sentence. But despite the Prestons’ loss
and the sentencing against a sympathetic defendant, the show implies that this solution
was the correct legal finding. The show advocates for a change in the law, but it does not
complain that the law was executed incorrectly. Likewise, in the aforementioned “Iron
Man” episode, the Prestons represent and ultimately exonerate a morally repulsive neoNazi because Larry perceives him as exercising his rights to free speech. Morality in such
instances becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy—because past episodes have proven Larry
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to be a fundamentally moral character, viewers are conditioned to trust him and to seek
out the moral high ground that he has already obtained. In this circular way, the
consistent repetition of the formula asks viewers to see each episode as further
confirmation of the formula.
The show’s very first episode focuses on a doctor who euthanizes a newborn with
Down Syndrome to save the child’s parents from a lifetime of bills and suffering. The
episode retains its shock value to this day, examining the different ethical claims from a
surprisingly nuanced perspective—portraying the doctor as noble while also drawing
comparisons to Nazi Germany. Its arguments are dated; its basic claim that a child with
Down’s Syndrome would have a painful and nearly inhuman life is not challenged until
the episode’s final moments, when it is revealed that the prosecutor had a disabled
brother who died at a young age. Even then, the disabled child is only cast as the object
of the assistant district attorney’s love, not as a conscious individual or an individual with
ethical autonomy. This omission enables a fairly sympathetic treatment of what was then
called a “mercy killing.” That sympathetic treatment would have run directly against the
PCA guidelines for “mercy killing” representations that had caused such trouble for The
Crime of Dr. Forbes back in 1934.
In a jailhouse conference that occurs early on in “The Benefactor,” Larry asks the
defendant, Dr. Montgomery, why he provided abortions. In the ensuing exchange,
Montgomery and Larry lay out the ethical quandary that the doctor faces in performing
these illegal abortions:
MONTGOMERY: But there were times when I felt it would have been sinful to
refuse to help.
LARRY: When was that?
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MONTGOMERY: When I’d sit across my desk from a teenage girl who’d made a
terrible mistake and had nowhere to turn. Try to imagine that predicament.
Accidentally pregnant, yet not strong enough or mature enough to want the child.
On the one side, the law says that she must have the baby. On the other, her
parents, relatives, society in general condemns and ostracizes her if she does as
the law demands. If she has the baby she’s ruined, if she doesn’t she’s breaking
the law.
LARRY: This country is run by laws, doctor. Why did you decide to break the
law?
MONTGOMERY: I couldn’t think about the law. I was faced with unhappy
suffering people. Human beings who were alone and afraid. They’d come to me
because I could help them. Because I had the training and the ability to help them.
LARRY: You also had a responsibility, doctor.
MONTGOMERY: A responsibility to whom? To the people who can’t forgive a
mistake? Or to the victims of that mistake?
LARRY: All right, doctor. I can tell that to the jury.
Here, the show enacts the controversy that it engages, placing Montgomery and Larry on
opposing sides of the debate in this scene. Although both sides are presented alongside
one another, the show also quite openly endorses Montgomery’s actions and does
everything possible to convince the viewer of Montgomery’s ethics or, as Larry later calls
them, “principles.” The show clarifies this allegiance by having Montgomery speak in
great detail about his stance, urging Larry (and by extension the viewer) into an
imaginative exercise designed to cultivate empathy for Montgomery’s patients.
Meanwhile, Larry’s invocations of the law remain short and highly abstract—“this
country is run by laws,” “you also had a responsibility”—rooted in generalization rather
than the specific situation. This rhetoric distances the viewer from the argument, and so it
comes as no surprise when Montgomery swiftly wins Larry over to his side. At least, he
wins him over as a lawyer: Larry explicitly here says that he is searching for a legal
argument that he can “tell to the jury,” reminding us that his role is to represent rather
than to agree. Later, he explicitly says that he is unsure whether he agrees with
Montgomery’s actions, though he respects his conviction.

249

The pattern of elaborating one side of the argument and curtailing the other is
repeated during the trial that comes later in the episode. There, Larry examines witnesses
in great detail, asking about their lives and motivations and giving them space to tell their
individual stories. The district attorney, by contrast, aims to exclude their testimony—it is
worth thinking here about the structure of evidence exclusion discussed in Chapter 2 of
this dissertation—and asks witnesses only two questions: whether an abortion was
performed, and whether Montgomery performed that abortion. Those two questions get
to the legal truth of what happened, whereas Larry seeks something more nuanced. Based
on the witnesses’ testimony, the court finds Montgomery guilty, although the jury
foreman then interjects that they would like to ask the court for leniency. Montgomery
then confirms to Larry that he always knew he would be convicted; as he had previously
mentioned, he wants to use this trial as a way to express his claims and help generate a
cultural discussion. The judge takes the jury’s recommendation into account and gives
Montgomery a suspended sentence, meaning that he will go free unless he commits
another crime. The trial’s resolution thus manages to serve both legal and moral justice,
as the law finds Montgomery guilty on a factual level, but then grants him mercy in a
way that is pleasing “on a personal level,” as the district attorney puts it.
Like other midcentury ELPs, The Defenders displays a favorable representation
of the legal system as a whole. Individuals acting within the system behave with decorum
and respect. The district attorney prosecuting the case is on friendly terms with Larry
despite their opposition in the courtroom; the judge, who appears faintly amused by the
entire proceeding, listens to each objection and offers fair responses. During the voir dire,
prospective jurors who have pre-existing prejudices are excused, and the ones who stay
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display self-possession and awareness of their gravity of their role. So although viewers
are told that “the law” can do further harm to “unhappy suffering people,” they are also
told that there are good individuals within the system who will work to ensure that the
fairest possible verdict is reached. Brodkin insisted that the Defenders would differ from
Perry Mason in that the protagonists would not win all the cases; nevertheless, although
Larry and his son do nominally lose this case, they seem pleased with the eventual
outcome and everyone involved in the decision has put a great deal of thought into their
actions.
One contemporaneous reviewer’s mixed reaction to “The Benefactor” episode
illustrates what a delicate balancing act this moralizing didacticism could be.
Disappointed that the episode “simplif[ied] content to fit dramatic objectives,” New York
Times reviewer Jack Gould wrote:
Where ‘The Benefactor’ was less than satisfactory […] was in the handling of the
trial of the doctor. The legal by-play between the defense attorney, prosecutor and
judge was treated as if the proceedings were a diverting little game. The injection
of a reporter who smeared the front page of his newspaper with the testimony of a
minor was absurd. And the presentation of the glamorous fashion model who
decided to keep her child put cheap courtroom trickery above serious substance.
[…]
By encasing the doctor in such an elaborate framework of sympathy, “The
Benefactor” only detracted from its own vigor and significance. The crossexamination of the doctor should have been a sociological tour de force in what
could have been a memorable courtroom scene. As it was, the doctor never was
put to any genuine intellectual or moral challenge. Instead, the dénoument [sic]
came with the pat slickness common to Saturday night’s trite legal dramas.443
On one hand, Gould criticized The Defenders for resorting to “cheap courtroom trickery”
and “the pat slickness” of “trite legal dramas.” On the other hand, he seemed to see the
courtroom as a good candidate for the site of a “genuine intellectual or moral challenge”
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and saw the “legal by-play” as insufficiently solemn. Ultimately, what seems to have
bothered Gould about the episode is not its heavy-handed moralism (to which twentyfirst-century viewers might take exception), but the sense that the show undermined its
own promise of moral authority.
The ELP embodies two forms of national consolidation: the standardization of
criminal rights on a national scale, and the emergence of television, a homogenized massmedia engine that broadcast standardized cultural images into households across the
country. The ELP twists these two developments together, using the broad national form
of television to deliver an account of criminal justice that, although set in recognizable
metropolitan communities (namely, Los Angeles or New York), can be easily generalized
to the rest of the United States. Unlike the regionally specific views of justice presented
in 1930s literature, which depicted mob justice as morally questionable but narratively
compelling, the episodic legal procedural depends on predictability and repetition to
propel viewers forward through a largely sanitized, standardized narrative of state-run
justice. Seen in concert, the twinned trajectories of the criminal rights movement and the
television legal procedural suggest that midcentury audiences felt a cultural desire for
standardization, uniformity, and predictability from both their criminal justice system and
their entertainment. The ELP became a valuable vehicle for the transmission of that
predictability. The genre built upon the homogeneous nature of the new medium of
broadcast television in order to “prove” to viewers that their justice systems were
uniform; in turn, courts and legislative bodies found themselves having to live up to the
expectations of uniformity that ELPs set.
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In later ELPs from the 1990s and 2000s, such as Law and Order, the episodes
often end with a police officer or prosecutor staring uneasily into the distance after a trial,
wondering if justice has been served or observing the continued tragedy (a family’s grief,
another murder). While the diegetic trial is completed, the show retains a thread of
dissatisfaction that encourages the viewer to tune in next week. In contrast, midcentury
ELPs tend to omit these moments of unease. The standardized midcentury representations
ultimately promote a positive view of the justice system as a system that successfully
solves crimes, punishes the guilty, and exonerates the innocent. Each episode of the
midcentury ELP stands alone and provides closure, reassuring the viewer that the trauma
that crime does to the collective consciousness can be resolved within forty-five or ninety
minutes. The charismatic and morally upstanding defense attorneys at the center of the
midcentury ELP are the agents of this closure; by the end of each episode, they have
reaffirmed the essential rightness of the system, resolved the issue, and cleared the docket
for the next week’s case. Because this process repeated and repeats on a weekly basis,
showing the defense attorney’s step-by-step movements and the incredible emotional and
temporal investment he makes in each character, the midcentury ELP lends itself to a
vision of the criminal justice system as deliberate, careful, and deeply concerned about
the criminal’s rights and treatment under the law. Thanks to the socio-historical and
medium-specific conditions of its emergence, the ELP formula therefore contained
intrinsic conservative and pro-state elements, such that even individual shows that
experimented with more controversial material were fundamentally invested in
presenting the American criminal justice as rigorous, standardized, and fundamentally
good. At best, the ELP’s vision of a uniform and positive justice system could be a tool
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for holding the government accountable for deviations from the routine. At worst, it
could enforce a sense of the justice system as finished and impenetrable, negating past
activist efforts and discouraging future ones.

254

CODA

When I began this project three years ago, I wanted to understand why fictional
representations of courtrooms followed such fixed patterns of representation, and how
those representations have influenced popular understandings about criminal procedure.
During the intervening years, I have made progress towards the first goal by connecting
the formula’s development to the standardization of criminal procedure. But the second
has remained elusive, continually changing form and slipping out of reach. It is nearly
impossible for literary methodologies to measure texts’ impact on any given person in
any empirical way, and the effort to measure an impact on a group of people—with
diverse lived experiences, different connections to American identity and to the criminal
justice system, and myriad modes of consuming cultural production—is even more
hopeless. The more I have worked on this project, the more I have realized the futility of
trying to articulate how different authors, readers, viewers, filmmakers, lawyers, judges,
defendants, victims, jurors, and passersby have internalized and externalized the
ideological tenets of criminal due process.
That statement may seem obvious, and many literary critics may well read that
paragraph and point out that literary studies has not ever really purported to be able to do
the kind of analysis I wanted to be able to do. My desire to gain concrete insight into the
ways in which texts influence readers was contiguous to a wish to somehow prove the
relevance of the humanities to its doubters, a desperation I know that many other scholars
share, given the current political climate and university funding situation. But despite the
triteness of that observation, I want to acknowledge my naïveté here not only in order to
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acknowledge how my ways of thinking about this project have shifted over the years, but
also because, in a project about the standardization of procedure and the standardization
of formula, it seems especially crucial to acknowledge the perpetual nonstandardness of
ideology, even an ideology that claims standardization as its end goal. That heterogeneity
of influence and experience can be seen on the level of the individual text, where authors
working within similar historical and discursive constraints nevertheless create distinctive
texts that resist the legal procedural genre even as they contribute to its codification. It
also occurs, more invisibly, on the level of the individual reading and viewing
experience, where audiences can accept or reject, both consciously and unconsciously,
the claims that are made by whichever of these texts they happen to pick up or turn on.
Often, the contradictions between texts indicate a change, controversy, or tension
that structures the legal procedural genre. For example, one noticeable difference in texts
is where they place the blame when morality and institutional justice fail to align, as they
do in the situation of wrongful convictions. Texts such as To Kill a Mockingbird or Blues
for Mister Charlie frame wrongful convictions as the fault of systemic racism that is then
expressed through the judge or jury. In shows such as Perry Mason, however, if a person
risks wrongful conviction, it is usually because they are a victim of circumstance or have
been framed by the real criminal. Similarly, while some texts show the wrongfully
accused being exonerated by a fair justice system, other texts show wrongful convictions
and use them as levers to criticize the justice system. Some texts openly criticize the
racism ingrained in the justice system (Baldwin) and others perpetuate the racism through
their choice of point of view (most episodes of episodic legal procedurals), while still
others do both simultaneously (Faulkner and Lee). Variations between texts, of which
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these are only a few examples, point towards embedded anxieties about the relative
goodness of the legal system, as well as concerns about the potential curtailment or
granting of individual rights within that system. As different legal procedurals take
different approaches to these issues, the genre as an accumulation of texts becomes
characterized by a dialectical relationship between corruption and moral integrity,
individual rights and institutional power, equality and personalization. These dialectics
then influence readers’ understanding of the “contract” they form with the legal
procedural genre and the expectations they have when they encounter a specific legal
procedural.
As I move forward with this project, there are several ways in which I hope to
expand and nuance my research. First, on the level of methodology, I want to incorporate
more types of legal and historical evidence. Simon Stern, in arguing that we should teach
law and literature using “tools internal to each discipline,”444 has observed that literary
critics tend to obsess over legal decisions, especially Supreme Court decisions, to an
extent disproportional to their influence and preponderance in law. In its current form,
this dissertation relies heavily on Supreme Court decisions, both because these decisions
were so influential and transformative in midcentury criminal law, and because they tend
to be more visible to the layperson than other forms of law, such as the statutes,
pleadings, and regulations that Stern names as the areas of law that are less narrative and
therefore underanalyzed in interdisciplinary work. On one hand, this visibility is precisely
what interests me: the idea that narrative inherently appeals to audiences and that, when
seeking out information about the law, they therefore gravitate towards narrative accounts
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of it, is a major explanation I see for legal procedurals’ popularity, as well as a reason
why it is so essential to study them. The importance of judicial opinions in this context is
also justified by legal scholars E. Thomas Sullivan and Toni M. Massaro’s argument that
judicial interpretation has been the most important mechanism for due process’s
development in American thought.445 That said, in future versions of this project, I plan
to move even deeper into the criminal procedure statutes and regulations that, although
less legible and monumental than Supreme Court decisions, were nevertheless formative
to individuals’ experiences of the criminal justice system during the mid-twentieth
century.
Second, on a similar methodological note, and with an eye toward addressing the
issue of influence raised at the beginning of this coda, I would like to conduct more oral
history interviews and surveys with individuals from various generations about how they
remember their initial encounters with criminal procedure and legal procedurals. I also
plan to incorporate data analyses of (a) the literary market for legal procedurals, and (b)
the censorship strategies of the Production Code Administration, based on Film Analysis
questionnaire sections related to crime and law. These kinds of big-data analyses have
proven difficult to accomplish for this version of the project, mostly due to obstacles in
assembling these corpuses and then running the relevant programs on them, but I believe
that this work will help illustrate both the scale of the genre’s growth and its reflection of
specific legal frameworks.
Third, I plan to dig further into the relationship between genre, medium, and
audience by better quantifying the imagined audiences for legal procedurals and
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investigating the different media ecologies in which legal procedurals are consumed. In
media studies, Jason Mittell has observed that the turn towards “audience studies” tends
to flatten the audience into a single unreal unit, collapsing group divisions and/or using
one group’s responses to stand in for those of all groups. In reality, of course, the
individuals watching a given show can differ in demographic terms as well as in terms of
their investment (fans vs. nonfans). As Mittell writes:
Is the audience only the people who watch a given program? Are people members
of an audience when they are not watching a show? […] Is the audience a
collection of individuals or only operative as a collective group? I will not answer
these questions definitively (as if I could), but consider them to demonstrate how
the object of audience studies is neither stable nor uniform—the assumptions
made upon embarking on audience studies construct a specific conception of the
audience as an analytical object.446
The ontological problem of audience haunts this dissertation, and although I have strived
for specificity where possible, there are also several zones that merit future consideration.
I am particularly interested in exploring legal procedurals’ place within the media
ecology of prisons, where technology and entertainment are highly regulated. That
regulation is nothing new: most remaining documentation of Perry Smith and Dick
Hickock’s time in prison during the 1960s is related to Hickock’s attempts to convince
the prison warden to give him and the other death row inmates a radio. Today, the range
of texts available in prison varies widely according to the institution’s regulations.
Prisons might ban hardcover books or violent films. Prisoners may all crowd around a
single television, creating a distinctive collective viewing environment. If there is a
prison library, the book selection may be determined through book donation programs,
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which take into account prisoner requests but also rely heavily on donors’ decisions about
which books to give away. The artificiality and uniqueness of this media environment is
important because it controls the resources that prisoners have to learn about the criminal
justice system after conviction (or pre-trial, if they are among the many American
prisoners who are detained for months or years before the trial takes place). Fictional
legal procedurals are therefore sometimes a primary resource for prisoners seeking
information about their rights, the appeals process, or other criminal procedures. In the
monograph version of this project, I hope to address this topic, especially as it relates to
procedurals’ didactic function.
Finally, also in terms of the content of the dissertation, I aim to expand this research
forward historically, tracking the changes to the legal procedural that occurred after the
end of the Warren Court and into the twenty-first century. Topics I plan to address in this
context include the expansion of prosecutorial power and plea deals in the 1970s and
1980s, the 1990s idea of “supercriminals,” the 2000s controversy over Guantánamo and
states of exception, the rise of private prisons, and the increasing awareness of mass
incarceration of African-American men. These historical developments dovetail with the
rise of legal thrillers by authors such as Scott Turow and John Grisham; the growth of
true-crime on television and in books such as Norman Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song;
and the rise of the serial legal procedural, such as the television shows The Wire or The
Night Of. In particular, recent years have seen a massive rise in the popularity of serial
true-crime legal procedural television shows, such as Making a Murderer, The Jinx, The
Keepers, Evil Genius, and equivalent podcasts such as Serial or S-Town. Similarly, there
has been an influx of literary representations of prisons aimed at critiquing the prison-

260

industrial context and the unfair court procedures that contribute to the problem: e.g.,
Jesmyn Ward’s Sing, Unburied, Sing; Tayari Jones’s An American Marriage; Rachel
Kushner’s The Mars Room; or Margaret Atwood’s The Heart Goes Last. Perhaps most
crucially, from the 1990s onwards, episodic legal procedurals became immensely
popular, although these versions centered around investigators and prosecutors. This
laundry list of texts and historical developments is unordered here, but in future study I
will arrange them alongside one another and situate them as the descendants of the
midcentury legal procedurals I have so far described.
Although the scope of this genre can sometimes be overwhelming, and although the
question of influence and ideological formation remains a thorny one, I keep coming
back to a basic anecdotal truth I have witnessed again and again: many Americans learn
about their criminal rights from television, film, and literature. Whether they have
memorized their Miranda rights by seeing Benson and Stabler make arrests on Law and
Order: Special Victims Unit, learned the obscure statutes behind legal controversies from
John Grisham, or envisioned jury deliberations as transformative experiences à la Twelve
Angry Men, people take up fictional representations of the law and—even when they
understand that these representations are in some way inaccurate or exaggerated—
incorporate them into their understanding of the criminal justice system that structures the
real world they live in. Our normalization of this educational process is illustrated by an
article published on Vulture about the 2016 HBO miniseries The Night Of, a legal
procedural about a young Pakistani man accused of a murder he does not remember
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committing (and, it turns out, did not commit).447 In their article, entitled “All the Dumb
Things Naz Does in The Night Of (So Far),” E. Alex Jung and Dee Lockett complain,
But scream all you want, dear viewer, because our naive protagonist has
apparently never watched an episode of Law & Order, Criminal Minds, The Wire,
or, for God’s sake, Bones in his entire existence. He’s a freshly hatched chick,
oblivious to the most basic rules of conduct after you’ve been arrested for a
crime.448
Their list of Naz’s mistakes includes actions such as “put the murder weapon in your
jacket pocket,” “agree to DNA testing,” and “talk to the cop!” Even the most sympathetic
viewer of The Night Of would admit that Jung and Lockett have a point: after all, the
entire first episode is rife with dramatic irony based on the assumption that viewers, welleducated in the aforementioned shows (one of which, The Wire, was also broadcast on
HBO), know Naz is making mistakes. The assumption that legal procedurals teach us
how to act correctly in the criminal justice system has so fully penetrated our culture that
it is evident in legal procedurals themselves. Continually generating its own authority, the
legal procedural disseminates information that can become entirely unmoored from
reality without risking its popularity. Unfortunately for the audience, the only way to
judge the accuracy of the legal procedural’s teachings is to face, or see a loved one face,
the criminal justice system in all its vast institutional power.
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